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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL
DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND KOREA, 1985-1995:
MOTIVES, ACTIONS, AND RESULTS
FEBURARY 2008
YEON HAN CHUNG
M.A., STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Ed. D., UMIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey W. Eiseman

Theoretically, the benefits of decentralization include the enhancement of
democratic participation and managerial efficiency, and the reduction of financial
deficiencies. Empirically, however, there is little consistent evidence supporting this
premise. The consequences of reform vary

in accordance with country-specific

conditions: they appear to be successful, mixed, or failed.
This study seeks to shed light on how the goals, strategies, and consequences of
decentralization interact with each other. It focuses on educational governance reform in
China and Korea, which have different historical, economic, and political backgrounds.
Two main themes are identified in this work: how different problems were addressed by
the same policy instrument, decentralization, and how the results differed depending upon
environmental conditions.
This

led to

three

areas

of investigation:

the

motivating forces

for the

decentralization of education, the manners of actuation, and the consequences in China
and Korea between 1985 and 1995. A comparative approach was used involving a
mixture of longitudinal (vertical) and cross-sectional (horizontal) analyses, which had
been proposed and developed subsequent to the work of Bereday, Hilker, and Noah.
These longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses identified several isomorphic and
idiosyncratic aspects of the educational governance reforms in China and Korea. The
major similarities found include: 1) the economic and political crises as motivating
forces, 2 ) the establishment of legal infrastructures, and the utilization of the incremental

v

and asymmetric approaches in the manner of reform actuation, and 3) some positive
consequences of reform such as increased educational funds and local educational
autonomy.
However, coupled with these similarities were three important differences: 1) the
key objectives to be solved: the financial problem in China versus the political problem in
Korea, 2) the major actuation strategies: restructuring fiscal authority by decentralization
and diversification in China, versus rearranging

political power for public education

between the central and local governments in Korea, and 3) the main consequences of
educational decentralization: improved fiscal efficiency in China, versus enhanced
political autonomy in Korea. Both countries experienced some side-effects or limits of
decentralization such as financial disparities in education among regions in China, and
rhetorical decentralization and citizen apathy regarding local educational autonomy in its
early stage in Korea.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Decentralization has long been viewed as attractive by many policy makers who
perceive it as a nostrum for the problems in education. Chief among the problems include
structural inefficiencies, financial deficiencies, and legitimacy crises in education
policies. Policies of decentralization typically are implemented with a shift of power and
responsibility over decision-making and financial resource management from the central
government to lower level institutions.
This type of governance restructuring has occurred in many countries around the
world, independent of the level of national advancement.

For example, many Latin

American nations with their long histories of highly centralized systems have
enthusiastically introduced decentralization in education since the 1970s. It began in
Argentina in 1976, and was followed by Chile and Brazil in the 1980s. Other countries El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay
- soon joined the movement, embracing decentralization during the 1990s (Winkler,
1999).
During the same period, many member countries of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) have also pursued the restructuring of their educational govemancse
systems in the belief that it would improve efficiency, equity, and quality of education.
While developing countries pursued decentralization, some industrialized countries have
shown recentralization at the macro level in the areas of the national assessment and
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curriculum, for example (Cummings & Riddell, 1994; Caldwell, 2004; Hanson, 1995).
This worldwide trend toward decentralization was driven by various socio-political and
economic forces such as globalization, neo-liberalism and international aid policies. In
particular, international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF have exercised some
critical influence on the education decentralization movements in many developing
countries (Amove, 2003; Camoy & Rhotes, 2002,).
Some Northeast Asian countries such as China and Korea, which traditionally had
highly centralized systems, were no exception. They have been moving toward
decentralization since the 1980s.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
The assumed benefits of decentralization fall into three categories. First, political
participation is supposed to increase as a result of the empowerment of local stakeholders
such as teachers, parents, and community leaders, hence reshaping the level and fashion
of grass-root democracy. Second, managerial and administrative efficiency is supposed to
improve as a consequence of procedural renovation including the reduction of abstraction
in decision-making, quick problem identification and response, and facilitation of
innovation. Third, financial deficiencies are supposed to decrease by generating new
sources of educational funding from newly empowered local governments, organizations,
private institutions and individuals (Brown,

1994; Fiske,

1996; Kemmerer, 1994;

Rondinelli, 1981; Sharpe, 1996).
Empirically, however, due to a lack of baseline data and the contextual sensitivity
of policies, there has been little consistent evidence that the actual impact of
decentralization matches its theoretically claimed advantages (Winkler, 1999). While the
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results of studies vary, some show positive (Spain, Nicaragua), others mixed (Colombia,
New Zealand), and some negative effects (Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Zimbabwe)
(Rondinelli 1981, Prawda 1993, Fiske 1996, Hanson 1998, Winkler 1999). Some assert
that the impact is

contingent upon the

specific policy

designs,

implying that

decentralization in and of itself might be neither good nor bad for solving problems in
education. It only provides a window of opportunity for improvement without
guaranteeing any specific outcomes (Litvac et al., 1998; Sharpe, 1996).
Therefore, the virtue of decentralization in education needs to be confirmed and
validated by research that is both systematic and comparative in various situations and
circumstances. Cross-national comparisons may yield some important policy implications
on the relationship between governance style and its performance (Swanson 1989, Sharpe
1996). This study is based on two basic issues:(l) how different problems such as
financial deficiency (China), and political participation (Korea) are addressed by similar
policy ideas like power transfer in the different settings, and (2) the extent to which the
policy consequences in the two countries are isomorphic or idiosyncratic with each other.
The necessity for a cross-country comparison of educational policies is identified
by the admonition of Stephen et al. that “there is a lesson (and a warning) for policy
makers: a common policy idea can be interpreted and acted upon differently when it is
transferred to a different setting” (Stephen et al., 2004 p.l 11).
China and Korea share some unique historical relationships in the evolution of
their education systems. The Chinese education system in the modem period (pre-1949)
was established under the influence of the western model. The Korean system was also
considerably affected by the American system since the establishment of modem Korea
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in 1948. As of 2003, a number of statistics illustrate the keen educational relationship
among the two countries. China and Korea are among the top four sender countries of
international students to the United States, along with Japan and India. Overseas students
from Korea make up 47 percent of all international students in China. More than half (51
percent) of the international students studying in Korea are from China and the United
States (Guo and Cummings, 2005). These two countries, however, appear to have
evolved different courses of development in terms of their education governance systems.
Comparing and contrasting governance reforms in these two countries will help to answer
some of the above questions.
1.3. Purpose of the Study
Although the benefits to be derived from the relocation of authority are
theoretically clear in terms of enhancing efficiency, popular participation, and the
generation of financial resources, the actual consequences of decentralization may vary
considerably from one country to another due to specific social and political contexts.
Rhetoric and reality are not necessarily on the same line: studies have revealed a range of
isomorphic and idiosyncratic features in governance reforms over the world (Prawda,
1993). The range of policy dynamics needs to be investigated by examining the
motivating forces underlying the current movements, and specific aspects of the changes
in the governance structure and school financing.
The purpose of this study is to identify some convergent and divergent aspects of
the changes that have occurred in educational governance in the two selected countries China and Korea, focusing on the watershed cases in each country. In these two
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countries, a similar policy, decentralization, has been designed and implemented for
different purposes under different social settings between 1985 and 1995.
1.4 Research Questions
Toward the end described above, this study will be directed at answering the
following four questions.
(1) What were the primary motivating forces behind the decentralization movement
in China and Korea ?
(2) How was the reform idea implemented between 1985 and 1995 in China and
Korea ?
(3) What were the major consequences of decentralization in China and
Korea?
(4) What were the similarities and differences in educational governance reform
between the two countries?
1.5 Significance of the Study
This comparative study has at least three attributes that will make it significant.
First, it will provide policy makers with salient lessons in understanding how a common
policy agenda is implemented similarly or differently in different settings. The result will
help them understand the importance of contextual conditions on policy making and it
will suggest the extent to which a certain policy that has flourished in one country can be
transferred to another nation (Stephen et ah, 2004).
Second, the findings of this comparative analysis may be of interest to educational
administrators in the case countries. They can use this information on governance
reforms in these the socio-politically related countries. I hope to draw some conclusions
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regarding

strategies

or

conditions

for

effective

design

and

implementation

of

decentralization policies.
Finally, this research can contribute to the development of theory-based policies.
As Wirt clearly identifies, the relation of comparison to theory is interactive in nature for
the mutual development of both. “Without theory, it cannot be explained why a certain
policy is devised and implemented in a given system. By the same token, the theory
wouldn’t be appropriately tested and developed without systematic comparisons” (Wirt,
1986, p.252). I hope to be able to develop guidelines and strategies for successful
decentralization in developing countries.
1.6 Limitations of the Study
For the most part, this study will examine the macro-level changes of educational
decentralization in the case countries, rather than the changes in classroom and school
settings. It will mainly cover the changes in the governance structures and in the
educational financing systems, focusing on the seminal reforms that occurred between
1985-1995 in China and Korea.
As is the case with most cross-national comparison studies, this study may not be
free from the following general limitations: (1) some difficulties in gathering baseline
data from different countries, and (2) cultural bias in the process of this research such as
in making inferences and drawing policy implications (Coombs, 1985; Noah, 1985;
Raivola, 1986). Therefore, appropriate caution is needed in the design of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORKS
This section will describe three strands of past and current literature associated
with educational governance reform. First, it will give an overview of the literature on the
conceptual and theoretical frameworks related to decentralization in education. This will
cover the meanings, models, and motivating forces underlying decentralization. Second,
it will look at empirical studies that illustrate the variation among efforts for rearranging
governance in different settings in terms of goals, strategies, and consequences, including
the side effects of decentralization. Third, the global characteristics of decentralization
will be briefly reviewed from the geographical and temporal perspectives.
2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks
2.1.1 Concepts and Meanings
Decentralization has various meanings depending upon its setting. In general, it
connotes “the transfer of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage
public functions from the central government and its agencies to field organizations of
those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations,
and area-wide or regional development authorities” (Rondinelli 1981, p. 137).
Decentralization has often been conceptualized as being either functional or
territorial, depending upon whether the power shifts are horizontal or vertical,
respectively. Functional decentralization means that the power shifts from a single
authority to two or more other units of governance that operate in parallel. For example,
the education functions in China are horizontally divided and managed by two or more
ministries in the central government. “Each ministry operates its own comprehensive
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system of education... more than a third of higher education institutions in China were
administered by ministries in the central government” (Cheng, 1997, p. 397). Territorial
decentralization refers to the vertical redistribution of authority and responsibility to a
lower level of organization within a system such as a state, province, region,
municipality, district, or school site.
Territorial decentralization is subdivided into three subcategories according to the
degree of the power-shift: deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Bray, 2003;
Rondinelli, 1981).
Deconcentratioir. the process through which a central authority establishes

field units or branch offices, staffing them within its own offices. Thus personnel
of the ministry of education may all work in the same central building or some of
them may be posted out to provinces and districts.
Delegation: a stronger degree of decision-making power at the local level.
Nevertheless, powers in a delegate system still basically rest with the central
authority, which has chosen to Tend’ them to the local one. The power can be
withdrawn without resort to legislation.
Devolution: the most extreme of these three forms of territorial
decentralization. Powers are formally held at subnational levels, the officers of
which do not need to seek higher-level approval for their actions. The
subnantional officers may chose to inform the center of their decisions, but the
role of the center is chiefly confined to the collection and exchange of information
(Bray, 2003, p. 206).

2.1.2. Theoretical Models
There are three theoretical models to explain the dynamics of decentralization, the
political, economic and social perspectives.
2.1.2.1 Economic Models: Public Choice Theory and Liberalism
Public choice theory provides an avenue for the presentation and analysis of
decentralization (Rondinelli, 1989). According to this approach, the efficiency and the
quality of public services including education are better improved when a number of
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providers, namely the individual local governments, are involved in the provisional
mechanism than when a monopolized provider such as the central government dominates
the market (Ostrum & Ostrum, 1977). That is, decentralization provides citizens with
more opportunities to choose various options according to their preferences and needs,
thus enhancing the quality of public services and increasing consumer satisfaction
(McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Levin & Belfield, 2002).
Liberalism is based on a belief in the value of the functional efficiency of liberty
and individual freedom. It assumes that the market may function to increase personal
freedom, thus resulting in the enhancement of societal freedom as a whole. It serves as an
ideological framework for strong local government, puts an emphasis on market based
competition in public organizations, and encourages the non-governmental provision of
education.
Liberalism favors individual freedom and the wide dispersal of authority. It
rejects the concentration of political power, and calls for strong local government.
Liberals apply the function of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to the public sector in the
belief that the marketization of public service will result in enhanced quality and
efficiency through competition. It also facilitates the privatization of education. By
breaking the monopoly of the public provision of education, the quality and efficiency of
education are supposed to improve (Lauglo, 1995).
2.1.2.2 Political Models: Federalism and Populist Participation
Federalism allows different states or provinces of a nation to have considerable
power to make their own decisions. There are two forms of federal government systems.
Constitutional federalism as seen in the United States is articulated in the national
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Constitution as a key mechanism to prevent central authoritarianism by reserving power
for each state in areas such as education. In contrast, political federalism is established as
a result of political compromise between the central government and provincial
governments These negotiations try to obtain national unity for the central government
while giving considerable self-governance to provincial authorities Political federal: sss :
found in Canada and Belgium (Lauglo, 1995).
Populist participation

in

political

expression

fosters local

democracy and

empowers ordinary people to participate in making decisions for their community. This is
viewed as a challenge to dominant groups of the society like technocrats and professional
experts, by the populace. Populism for education means that "schools should be local,
community-based institutions, and run by local government in small population units '
(Lauglo 1995, p. 8).
2.1.2.3 Social Origin Model: Restriction and Substitution
According to Archer’s work on the social origin of the education system (T984),
the education system did not emerge until the eighteenth century, contrary to the popular
belief that it has had a long history of existence. Since then it has evolved through socio¬
cultural

and

political

interactions.

Archer

examined

the

origin

of educational

decentralization in the evolutions of the education systems in selected European countries
including France, England, Denmark, and Russia.
This evolution was intertwined with the social conflicts between the dominant
groups and the assertive groups in education. The dominant groups were represented by
the Catholic church in France, the Anglican church in England, the Danish Lutheran
church in Denmark, and the Orthodox church in Russia. The assertive groups had
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emerged against the monopoly of the dominant groups in education. The opposition
groups were led by the bourgeoisie, the working class, professional commercial groups,
and political and economic elite groups in each country. Two major strategies used by
assertive groups to attack the dominant groups were the activities of restriction and
substitution.
The restriction strategy was employed to exercise coercion by the political elite led groups through the legislative process, to damage the dominant groups in education in
order that “school building may be appropriated, education funds confiscated, or
personnel excluded from teaching and administration.” Assertive groups led by the
economic elite utilized the substitution strategy to devalue the dominant groups “by
building and maintaining new schools and recruiting, training, and paying new
teachers”!Archer 1984, pp.104 -107).
According

to

Archer,

while

substitution

evolved

into

decentralization

characterized by differentiation and specialization, restriction led to centralization
epitomized by unification and standardization (Tang and Bray, 2000).
2.1.3 Motivating Forces Behind Decentralization
Why has decentralization happened?

A host of studies have identified several

driving forces that have led to the decentralization movement. McGinn and Welsh (1999)
examined three global forces that account for the decentralization movement that began
in the late part of the 20th century. These include changes in the economic paradigm, the
educational environments, and in information technology.
First, the paradigm change in the economic policies resulted from the collapse of
government-driven economic policies. This gave rise to a market-driven policy scheme.
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This, in turn, weakened the authority of the central government and strengthened local
power. Second, during the 1970s and 1980s, student enrollment all over the world
doubled, thus increasing the number of teachers. These increases outstripped the
government’s financial capacity to provide quality public education, which in turn
caused pubic dissatisfaction regarding education. These public complaints pushed the
central government to shift power to local authorities.
information

and

communication

technology

(ICT)

has

Third, the revolution in
functioned

to

promote

decentralization. A quality IT infrastructure allows a central government to effectively
control local systems, even when they are decentralized.
Swanson (1989) analyzes the origin of educational governance reform. From his
point of view, the reform movement reflected a worldwide trend in economic, political,
and technological changes. From an agricultural society through an industrial stage to the
information society, societal changes have led to changes in governance structures. He
argues that there has been a cyclic pattern of centralization and decentralization with
societal changes: both the agricultural and the information societies were characterized
by decentralization while the industrial society was characterized by centralization. The
growth of decentralization in the information age is supposed to go hand in hand with the
decline of industrial society.
Camoy and Rhotes (2002) view globalization as a major impetus toward
decentralization because it diminishes the power of nation-states. Increased global
economic competition leads the nation state to adopt output-oriented policies rather than
input-based ones. Consequently, the nation-state transfers power to local governments
and organizations in the belief that decentralization may result in higher productivity and
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efficiency in the market. This strengthens local decision-making power (McGinn and
Welsh

1999). Globalization also has an impact on educational finance, forcing

governments to seek new sources of school funds, which results in decentralization of
authority for financing education (Cheng ,1997; Hawkins, 2000).
Astiz

and

his

associates

(2002)

maintain

that

neoliberalism

facilitates

globalization, and leads to “privatization, retreat of the state, and localization.” Neoliberal
policies emphasize decentralization and privatization of the school system. They argue
that neoliberalism has several virtues as follows: “(1) being democratic, efficient, and
accountable; (2) being more responsive to the community and to local needs; (3)
empowering teachers, parents, and others in the education community while improving
the effectiveness of school reform; and (4) being able to improve school quality and
increase funds available for teachers’ salaries through competition” (p.70).
2.1.4 Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization
The assumed benefits of decentralization fall into three categories. First, political
participation is supposed to increase as a result of the empowerment of local stakeholders
such as teachers, parents, and community leaders, hence reshaping the level and fashion
of grass-roots democracy. Second, managerial and administrative efficiency is supposed
to improve as a consequence of procedural innovation including the reduction of
abstraction

in

decision-making,

quick problem

identification

and

response,

and

facilitation of innovation. Third, financial deficiencies are supposed to decrease by
generating

new

sources

of educational

funding

from

newly

empowered

local

governments, organizations, private institutions and individuals (Brown, 1994; Fiske,
1996; Kemmerer, 1994; Rondinelli 1981; Sharpe, 1996).
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Decentralization is not free of shortcomings. The most commonly argued concern
is that decentralization deteriorates equity among the provinces, despite increasing
administrative efficiency (Brown, 1994; Kemmerer, 1994; Winkler 1991,). Considering
that different provinces have varying capacities to generate financial resources, the
quality of public services including education will be considerably diverse among
regions.
Another concern is that the economic rationalism that emphasizes financial
efficiency and leads to budget-cutbacks, pays less attention to the quality of schooling. It
is regarded as ‘a shift of the blame and responsibility without power’ (Barcan, 1992;
Sharpe, 1996). Some argue that decentralization in education imposes heavy workloads
on local school actors such as the teachers and the principals, and their priorities
involving teaching and managing in school sites may get distorted (Watkins, 1991;
Sharpe, 1996).
Some also warn that decentralization advocates are likely to be misled by
economic liberals despites its advantages. Liberals attempt to privatize and deregulate the
activities or provisions of public services in the name of efficiency and productivity. In
reality, however, they hand their roles over to undemocratic and unaccountable bodies
(Hirst, 1994).
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2.2 Empirical Evidence
An extensive review of the application of decentralization policies worldwide
reveals considerable variations in the major objectives, strategies of power relocation,
and consequences.
2.2.1 Major Objectives of Decentralization
Many empirical studies have used comparative research to examine the dynamics
of shifting power in educational governance. Decentralization policies appear to focus on
several different issues depending on country-specific situations. These situations include
five major issues: political, financial, administrative, educational and social problems.
First, the political rationale for decentralization is that a good government is that
which is closer to the people, which reflect the basic principle of participatory democracy
(Litvac et al., 1998; Bray, 2003). In many cases, decentralization policies have been
motivated primarily by the political need to respond to the people’s demands to
participate in important decision-making processes. The case of Colombia in the 1980s
provides a good example of decentralization in response to political pressure. The main
objective was securing national stability and legitimacy for the central government
amidst the countrywide chaos that resulted from corrupt drug cartels and terrorist armies.
Education was one part of a larger decentralization process. Educational decentralization
resulted in a political compromise between the militant teacher union and the government
(Fiske, 1996).
Spain’s

experience

illustrates

the

dynamics

of political

decentralization

(Hanson, 1995). After the death of General Franco, the Spanish government rapidly
distributed

its

power

to

the

seventeen
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provinces,

particularly

three

important

industrialized regions that were demanding political autonomy — Catalonia, Galicia, and
the Basque Territory — to discourage their independence movements (Hanson 1998).
Education was an important part of the larger decentralization. This, however, is
considered to be a great success and is widely known as “the miracle of Spain” (Fiske,
1996, p.14).
Second, financial constraints often push a central government to seek new sources
of educational funding. The central government shifts the financial authority and
responsibility for education to lower-level governments and encourages the local
authorities and private organizations to generate new sources of revenue. In 1985, China
transferred financial authority from the central government to the provincial governments
to support elementary and secondary education, as a brand new device to solve a
financial problem that was supposed to be caused by the implementation of a 9-year
compulsory education reform plan. Argentina also had a similar experience when it
shifted the burden of primary and secondary school finance to the provinces. This,
however, ended in failure when the governors of many provinces strongly rejected it.
Many other developing countries experienced decentralization triggered mainly by
financial problems (Bray, 2003; Cheng, 1997; Fiske, 1996; Hawkins, 2000).
Third, it is argued that managerial and administrative efficiency is a formal goal
of decentralization. Decentralization is viewed as an effective means of deleting
ambiguity in decision-making, clarifying lines of accountability, identifying problems
and solutions, and facilitating renovation (Kemmerer, 1994). The case of New Zealand is
a typical model of administrative decentralization. In 1989, the reform initiative called
“Tomorrow’s School Project” greatly reduced the size of the central government staff.
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eliminated provincial administration, and decentralized to the school sites considerable
responsibilities, related to personnel employment, budget allocation, and other education
matters (Fiske, 1996).
Fourth, in some cases, educational improvement is stated as an official objective
of decentralization. In the United States since the 1980s, parental dissatisfaction with
public education has prompted governance reform that empowers local actors such as
parents and teachers. Chief among proposals to address these concerns include schoolbased management, school choice, voucher programs, and charter schools. In the latter
part of the 1980s, the Illinois state government undertook a radical reform to enhance
student achievement in the Chicago school by decentralizing authority for personnel
administration and school finance to the principals, the parents, and the communities
(Hess, 1995; 1999; Levin & Belfield, 2002; McGinn & Welsh).
Finally, the management of legitimacy crises or social conflict is regarded as an
important cause of decentralization. According to Weilesr, decentralization often appears
to fail to accomplish the stated objectives because the real goal of the governance
restructuring is socio-political rather than administrative or technical. This type of
decentralization occurred in France in 1968. When student protests against government
policy gave rise to massive disturbances, the French government restructured the
organization of the University of Paris into many decentralized entities. West Germany
used similar strategies when serious conflicts occurred over the introduction of the
comprehensive school system in the 1970s (Weiler, 1990).
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2.2.2 Strategies of Decentralization
Countries that pursued governance reform demonstrate various strategies of power
transfer. These can be grouped into two major categories: vertical and horizontal
decentralization. As explained in the previous section, vertical decentralization is
classified into “three - D types” such as deconcentration, deregulation, and devolution.
Horizontal decentralization is seen in the case of China, in which education
matters are taken care of by multiple authorities along with the ministry of education in
the central and local levels.
Theoretically, decentralization is usually undertaken in the name of efficiency or
effectiveness of the marketization of public services under the assumption that
localization may increase the quality of service and customer satisfaction. However, in
reality, the power shift during decentralization is aimed at strengthening the central
authority, meaning that “the real reason for decentralization is not to distribute power but
to maintain central effectiveness” (McGinn and Street, 1986, p. 472). McGinn and Street
explain decentralization based on two hypotheses. One is that it is initiated and supported
by some groups, but impeded by other groups, both groups being within the same
government. The other is that a certain group supports decentralization mainly because it
is in their interests to do so.
Decentralization is power redistribution among interest groups, rather than
between the central and the local governments. Consequently, the objective of this power
shift is to strengthen central interest and power (McGinn & Street, 1986; Prawda, 1993).
The central government is likely to share power with a group that keeps similar ideology
and supports its interests (McGinn & Street, 1986).
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2.2.3 Consequences of Decentralization
As Winkler (1999) argued that there is no consistent evidence of impacts from
decentralization. Any examination of changes associated with decentralization should
consider observed outcomes from the process. Three major areas of impacts —
educational, financial, and political — are considered below. Regarding educational
quality, a host of studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on student
achievements in terms of test scores, but the results are inconclusive. As King and Guerra
(2005) have written, “...because educational development is rarely the rationale for
decentralization, there is no guarantee that the reform will, in fact, improve educational
outcomes” (p. 180). For example, some cases — Chicago and Memphis in the United
States — provide positive impacts of decentralization by showing increased student test
scores. However, other cases in Latin America — Chile, Nicaragua, Brazil, and El
Salvador - have shown ambiguous and inconsistent results (King and Guerra, 2005).
As for financial accomplishments, the cases of the Latin American countries
illustrate a wide gap between what was predicted and what was achieved. A group of
South American nations initiated decentralization in the 1980s as a way of gamering
additional revenue for education. The results varied among countries. Some showed
positive effects while others demonstrated negative effects. Before the reform during
1971-1982, Mexico had an average growth rate of 13-14% in its education budget with a
7.2 % GNP growth rate. However, from 1982 onward, federal spending in education
sharply declined with an annual decrease of 9.1%. This was mainly due to a rapid
decrease of teacher salaries. Chile also experienced a similar development to Mexico.
Before reform in 1985, the total education expenditure in Chile was 6.8 % of GNP, but
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this decreased to 2.5% in 1990. Columbia joined the same path when education budgets
as percentage of GNP decreased from 5.6% in 1985 to 5.4% in 1990. Only Argentina
showed some positive results. When reform was launched in 1975, education budgets in
Argentina were 16.7% of the total government budget, or 3.9% of GNP. After reform in
1980, this amount was increased to 18.7% of the government budget and 4.9% of GNP
(Prawda, 1993).
The shift of financial burden from the central to local governments as an objective
of decentralization was not the case in either Mexico or Chile. Mexico demonstrated an
increased share of financial responsibility for the central government for education during
the reform period 1971 - 1982. The central government paid 79% of the total expenses in
1987, while it paid only for 66% before the reform in 1971 (Prawda, 1993).
In terms of distribution of political power and participation in education, the
OECD survey (2004) reveals varying results. It appears that instructional matters are
largely controlled by school sites, while issues of planning and structure are decided by
central authorities. However, decisions on personnel management and resource allocation
are shared with local and central authorities. Schools have only partial authority
regarding these decisions. The PISA study by OECD (2004) shows a change in power
distribution and participation in OECD and participating countries between 2000 and
2003: industrialized countries toward centralization, and developing countries toward
decentralization.
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2.3 Global Characteristics of Decentralization
2.3.1 Geographical Scope and Political system of Decentralization
Castles and his associates (1993) identified, among the industrialized European
nations and the United Kingdom’s daughter nations, families of nations in industrialized
society: groups of countries that show cultural isomorphic aspects. Each family of nations
demonstrates similar aspects in its policy making dynamics and decision-making patterns
based on some particular set of historical and cultural traditions. They identified four
families of nations. The Anglo-American family consists of countries such as Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The German
family includes Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. The Latin family is comprised of
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Finally, the

Scandinavian family is

represented by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
Regarding the governance structure, the Anglo-American family has a tendency
to emphasize the importance of individual and regional authority in decision-making; this
leads to highly decentralized systems. In contrast, the Scandinavian family is viewed as
having a more collectivist tradition that emphasizes the role of central intervention, which
leads to the evolution of centralized systems. The German and Latin families are
intermediate between the Anglo-American and the Scandinavian families. The German
family is deeply associated with the federalist approach to political organization; this
discourages the involvement of the central government in public policy making. The
Latin family, however, is closer to the Scandinavian family; it supports the idea of big
government and expanded central authority. The Latin family has a long history of strong
and powerful central authority that has resulted from the social demand to outperform
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Northern European countries in economic and military capacity. In decreasing order, the
degree of centralization in the four country families is Scandinavian, Latin, Germany and
Anglo-American family.
Many other countries all over the world are initiating decentralization for various
reasons. The major rationales for these power shifts from central to lower level of
governments reflects the regional characteristics such as: (1) the emergence of multiparty
political systems in Africa, (2) the advancement of democratization in Latin America, (3)
the transition of the national economic system from a planned communist system to a
market economy in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, (4) the demand to
enhance the quality of public services in the centralized systems of East Asia, and (5) the
resolution of problems of geographic and ethnic diversity in South Asia (Litvac et. al.,
1998, p.l).
There are also variations on decentralization based on the political system, the
geographic size, and the degree of linguistic pluralism (Bray 2003). According to whether
their political systems are federal, unitary or confederal, the types of governance vary.
For example, the countries with federal systems like Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria,
and the United States are the mostly highly decentralized. In these countries, each state or
province has substantial power to create its own educational policies; accordingly,
policies differ considerably from one state to another. The nations with confederal
systems also have a high degree of decentralization. For instance, Switzerland has
devolved educational power and responsibilities to each of its 26 cantons. Every canton
has the power to make important decisions on education in term of curriculum, structure,
and organization, independent of the central government.
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However, countries with unitary systems have both centralized and decentralized
systems. Some like the United Kingdom have highly decentralized governance structures,
while many others such as China and Korea have centralized structures.
Geographically large countries such as India, Russia, Canada, and the United
States tend to be decentralized. However, this is not the case in China and Indonesia.
Furthermore, small countries are not always centralized as shown in Malta and Brunei
Darussalam. Countries that use plural languages appear to have decentralized systems.
Such nations include Nigeria, Canada, Switzerland, and Belgium. Belgium, a small
nation, operates two different education systems separately according to linguistic
pluralism, i.e., French speakers and Flemish speakers. Alberta and Quebec in Canada are
like Belgium, each showing a territorial decentralization of its educational structure,
within which the former is operated in English, and the latter in French (Bray, 2003).
2.3.2. Temporal Oscillation of Decentralization
Decentralization changes over time, sometimes showing a cyclic pattern. For
example, Swanson (1989) identified a mega-trend of the oscillation of centralization and
decentralization. As society evolved from being agricultural to industrial, and now it to
informational, the social governance structure has changed from decentralized to
centralized, and now it is changing back to decentralized. Industrial society is
characterized by top-down management with center-oriented systems. In contrast,
agricultural and information societies are much more decentralized.
Schesinger (1986) presented a compelling analysis of the oscillating policy
pattern in the United States. He observed that a cycle of liberalism and conservatism has
occured every 30 years in American politics since 1900. He found that conservatism
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pervaded in the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s, while liberalism dominated in the 1900s, 1930s
and the

1960s. When conservatism predominated, the ideals of excellence and

centralization were honored. During the periods of liberalism, society encouraged equity
and decentralization. This policy pendulum was also seen in the pattern of the education
policy.
Cuban (1990) provided a more comprehensive analysis of this recurring education
reform patterned by centralization and decentralization. Education governance reform in
American shows a cyclic pattern. He describes a five-stage oscillation of governance
reform. At the turn of the 20th century, there were more than 100,000 school districts
across the country, demonstrating a highly decentralized system of school operation. The
progressive movement in the early 20th century, which emphasized the value of efficiency
and scientific management, drove reformers to consolidate school districts. This
movement resulted in centralization and empowered local school boards to hire well
trained professionals for education, in the hope that they could enhance educational
efficiency.

This mood of centralization changed when civil right activists argued that

schools should be sensitive and responsive to local needs, particularly educational needs
of students from poor regions in the 1960s. This led school governance back to
decentralization again. “Values of participation and equity lay at the core of the impulse
in decentralizing authority to govern schools” (Cuban, 1990, p. 5).
In the 1980s, with the report

“A Nation at Risk” in 1983, centralization again

became the theme of the policy agenda. It stressed that the federal and state government
should be actively involved in school operations in order to maintain the world
competitiveness of its education systems and programs. However, it was soon recognized
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that the centralized system was not working well. This facilitated the emergence of
alternative governance structures including School - Based Management, the most
decentralized form of governance. This was influenced both by research results regarding
the importance of individual schools as the unit of change, and business leaders who
argued for the efficiency of site-based decision-making. The late 1990s has witnessed yet
another trend in governance change, so called recentralization, during which the federal
government sought fragmented centralization and decentralization. In other words,
decentralization existed at the micro-level, with centralization at the macro-level (Tyack,
1990). While the US education system further developed the traditional mode of
decentralization, the state and federal governments became involved in school education
policy in terms of the curriculum and the evaluation of student achievement. Chief among
them were two seminal federal initiatives — the Goals 2000: Educate America Act in
1994, and No Child Left Behind in 2000.
China also is seen in cyclic changes in policy and governance structures.
According to Hawkins (2000), the Chinese education system, a highly centralized
structure throughout its history, experienced a radical change in the mid-1980s. When the
Chinese political leaders proclaimed the importance of economic reform and an opendoor policy for national development, education, along with science and technology, was
regarded as a key sector to be renovated. Education leaders in China initiated educational
decentralization in 1985. The power and responsibility for providing primary education
were transferred from the central and provincial governments to regional and local
governments. This decentralization then saw another change toward recentralization in
1993 when the central government took some of tax authority back from the local
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governments in the name of protection of equality among regions. Cuban (1990) believes
that educational reform policies oscillate for several reasons:
Reforms return because policy makers fail to diagnose problems and
to promote correct solutions. Reforms return because policy makers use poor
historical analogies and pick the wrong lessons from the past. Reforms return
because policy makers fail to think seriously about educational purpose or
question the mindlessness of schooling. Reforms return because policy makers
cave in to the politics of a problem rather than the problem itself. Reforms return
because decision makers seldom seek reliable, correctly conducted evaluations of
program effectiveness before putting a program into practice, (p.6)
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
3.1 Some Technical Issues in Comparative Studies
When it conies to comparative analysis, several issues regarding research methods
arise. They pertain mostly to issues of comparability, the dimensions of comparison, and
the relationship between theory and comparison.
The concept of comparability can be understood in two ways. One is defined as
the condition existing when two measures are expressed in the same units thus making
possible direct comparison. The other is a general agreement that there is no need for a
definition of comparison, that it is enough and sufficient if a point of reference is
available for comparison (Edward, 1970; Raivola, 1986).
Comparing involves several types of equivalence or correspondence (Edward
1970). According to Edward, comparisons cannot be based on absolute similarity and
identicality. His dimensions of comparability include cultural, contextual, functional,
correlative and generic equivalences (Raivola, 1986).
Regarding the relation of comparison to theory, one of the common purposes of
the

comparative

research

approach

is

to

contribute

to

the

establishment

of

generalizations, thus conceptualizing the existing phenomena. The relation between the
two is clearly identified by Wirt (1986):
...the explanation of why something happens in a given system requires the
application of a theory. The development and testing of theory requires explicit
comparison. Without the systemic cross-system comparisons, we won’t develop
the theories we need; without these theories we won’t explain much of anything,
even within a single system. [ p. 252]
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This study will be consistent with the above-described properties that are required
in comparative analysis. The points of reference for comparison (comparability) will be
motives, implementation, and effects of decentralization, focusing on the reforms of the
governance structures and the financial systems. The dimensions of comparison will be
contextual and functional ones. Theoretically assumed advantages of decentralization will
be examined by the comparison of equivalent qualities in the two cases.
3.2 Case Countries
I have selected the case countries China and Korea for three reasons. First, these
countries have initiated education reform based on a common policy idea - governance
restructuring - to solve various problems facing each society during the latter part of the
20th century. Second, reforms that occurred in the two countries in the 1980s resulted
from similar situations, with econo-political system changes in a state of transition: China
moved from a planned national economy toward a socialist market economy, and Korea
moved from a military-authoritarian government toward a democratic political system.
Third, however, each country has an idiosyncratic social setting in terms of its economic
and political conditions. Regarding those economic conditions, China and Korea are
lower and upper middle-income societies, respectively. As for the political systems, these
countries are characterized as a developing democratic society and a developing socialist
state in transition, respectively. Examining how a policy idea is interpreted and
implemented differently depending upon contextual conditions may provide policy
makers with valuable lessons (Broadfoot,2002; Amove, 2003; Stephen et al., 2004).
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3.3 Data Collection
3.3.1 Data Gathering Strategies
Rust

and

his

associates

(1999)

conducted

a

comprehensive

analysis

of

comparative data collection strategies appearing in three major international journals Comparative Education, Comparative Education Review, and the International Journal
of Educational Development - between 1955 and 1994. They found that the two major
approaches among the nine data collection methods commonly used in comparative
education research, were literature review and the search of existing data bases (Rust et
al., 1999, p.98). They reported that “More than half of the articles were exclusively based
on literature reviews or included literature review with some other strategy” (p.97) and
many studies that utilize the literature review strategy are based on secondary data
sources and are consequently seen as interpretive studies grounded in various previous
work in related fields.
Studies that employed the search of existing databases use numeric data (survey
and census data) from, primarily, international agencies and organizations such as OECD,
the World Bank, and UNESCO. According to the analysis by Rust et al., the dominant
research method in comparative study is qualitative, while the quantitative approach
plays a ‘minor though important’ role in the field. (Rust et al., 1999). This study employs
a combination of various data gathering strategies including literature review and
statistical tools.
3.3.2. Data Sources
Most of the data used for this study has been gathered from the following sources.
(1)

International Agency data: OECD, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, and APEC
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(2)

Government documents: policy proposals, implementation reports, evaluation
documents by central and local governments, and statistical data published by
each government

(3)

News media - daily newspaper, weekly, monthly, and yearly magazines

(4)

Published books, articles, and dissertations.
3.4 Analytical Framework
This study employs a mix of cross-sectional (horizontal) and longitudinal

(vertical) analysis based on the “Comparative Problem Approach” developed by Bereday
and used by many since 1964 (Bereday, 1964; Hilker, 1965; Edward, 1970; Noah, 1985;
Raivola, 1986; Rust et ah, 1999). The problem approach is a research method that centers
on certain key problems in the comparative study, while the total approach covers all
aspects of education in the different countries. This problem approach will be
supplemented by the five-stage analysis of the policy process: agenda setting, policy
formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation (Adolino & Blake, 2001).
In this study, four steps will be taken in carrying out the analysis of collected data (See
Table 3.1).
3.4.1. Longitudinal (Vertical) Analysis
The first step will begin with an overview of problem-related factors. Some core
factors and characteristics of the educational systems and policy practices will be
described from a historical perspective. This description will be based on data collected
from various sources mentioned in the previous section, including primary, secondary,
and auxiliary data. Sometimes the isotypes and cartographic methods will be used.
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The second step will be interpretations of the data and the situations, focusing on
key reform programs in China and Korea in the period 1985-95. It will include an
analytic explanation of what the driving forces behind the observed and gathered
information on reform policy are. These interpretations are based on country-specific
idiosyncratic conditions, and the different social, political, economic, and historical
perspectives.
The first two steps mentioned above are conducted as vertical descriptions. Each
describes and interprets the phenomenon and factors, focusing on seminal cases of
education governance reform. For the two countries to be considered in this work, the
reforms occurred in China in 1985 and 1993, and Korea in 1987 and 1991. To be more
specific, these steps result in an overview of the chronological arrangement of these
educational policies that reveals for each country: (1) the environmental context of the
reform, (2) the structure of the education system, (3) the historical review of education
reform (See Table3.1).
3.4.2 Cross-Sectional (Horizontal) Comparison
The third step, the actual beginning step of the comparison, focuses on the
establishment of criteria for comparison. In seeking answers to the research questions,
several key facts need to be arranged according to the multi-stage policy analysis model
such as (1) problem identification and agenda setting, (2) policy formulation and
decision-making, (3) implementation, and (4) evaluation (Adolino and Blake, 2001). In
this study, focus will be placed on agenda setting (Motives), implementation (Actions),
and evaluation (Results). The agenda setting stage will deal with why and how the two
countries put decentralization on the national agenda. The implementation and effects of
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reform will largely cover two major areas. One is the changes in the governance
structures in terms of the relationship between the central and local governments. The
other is changes of the basic financing system for education in terms of revenue and
expenditure, the vertical imbalance of finance, and the effect of relocation of financial
authority on education. The final step consists of evaluations of the results of the
comparison. It will draw some lessons for policy makers and administrators, establishing
strategies and conditions for effective decentralization.
Table 3.1 Comparative Analytical Framework

Dimension

Longitudinal

Steps

Description

Major Tasks

Depiction of the seminal cases of education
decentralization in China and Korea between 1985
and 1995, focusing on
- the environmental context of the reform
- the structure of the education system
- the historical review of education reform

•

Seminal cases of the two countries

- CHINA:
(1 )“Decision of the CPC Central Committee
for Reform of Educational Structure”
(Communist Party of China), May, 1985
(2)“The Compulsory Education Law” (National
People’s Congress), 1986

Table 3.1 continued on next page
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Table 3.1 continued

(3)“The Program for China’s Education
Reform and Development (State Education
Commission), March 1993

- KOREA:
(1) “Eight-Points Proposal for Reform”
(Democratic Justice Party: DJP), Jan. 1987
(2) “Education Reform toward 21 Century”
(Presidential Commission for Education
Reform), December 1987
(3) “Law on Self-Governance for Education”
(The National Assembly), 1991, 1995

Interpretation

Analytic explanation and reasoning for the key
reform policies from various perspectives

Cross-Sectional Juxtaposition Establishment of criteria for comparison regarding
decentralization policy process
Agenda setting (Motives)
Evaluation (Results)

Comparison

Analysis of similarities and differences among the

compared countries and some inductive statements

Source: Beredey, G. (1964), Edward, R. (1970), Raivola, R. (1986), Adolino and Blake

(2001)
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CHAPTER 4

LONGITUDINAL EXAMINATIONS OF REFORM IN CONTEXT
IN CHINA AND KOREA

This chapter presents a preliminary procedure for the comparative analysis of the
main themes of this research - Motives, Action (Implementation), and Consequences of
education reform in China and Korea. In order for this comparison to be more effective, it
needs to examine and describe the three main contexts of education reform in each
country.
The first of these is the environmental context of reform viewed from the socio¬
political perspective. This is followed by a description of the basic frameworks of the two
educational systems, which developed under different idiosyncratic circumstances.
Finally the education reform movements in the two countries are reviewed from the
historical perspectives.
4.1 China
China has developed a peculiar system of educational governance that has
fluctuated over time. The fluctuation was largely associated with the ever-changing
circumstances, including its political and economic conditions. This section describes
China’s education reform from the longitudinal perspective.
4.1.1 Environmental Context
During the past half century, China has witnessed two fundamental changes in its
socio-economic environment. First of all, the nation was transformed from a semi-feudal
and semi-colonial state to a socialist state in the 1950s. Then, in the late 1970s, the

34

Chinese government tried to shift its economic system from one that was centrally
planned and controlled to a socialist market economy. These socio-economic changes,
along with its cultural tradition, have had a crucial influence on the education reform
movements in China (Henz, 1992; Guo and Cummings, 2005).
China is known as a country' with varying characteristics in terms of its political,
socio-economic, and cultural perspectives. This can be better understood by glancing at
its past and present trends. China has a unique cultural tradition that still has strong
influence, particularly on education. It appears that one of the effective ways of
understanding Chinese education is by looking at the relationship between Confucius and
its educational tradition. The Confucius spirit in education plays as a springboard for
national development; it is characterized by a saying like “the trinity of the king, the
father and the teacher.” It led to a tradition of reverence for education. Education is
viewed as the most important way to achieve success (Lewin et al, 1994).
As in most developing countries after World War II, China experienced several
radical reform movements covering the whole range of the socio-political arena since the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Reforms during that
period mostly resulted from ideological competition between radicals and moderates that
gave rise to the dialectic development of the nation. This struggle was led by Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, respectively (Tsang, 2000).
The radicals were ideologically devoted to communism and human liberation, and
“redness” was recognized as a symbolic entity. They assumed that national development
could be realized by continuing the class struggle and revolution to change social
relations involved in production. Education was viewed as a primary mover for
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facilitating social equality. They strongly opposed social stratification and eliteorientation in education. In contrast, the moderates set key goals, most crucial among
them being the improvements of the material and moral fundamentals of people’s lives.
In addition, “expertise” was a respected symbol. Their approach to national development
was economic and technical rather than political and ideological. Education was expected
to play a key role in human resource development, leading to the advancement of science
and technology. Moderates favored and encouraged social stratification based on
performance, as evidenced by key schools1 and university entrance examinations. This
competitive struggle resulted in a pendulum-like policy pattern for national development
since the inception of PRC (Tsang, 2000).
China presently has unique features that attract world attention, mainly because of
its huge potential for development and possible impacts on world society, including
education. China is geographically the third largest country, after Russia and Canada,
covering 9.6 million square kilometers, for 6.5 percent of the global land area. It is the
world’s most populous nation with a population of 1.3 billion as of 2005, one fifth of the
world’s total, and its annual population growth rate in 2004 was 5.7 percent. Its economic
development during the past five decades has been remarkable, particularly since the mid
-1970s when economic reform was initiated (PRC, 2005).
Since the fundamental reform of Chinese society in the mid-1970s, China has
been in transition from the communist-planned national economy to a socialist market
economy. The annual growth rate in China’s GDP per capita during 1975-2002 was 8.2

! It was a symbolic school of education reform led by Deng Xiaoping and his followers
because the entrance was based on student performance/test scores in the provincial and
national levels. It was abolished during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976.
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percent, while the world average was 1.3 percent. The scale of its economy in terms of
import/export was fourth in the world in 2003. Its GNP (Gross National Product) during
the economic reform of 1978-2003 increased 32 times from 3,624 billion yuan to 116,
898 billion yuan (Guo and Cummings, 2005).
These economic accomplishments were accompanied through advance in other
areas of society including education, science and technology. The successful completion
of China’s first manned space flight in 2003 proved its capacity and potential for science
and technology. With that accomplishment, China received world recognition as the third
most advanced nation in space science. In education, China has achieved another
accomplishment, primarily quantitative but, with some qualitative aspects. China operates
the world’s largest education system. The enrollment totals 340 million, accounting for
more than one fourth of the country’s entire population. It has increased 850 percent
since the inception of the PRC in 1949. The expansion of education was triggered by
“The Compulsory Education Law” in 1986. Along with this quantitative growth, Chinese
education has demonstrated its qualitative excellence in international student math and
science competitions (Teng, 1994; Guo and Cummings, 2005).
While China accomplished the outstanding achievements described above, it has
suffered various socio-economic problems. These include the regional disparity in
development, the population increase problem, and the overwhelming financial burden on
the central government for this reform. In order to cope effectively with this financial
issue, the Chinese government initiated a radical governance reform, shifting the power
and responsibility of the central government to provide social services including
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education to local governments, communities, private institutes and even individual
citizens.
4.1.2 Educational System
China runs the world’s largest education system. The goals of this system are
based upon a broad national direction provided by the Communist Party of China (CPC).
The political direction of China is primarily rooted in four cardinal principles: socialism
through proletariat dictatorship, the leadership of the Community party, adherence to
Marxism-Leninism, and the ideology of Mao Zedong (Tsang, 1996; Hawkins, 2000).
Other fundamental guidelines of the Chinese government include the economic reform
and an open door policy to the outside world. The role of education is critical in the
realization of these national goals. The link between education and national development
was clearly stated when the State Council announced the direction of education reform in
1985, saying “education must serve the purpose of socialist construction and socialist
construction must rely on education” (Hawkins, 2000).
To be more specific, education in China is expected to play a key role in
establishing socialist modernization and expected to be “integrated with practical work in
order to ensure the all-round moral, intellectual, and physical development of the builders
of socialism and their successors” (Deng, 1985). The general objective of the Chinese
education system, as promulgated in government reform documents, emphasizes both the
establishment of a modem education system to meet the increasing demand of society
and keeping Chinese traditional characteristics in terms of cultural and societal
perspectives (CPC, 1985).
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4.1.2.1. Basic Systems of Education in China
Education in China has two major tracks: regular and formal education, and non
formal and adult education. The basic structure of the Chinese formal education system
consists of preschool, primary school, junior secondary school, senior secondary school,
higher education institutes, and postgraduate institutes. As in many countries, the basic
system has a 6-3-3-4 ladder, six years of primary school, three years each of junior and
senior secondary school, and two to four years of higher education. Compulsory
education is provided through 9

grade; both six + three and five + four systems exist.

The senior secondary school is divided into two tracks, regular schools and vocationaltechnical schools. Higher education includes two to three years of junior college and four
to six years of university. Graduate education has two levels such as master’s and
doctoral programs with durations of education of two to three and three to four years,
respectively (Teng, 1994).
Along with regular education, education for adults is one of the characteristic
features of education in China in terms of its variety and the principle of “same level,
same standard.” The adult education program is provided for each level of school. Full¬
time adult education requires the same standard and length of schooling as the regular
schools, while the part-time program is a bit different from the regular course (Tsang,
1994).
It is evident that enrollment in adult education is rapidly increasing, helping to
achieve the universalization of senior secondary education. There was a considerable
increase in adult institutions and schools in China in 1991. At that time, there were 1,321
higher-education institutions with an enrollment of 1.56 million adult students, 58,501
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secondary schools with 15.29 million adult students, and 258,134 elementary schools
with 22.82 million adult students (Teng, 1994).
4.1.2.2 Administrative Structure of Education
Like the administrative system in the general government in China, the system of
educational administration consists of a three-tiered structure: major governance levels
consisting of the central, provincial, and local-level, including township and village,
government. There are 22 provinces, 4 municipal cities under the jurisdiction of the
central government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongching), and 5 autonomous regions
(Inner Mongolia, Guanxi Zuangxi, Ningxia Hui, Xinjang Uygure, and Tibet).
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National People’s Congress

▼
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress

▼
State Council

T
Ministry of Education

▼
Department of Education
of other ministries and
universities under their
jurisdictions

Education Commissions,
Bureaus of Higher Education
of Provinces, Municipalities
& Autonomous Regions, and
Local Major Cities

< Level of administration>
- higher education
- primary & secondary education
- vocational education
- adult education and other
kinds of education

Universities
under the Ministry
of Education

< Function of administration >
- planning
- finance
- personnel
- enrollment
- international exchange

T
Education Commissions at
City (Prefecture) Level
<Level of administration>
<Function of administration>
■ key primary and secondary schools - planning
■ secondary vocational schools
- finance
■ adult schools
- personnel
■ spare-time education
- teachers’ training

▼

Education Commissions
At County Level_

Figure 4.1 continued next page
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Figure 4.1 continued
< Level of administration >
primary & secondary schools
rural vocation education
spare-time education

▼

< Function of administration>
- planning
- finance
- personnel, teachers’ training

Education Commissions
At Township Level
< Level of administration >
preschools
primary & secondary schools
rural vocational schools
spare time education

< Function of administration >
- planning
- finance
- personnel
- teacher’s training

Figure 4.1 Administrative Structures of Education in China. Source: Wang (2003)
Education in China since 1976, p. 26
Each province has a number of cities and prefectures. Each unit of the
government has its own governance structures and functions to handle public affairs
under the control of the central government. The government affairs in each level are
conducted under the principle of the division of labor. The central authority largely takes
care of the macro-level planning and designing according to the national policy, while the
local governments focus on the implementation of these policies (Hawkins, 2000). The
education function is shared by the different levels of the governments.
The National People’s Congress (NPC) and State Council show a unique central
power structure in China; administration is “a direct action of the state including the
lawgivers.” In contrast, most western countries have a threefold power mechanism executive, legislative and judicial - that keep a check and balance on each other. The
National People’s Congress undertakes an important role in administering national
education policy, primarily by discussing and determining important educational policy
after listening to the report from the State Council on pending issues on education. It also

42

has the power to appoint and dismiss the chief of education administration in the central
government (e.g. the Minister of Education).
The State Council (SC) manages state educational matters under the control of
NPC. The major function of the SC is to report education matters to the National People’s
Congress and its standing committees. Drawing, issuing and implementing educational
law and regulations are another important function of the SC.
The role and title of the Ministry of Education, the central authority in education,
can be seen to have changed over time. From the inception of the PRC (People’s
Republic of China) in 1949 to 1985, the Ministry of Education had taken charge of
national education. It was replaced with the State Education Commission (SEC) by the
National People’s Congress in June 1985 when education reform was initiated. Since
then, the SEC has played a key role in guiding, organizing, and adjusting educational
matters covering a range of national and provincial issues. It also initiated a whole range
of education reform including the rearrangement of the educational governance structure
by reallocating the authority for decision making and financial accountability between the
central government and local governments. This was reversed by reinstatement of the
Ministry of Education in March 1998 after the death of Deng Xiaoping (Wang, 2003).
The provincial level government for education in China consists of 31 different
provincial authorities (22 provinces, 4 municipalities and 5 autonomous regions). The
educational commissions of the provincial governments have broad power to administer
education matters. Crucial among them are overall planning, financing, and personnel
administration for the improvement of higher education, primary and secondary
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education, vocational and adult education, teachers’ education, and all other kinds of
education within their areas.
The county governments administer rural education, a very important part of
Chinese education. About 866 million people, 70% of the total population of China,
resides in the rural areas. The education commissions of the county governments take
care of various roles in education. Their major functions include planning and
administering primary, secondary and vocational education, and managing the illiteracy
problem in rural areas. In addition, personnel administration and school financing are also
part of its major duties.
The township governments are not stipulated as units of governance in the
Chinese law. However, with the decentralization of decision-making authority, the
township government became responsible for taking care of education matters.
Consequently many of them established their own education commissions to perform
administrative functions.

The size of the education commission of a township

government is quite smaller than that of the county, but the major function is almost the
same.
4.1.2.3. Characteristics of the Education System
The educational administrative system in China has several unique features which
are not easily found in other countries.

Most interesting among them are territorial

decentralization, functional decentralization, and non-governmental involvement in
education.
First, regarding territorial or vertical decentralization, China is historically known
as a country with a highly centralized system. It was heavily influenced by the Confucian
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and center-oriented culture which is manifested in the name of “China” which literally
means “the key country in the world, the central part of universe.” Stimulated by the
national economic innovations of the mid-1970, education leaders, following the marketoriented president Deng Xiaoping, introduced a radical governance reform in 1985 that
resulted in shifting power and responsibility from the central government to localities.
Before that reform, providing educational services was mainly the responsibility of the
central and provincial governments.
This educational innovation program had dismantled the traditional governance
structure by emphasizing the involvement of local stakeholders in education. In turn, this
involvement induced the engagement of village and township authorities, farmers, and
private enterprises. More specifically, the authority for preschool and primary education
was moved from township to the village governments, and junior secondary education
was transferred from the county to township governments. Senior secondary education
was decentralized from the central government to county governments, and the
responsibility for higher education was also devolved from the central to local
governments. As shown in the table 4.1, China joined the global trend of decentralization
by shifting power and rearranging its intergovernmental relationship in education.

Table 4.1 Educational Governance Before and After Reform in 1985
—.-.-.-.-.—...-.Level
Before reform
After reform
Secondary
Primary

central government

upper secondary: county
lower secondary: township
village

county/city gov’t
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Second,

horizontal

or

functional

decentralization

makes

the

Chinese

administrative system quite unique. The Ministry of Education has the responsibility for
managing education matters. Even though it has the dominant voice regarding
educational issues, other ministries in the central government frequently develop their
own educational policies. Some ministries operate their own schools and education
programs, while other ministerial departments influence decision-making related to
education policy. For example, the Ministry of Labor runs its schools and universities in
order to train skilled workers for various sectors of industry. The Ministry of
Transportation does this also. This horizontal division of educational power is not often
found in counterpart countries. However, it raises the issue of effectiveness and
efficiency in management.
Third, the multiple involvement of educational actors is one of the most intriguing
strategies for the successful implementation of reform. It carries potential implications for
other developing countries that are pursuing similar reform, particularly to those suffering
from problems of financial deficiency. This can be called an ‘all-in strategy’ in which
every institution and individual takes accountability for supporting education.
This approach, advocated by China’s leaders, is better understood by capturing
the Chinese-specific cultural context.

China, as like many other Asian countries

including Korea, highly regards education as a primary mover not only of individual
advancement but also of national development. Education is viewed as a most important
instrument for social mobilization and a barometer of individual success in life. This
cultural foundation make political leaders pay closer attention to the all-in approach.
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4.1.2.4 Financial System in Education
The educational finance system in China has evolved over time. The greatest
change has occurred since the mid-1980s with the emergence of the market economy
which emphasized efficiency and productivity. During the pre-reform period, educational
finance was the responsibility of the central government, and most expenses and budgets
were borne by the Ministry of Education and Finance. However, this system failed to
effectively meet the increasing financial demands for education such as the rapid increase
of population; there was a chronic shortage of funds for education. In the reform period,
the

government took measures

like

multi-channelization and diversification

for

generating educational resources.
Financial

management

includes

raising,

distributing,

and

utilizing

funds.

Historically, the generation of revenues has been a paramount issue in Chinese education.
The GNP per capita of the country was just around $300 when Chinese leaders
introduced the 9-year compulsory education system in 1986. It was an ambitious reform
unparalleled among countries in a similar stage of their economic development (Tsang,
1996).
Since that reform, Chinese education has suffered chronic financial shortfalls due
to increasing financial demands, primarily the result of the expansion of schooling and
the growth of the population. Thus, China developed a unique financial system for the
generation of revenues. The traditional system of financial revenue relies primarily on
government taxes and levies. The new system has adopted some multiple and diversified
channels for generating financial resources in both the government and nongovernmental
sectors.
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The administrative system in education finance has a three tiered structure: the
central government, the local government, and the non-government sector.
At the central level, the Ministry of Finance allocates funds for public services
including education. The Ministry of Education is responsible for its implementation.
Among 18 departments, the financial division covers the broad function of managing
education expenses and generating revenues.
In the local level, each government has its own education commission for the
support of local education; in general these have 16 offices and departments. The Office
of Planning and Finance takes care of educational finance of its province, municipality or
autonomous region. Under the control of the Ministry of Education and the local
education commission, several sub-local governments have offices or departments of
education finance that manage the matter of school funding.
The government funding sources are classified into several categories such as
governmental appropriations, education taxes, special education funds, and student loans.
The non-governmental sectors are newly vitalized as critical alternative sources to
government funds for public education. Major sources of non-govemment funds come
from a wide array of education stakeholders: tuition and fees from students, donations
from parents and citizens, income from school-run companies, work-study programs,
private enterprises, and NGOs (Hawkins, 2000; Delany & Paine, 1991).
The education finance system in China shows some intriguing aspects. First, it
adjusted to a rearrangement of the governance structure by shifting power and
responsibility from the central government to localities. Second, it introduced an “all-in
strategy” for education (“education finance by the people”) that made all individuals and
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various levels of governments responsible for providing public education. Third, it
effectively developed a strategy for resource generation by increasing and diversifying its
sources of funds.
Despite these positive points mentioned above, China’s educational funding
system suffers from several shortcomings. First and most significant is the low level of
total public expenditures on education as a percentage of GNP. China spent 2.55 % of
GNP in 1998, whereas the world average is 4.9%. Next, China maintains an imbalanced
education investment between pre-collegiate and higher education. The ratio of per
student expenditures between them is 1: 60, while the world average ranges from 1:3 to
1:7. Finally, China has an inefficient system of resource utilization under the budget
constraint (Wang, 2003; Tsang,1996).
For example, teacher salaries in primary and secondary education are 84.5% and
75.4 % of the total budget, respectively, while those in higher education are only 46.8%
of their budgets. It is often said that the finance system does not catch up with the
changes in the market oriented economy, thus failing to meet the ever-increasing
financial needs in education (Wang, 2003).
4.1.3 Historical Review of Education Reform
The history of education reform in China can be classified as occurring in several
phases. These phases depend on focal points such as leadership changes. Like historical
momentum in other social changes, education reform shows a rise and fall according to
political changes epitomized by regime restructuring. Since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese education has witnessed three major phases
in its reform movement. In addition to the year of the pre-PRC, these may be termed as
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the years of Mao Zedong, the years of Deng Xiaoping, and the years of Jang Zemin
(Wang, 2001).
4.13.1 Phase I: The Pre-PRC Period (1905-1949)
The first phase came in 1905 when the traditional education system based on
Kuje, a traditional system for selecting government officials, was abolished. The central
authority, the Ministry of Education, was established, and adopted 6-3-3-4 education
system. Education leaders in this period took the American education system as a model
for the Chinese system, as seen in their motto “learn from America” and “learning
Chinese as essential, learning western as utilization”(Sun, 1990).
4.13.2 Phase II: The Mao Zedong period (1949-1976)
Education reform under the leadership of Mao Zedong occurred in three waves.
The first wave (1949-1956) began with the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in 1949.

The school system, under highly centralized control, was

restructured by abolishing private schools. The major education goal was to train the
working class cadre needed for the construction of a new country. Education leaders
adopted the Soviet Union system as the education model in this beginning stage of PRC,
and the catch phrase “learn from the Soviet Union” replaced the motto “learn from
America.”

The

new

education

system,

transplanted

directly

from

the

socialist

superpower, emphasized cognitive skill and knowledge in science and technology. In this
wave, China imported the Soviet model indiscriminately without modification.
The second wave (1957-1965) is characterized as the period in which China
abandoned the Soviet model to seek a new model better suited to the Chinese culture,
historical background, and socio-economic situation. The goal of the reform in this period
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was to rear workers with the abilities and skills necessary for nation building. Unlike the
Soviet model, which sought to develop gifted learners to lead their nation in world
competition, the Chinese model pursued mass progress epitomized by the popularization
of compulsory education rather than stratification of groups. It also stressed ideological
and political training. Schools were encouraged to run factories and farms. Educational
professionals were forced to merge with the general public.
The third wave (1966-1976), also called “the period of the Cultural Revolution,”
displayed the most devastating features in the history of modern China throughout
society, particularly in the education sector. Political elites led by Mao and his four
followers began to criticize the current education system as a capitalist institution and
tried to restructure the governance system by altering leadership in education. Farmers,
workers, and soldiers displaced educational professionals. Education leaders like
professors, teachers, and the intelligentsia were forced to go to the countryside, to
factories, and to military camps to learn from the new power holders. In education, the
entrance examinations were cancelled. Thus “Chinese education sustained a great loss
during the Cultural Revolution.’’(Delany and Paine, 1991).

4.1.3.3 Phase III: The Deng Xiaoping Period (1976-1997)
The education reform initiated in the mid-1980s is regarded as a most
comprehensive and paramount innovation. It appeared to focus on three wares for
educational restructuring: the education system as hardware, the curriculum and
operation as software, and personnel management as humanware. Deng Xiaoping ordered
the recovery of the education system of the pre-cultural revolution period. This resulted
in rehabilitation of private schools, and the resumption of the entrance examinations for
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universities. The motto with wide currency during this period was “Learning from the
West.” This motto had resurged again as it had in 1905.
Deng’s reform was symbolized by two key words - kaifang (open) and gaige
(reform)-, these connote the nature of the reform policy. The government in this period
was based upon those dominant principles: “the four modemizations”of industry,
agriculture, national defense, and science & technology, and “three orientations” toward
modernization, the world, and the future (Cheng, 1998).
The education reform in the 1980s consisted primarily of quantitative growth.
Schooling expanded as the 9-year compulsory education law was enforced, and the scale
of educational finance increased correspondingly.
4.1.3.4 Phase IV: The Jiang Zemin Period (1998-2002)
The education reform in the 1990s sought to increase the quality of education by
improving teacher education, highlighting student achievements, developing school
policy, and so forth. The educational leader in the Jiang period has the same basic policy
framework as former President Deng, both based upon marketization in the public sector
and an open door policy to western society.
Major policy goals, according to the announcement of the Ministry of Education
(1996), include (1) facilitating non-government schooling like private education, (2)
reforming the management and structure of higher education, (3) furthering innovation in
the

rural

education,

(4)

reforming

teacher

education

and

curriculum,

modernization of the education system and its codification in law (Wang, 2003).
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and

(5)

Table 4.2 Societal and Educational Trends and Changes in China 1977- 1993

Years

1977-1985

Society

Education

Deng Xiaoping returns
Four modernization

•

Rural responsibility system
De-collectivization
Pragmatism: the only truth
is practice

Economic rehabilitation
1985 Decision on Education
1986- 1988

1989- 1991

1992- 1993

Redevelopment of higher
education
Closures of revolutionary
schools
Reintroduction of key schools
Examinations reintroduced
Academic over ideological
Growth of vocational-technical
education
Universalization of basic education

Open door policy
Over- expansion of higher education
Industrial responsibility
Student loans
System
Commissioned students
Special economic zones
More autonomy to principals
Professionals dominant over party
Joint venture company
Higher economic growth
Overseas study
Inflation
Mismatches with job
placement
Growth halted
Recession
Politics classes reintroduced
Ideological conflict
Military service for some
Leftist conservatives
Party dominant over
Politics in control
professional
Recentralization
International isolation
Return to high growth
Higher education growth
Freeing labor market
Self funding students
International reintegration
Large scale school funds
raising
Rapidly expanding credit
Elite orientation, promotion of key
‘Socialist market economy’ schools
Deng Xiaoping visit Shezhen Development of private
tuition

Source: Levin et al. (1994) modified, p. 4-5
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4.2 Korea
Coupled with longitudinal description of decentralization in China, this section
presents the case of Korea. It will focus on the reform background that was intertwined
with various environmental, educational systemic, and historical variables.
4.2.1 Environmental Context
Korea has achieved both remarkable economic development and educational
advancement in a short time. In particular, it is said that its economic success can be
attributed to its evolving system of education. That education is a primary mover of
national development is not new to world history. Plato stated directly that “his republic
would prosper to the extent that the proper kind of education was provided.” (McGinn et
al., 1980, p. 60)
Education in Korea has shown unprecedented development during the past
decades, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, the enrollment at the precollegiate stage in 1995 was more than 90% of its age group, in sharp contrast to the
situation in 1945, the time of national independence after World War II, when the
absolute majority of Korean population, 86%, were left uneducated by the colonial policy
(Moon, 1998). McGinn et al. (1980) have observed an intriguing aspect of Korean
education:

In 1960, with a per capita income of $90, Korea stood fairly close to the normal
pattern of human resource development for a country with a mean per capita GNP
of nearly $200.” In 1965, with a per capita income of $107, Korea’s pattern of
human resource development was equivalent to that of countries with a GNP per
capita of $380.[p. 62]

Qualitatively, students from Korea showed their excellence in mathematics and
science in various international student achievement tests, such as PISA (Programs for
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International Student Achievements) and TIMSS (Trend In Math and Science Studies).
While the Korean education system attracted worldwide attention as an example of
success in student achievement, the general public in Korea has long remained
dissatisfied with it. They appear to believe that education in their country has serious
problems such as (1) an overheated educational fever and (2) endlessly rising expenses
for out-of-school learning activities, creating unreasonable financial burdens for parents.
Despite the sharp contrast between home and abroad in the assessment of
education in Korea, many have paid close attention to the driving force of Korean
education. What made this educational growth possible? Also, what characteristics of this
education led to the Korea’s rapid economic advancement?
The general explanations for national advancement in developing countries
including Korea are based on two theories: the modernization theory and the human
capital theory. The modernization theory is premised on the idea that education is “an
integral part of the modernization process.” As Adams and Gottlieb (1993) identify,
Modernization refers to a particular conceptualization of social change which
describes development as a transition from a traditional society whose roles are
ascribed, functionally diffuse and focused on particularistic goals, to a modem
society characterized by clearly identifiable specific roles which are acquired
through the application of achievement criteria and are oriented toward
universalistic norms. Modernization is ...strongly influenced by education.[p.l63]

The human capital theory maintains that education is an investment for creating
rich human capital both for the individual and for society as whole. Investment in
education is supposed to increase individual productivity and income, consequently
improving the national capacity for production and wealth (Cohen & Geske, 1980).
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It might not be possible to understand how Korea could achieve such a
remarkable growth in education in such a short period of time without looking at the
socio-cultural context that goes beyond the two theoretical explanations mentioned
above. There are several attributes that can account for the rapid expansion of education
in Korea since the inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948. They are political, socio¬
economics, and cultural.
A common tradition has prevailed for long time in Asian countries. That is a
reverence for education and educated people. It appears to have originated from
Confucianism, and Korea was no exception. In the early history of South Korea, this
legacy had a stronger influence on educational growth than did the various government
policies.
As reflected in the phrase Gun Sa Bu II Che (King, teacher, father are one body),
teacher and teaching were highly revered. The Confucian legacy left a zeal for
learning, an image of a cultured, accomplished person and a drive for education at
all costs. Education became a widely accepted and unquestioned goal. [Adams &
Gottlieb 1993, p. 164]

Sorrensen( 1994) identifies some interesting points regarding how Korea has
accomplished the quantitative aspect of its educational achievement. He observed two
features of education in Korea: the low level of resources and the high level of social
capital.
Korea’s low level of educational resources is evidenced by its level of financial
investment in education. Korea invested less than 4% of its GNP on education since the
establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948; other countries budgeted greater
percentages for education than Korea. In fact, Korea could not afford to invest much of
its national treasury in education because of the low capacity of its national economy.
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This low level of resources could be seen in the teaching force in the early stages of
industrialization in Korea. The average level of education in the teaching force was less
than two years of college.
Secondly, when it comes to Korea’s educational achievement, non-school factors
were often discussed as the key element responsible for its extraordinary performance.
That is, Korean education is based on a high level of social capital such as strong family
structure, norm of frugality, hard work, and high valuation of education. The educational
growth of Korea cannot be accounted for by a single factor. Sorrensen (1994) goes on to
argue:
Educational success is a complex interplay of values, institutions,
economic resources, and accumulation of knowledge... [and] is less a matter of
curriculum, class-size, and educational technique than a consequence of how
education is embedded in the fabric of Korean society. [ p. 13 ]

Coupled with the Confucian ideology apparent in the high valuation of education,
the family structure of Korea is often viewed as a crucial clue toward understanding the
characteristics of education in this country. Unlike the American family, according to
Sorrensen, the Korean family is a kind of corporation. This is associated with parental
enthusiasm, the so-called Chima Baram (skirt wind) for their children’s education. The
family commitment for its member’s education is unique in its intensity and duration.
4.2.2 Educational System
4.2.2.1 Overview
Influenced by the American model, Korea adopted the 6-3-3-4 education system
in 1952.

This happened 3 years after the first 6-6-4 school ladder system was

implemented in 1949. The system consisted of 6 years of primary school, 3 years of
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middle school, 3 years of high school, and 4 years of college or university. The system
contains various types of schools and institutions such as teacher colleges and colleges of
education, junior colleges, air and correspondence colleges and open universities, trade
schools and higher trade schools, civic schools and higher civic schools, special schools,
kindergartens, and miscellaneous schools.
Enrollments have rapidly increased since 1945 at all levels of schooling. Primary
school enrollments nearly tripled, from 1,366,685 in 1945 to 3,622,685 in 1965. The
fraction of students in the 6-to-12-year-old cohort was 45 percent in 1945, but it had
increased sharply to 90 percent by 1960, and was almost 100 percent (universalized) in
1970. Even though the number of elementary students decreased in the 1980s because of
the falling birth rate, similar growth was seen in secondary and tertiary education (Guo
and Cummings, 2005).

Table 4.3. Enrollment Rates by School Level and by Sex
Junior high
M
1985
1990
1995

F

100.5 99.6
87.9 98.5
101.4 101.8

Senior high

Tertiary institutions

Total

M

F

Total

M

F

100.0
98.2
101.6

83.2
90.5
92.4

75.5
85.4
91.3

79.5
88.0
91.8

48.0
50.0
69.9

21.4
23.9
38.6

Total
35.1
37.4
57.9

Source: Kim, Y.H. (1999), p. 58
The education law required a minimum number of school days per academic year.
For instance, at least 220 school days per year are required at the pre-collegiate level,
while a minimum of 32 school attendance weeks are required at the tertiary level. There
are two semesters per academic year at the tertiary level. The first (spring) semester
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begins on March 1 and closes at the end of August, whereas the second (fall) semester
starts on September 1 and ends on February 28.
4.2.2.2 Educational Administration
Educational administration in Korea has a three tier structure: central government,
■

municipal or provincial government, and local government. The central authority is

(
represented by the Ministry of Education, which is responsible for seeing that the
Constitutional missions for national education are fulfilled.

The Ministry takes

responsibility for i) planning macro-educational policy based on the national government
standards, ii) composing and submitting various laws associated with education to the
legislature, iii) managing the generation and allocation of the education budget, iv)
coordinating subordinate agencies for policy design and implementation, and v)
supervising the educational practices of municipal/provincial governments and those of
higher educational institution such as universities and colleges. The ministry has a
number of bureaus and departments executing each function mentioned above. Major
departments among them are the planning and management office, the supervision and
i|

textbook compilation office, the university education office, and other five bureaus.
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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

Minister of Education
T
Vice Minister

▼

Colleges & Universities_
BOARD OF EDUCATION
9 provinces & 7 metropolitan areas
Superintendent

▼

Vice Superintendent

▼

High Schools

OFFICE OF EDUCATION
186 towns
Head Officer
T

Elementary/Middle Schools

Figure 4.2 Education Administration System in Korea. Source: Adams and Gottlieb
(1993), Ministry of Education, Korea (1991)

As shown in Figure 4.1, under the leadership of the Minister of Education in the
central government, the provincial and municipal governments administer various
educational affairs, focusing on elementary and secondary schools. There are 7
metropolitan city offices - Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangjoo, Ulsan and 9 provincial offices of education. The provincial/metropolitan education office is
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under the control of both the Ministry of education and the board of education in each
area.
Each board of education in the provinces and municipalities is responsible for
local ordinances, the review and approval of school finance, and the inspection of the
district education offices. The members of a board were selected by a provincial or
municipal assembly until this was changed to an electoral college system in 1994,
consisting of representatives from parents, teachers, and community leaders. The
superintendent of each province/municipality had been elected by the relevant board of
education, but this also changed in 1994 to the same electoral college system used to elect
the board members.

SUPERINTENDENT

T
Vice Superintendent
▼

School Affair Bureau

Planning and Inspection Div
General Affairs Div

Administration Bureau
Administration Div.
Financial Affairs Div.
Education Facilities Div.
Construction Div.

Elementary Education Div.
Secondary Education Div.
Science and Tech Edu Div.
Non-Formal Education Div.
Physical Education Div.

Figure 4.3 Organization of the Provincial/Municipal Office of Education in Korea.
Source: Adams & Gottlieb(1993), Ministry of Education (1990)
The district office is the lowest unit of education administration under the
jurisdiction of the provincial/municipal education government. It has the authority to
supervise all education affairs in each district regarding kindergarten, elementary, and
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middle school education. The authority includes planning, budgeting, and regulation
within the standards set by higher level authorities. There are 180 district offices of
education in Korea. As seen in Figure 4.3, the district office has two main divisions of
administration and school affairs. Their subdivisions and functions are similar to those at
the provincial /municipal organization.

Officer of Education

T

School Affairs Division

Administration Division

T

T
Elementary Education Section
Secondary Education Section
Science and Tech Edu Section
Non-Formal Education Section
Physical Education Section
School Affairs Section

General Affairs Section
Management Section
Planning and Inspection Section
Accounting Section
Finance Section
Facility Section

Figure 4.4 Organization of a District Office of Education in Korea. Source: Adams &
Gottlieb (1993), Ministry of Education (1990)
4.2.2.3 Educational Finance
There are three major sources of funding for education in Korea: the central
government, local authorities, and private contributions. The central government (the
Ministry of Education) has two accounts - a general and a special account - for national
education. The general account is used for the operational costs of the headquarters of the
Ministry of Education, grants for local education, and subsidies for national universities
and public educational institutions, including its annexed organizations. The special
account is established for the improvement of the educational conditions in pre-collegiate

62

schools, for a special education tax, for a special private education fund, and for national
university hospitals.
The general account receives revenues from property, sales of goods & services,
sales of capital assets, and foreign borrowing. The special account includes revenues
from the transfer tax for local education, the education tax, carry-over from the previous
year, and transfers from other accounts (Ministry of Education, 1999).

Ministry of Education

[ General Account ]

[ Special Account ]

- Operational cost
- Grants for local education
- Subsidies for national
university and public schools

- The special educational tax account
- A special account for education conditions
- A special account for national university
hospitals

T
Provincial Government

[ Grants from Central Government]

[Transfer from Local Government]

- Grants from general account
- Transfers for local education

- Special account for teachers’ salary
- part of the cigarette consumption
tax
- other subsidies

- Special account for improvement
of educational conditions
- Government subsidies
[ Other Sources ]
students’ tuition
sales of properties

Figure 4.5 Structure of the Educational Budget for Central and Provincial Governments
in Korea. Sources: Lee (1995), Ministry of Education (1996)

The revenues for the provincial office of education come from the national
treasury and the provincial government. The major sources of revenues are from the
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central government: grants from the general account, grants from the special account for
improvement of education conditions, and government subsidies. The revenue is
supplemented by allocations from the local government: special accounts for teachers’
salaries, part of the tobacco consumption tax, and other subsidies. The expenditures of the
provincial office of education cover the expenses of educational administration, school
operation, facilities and equipment, subsidies for private schools, and an emergency fund.
In addition, the educational expenditures pay for the educational programs and
services provided by the provincial/municipal government of education, as well as the
salaries of teachers and employees in elementary, middle, and high schools in each area.
Among the crucial sources of education funding in Korea is the education tax. It
was first introduced in 1958 as the source of educational finance, and abolished in 1961
when the law of education funding for compulsory education was enacted. The 1961 law
made the local governments dependent on the central authority because it promulgated
the national government’s power and responsibility for providing education finance.
Since the 1980s, the law has earmarked 11.8 percent of the national internal taxes for
educational outlays in order to secure financial stability in national education.
The national government’s budget for education has increased steadily since the
inception of the Republic in 1948 as shown in Table 4.4. While the ratio of the
educational budget to the total government budget in 1962 was 14.9 %, it reached 22.8
% in 1995.

64

Table 4.4 Government Budget vs. Ministry of Education Budget by Year (In thousand
won)
Year

-

1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1999

Government Budgets(A)
69,481,150
94,652,348
446,273,301
1,586,931,050
5,804,061,441
12,532,361,835
22,689,432,968
54,845,022,310
88,302,427,989

Education Budgets (B)
10,367,630
15,331,155
78,478,212
227,925,711
1,099,159,170
2,492,308,215
5,062,431,258
12,495,810,267
17,456,265,315

B/A *100
14.9
16.2
17.6
14.4
18.9
19.9
22.3
22.8
19.8

Source: Ministry of Education (1999). Education Statistical Yearbook, p.873

4.2.2.4 Uniqueness of Korea’s System of Education
Many studies have sought to identity the features underlying the expansion of
education in Korea. They seem to agree that education in Korea is different from that of
other countries with similar conditions. Three areas that are unique to Korea are
substantial private contributions, low unit cost, and automatic promotion policy (McGinn
et al., 1980; Adams & Gottlieb, 1993; Sorrensen, 1994; Guo and Cummings, 2003).
First, Korea has a unique social background including community support for
private schools and family support for education. The expansion of education in Korea
since 1945 was made possible through private contributions. This was based on the fact
that, with its limited resources and commitment to primary education, the Korean
government relied heavily on private schools for providing secondary and higher
education. As shown in the Table 4.5, while the private schools’ share of the total
enrollment in primary schools is only 1.3 %, their shares of high school and junior
college enrollment are 54 and 96 percent, respectively, in 2001.
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Table 4.5 Enrollments of Korea by School Type, 2001 (unit: %)
Level

National

Public

Private

Primary School
Middle School
High School
Junior College
College/Umv.

0.3
0.4
0.9
1.4
36.4

98.4
77.8
45.3
2.5
0.9

1.3
21.8
53.8
96.0
62.7

Source: Guo (2003) p. 83, Ministry of Education (2002)
Financial support from students and their families is another feature of Korean
education. Korea is an outlier among developing countries where the non government
sectors usually contribute little to education: “In Korea, parents have traditionally been
expected to make a financial contribution to education above their contribution through
taxes.”(Guo and Cummings, 2005, p.87) Table 4.6 shows the family contributions to
education, by levels. Family support covers almost half of the total educational outlays,
and these percentages increase as students advance, from 40.6 % in middle school to 72
% at the college level.

Table 4.6 Revenue Sources for Education-Family/Private Contributions in Korea, 1989
Source

Average Primary

Middle

High

Public Sources
- central gov’t

56.04

97.84

59.32

26.87

27.60

46.99
9.05

97.59
0.25

45.55
13.77

18.57
8.30

9.54
18.07

Private Sources
- Tuition/Fees
- PTA Fees

43.85

2.16

40.68

72.62

72.40

30.51
10.17

58.81
13.81

43.08
29.32

Total

100

100

100

100

- local gov’t
& others

30.73
13.12

0.98
1.18
100

College/Univ.

Source: Ministry of Education (1989), Adams & Gottlieb (1993), p. 168

66

Second, educational development was enhanced in the beginning stages by the
low unit cost for education. For example, the per pupil expenditures (PPE) per year in
1965 were $7 in primary, $18 middle, and $152 in high schools respectively. In the same
year, the PPE in Iraq were $81, $98, and $608, respectively (McGuinn et al., 1980).
This low unit cost was the result of domestic policy and foreign aid. The domestic
factors were low teachers’ salaries and large class size. Teacher salaries in 1965 were W
6,220 per month for primary school, W7,690 for middle school, and W8,860 for high
school teachers (exchange rate: 1$ = W250). How low the teacher salaries were can be
seen by comparing them with the cost of living at that time: the average expenditure for a
family of five living in Seoul was W 12,270 per month.

With the rapid increase in

enrollment after the end of World War II, the class size went the same path with a large
number of students. A large class size means a low per pupil expenditure. For example,
in 1965, 11 percent of the primary school classrooms held more than 90 students, and
another 26 percent had between 81 and 90 students.
Foreign aid also played an important role in keeping Korea’s expenses for
education low. Financial support from the US military government between 1945 and
1947 covered almost two thirds of the operational cost of running the primary schools.
Foreign aid to Korea from 1952 to 1966 totaled about $100 million. About half of this
money was invested in classroom construction for primary and secondary schools,
facilitating the expansion of education after the Korean War in 1950.
What is clear is that foreign assistance made it possible to build a great
many classrooms (23,000 either new or rebuilt) specifically intended for
instruction that probably would not have been constructed as such a rapid rate
without the availability of capital and materials. [ McGinn et al., 1980, p. 70]
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Third, Korea is one of the few countries that has maintained a policy of automatic
promotion at all school levels. This policy had the effect of increasing both the
enrollment rate and the advancement rate to the next levels, consequently resulting in the
expansion of education from the early stages. This expansion was accelerated further by
the open-door policy initiated in 1968 which allowed every elementary graduate to enter
middle school without examination. In practice, there was a clear increase in the
promotion rate as a result of this policy. For example, while 75.6% of the males and
55.8% of the female students went to middle schools in 1964, these percentages were
83.0% and 67.1% percent in 1974, respectively (Kim, 1973).
4.2.3 Historical Review of Education Reform
Korea has kept its own traditional and historical roots of education. At the same
time, it has been sharing experiences with neighboring countries like America, Japan, and
China in that those countries had considerable influence on the establishment of
education in Korea in the modem period. The history of education reform can be better
understood by considering each stage of national development. It is usually thought that
there are five stages for this.
4.2.3.1 The First Phase: the Period of US Military Government (1945-1948)
With the end of World War II, the United States Military Government (USMG)
took charge of education until the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The
educational policy of the USMG was to replace the Japanese system with the US system.
American military administrators believed that education should play a key role in
democratizing and modernizing Korean society. To this end, they issued three mandates
for education: i) the education system should provide equal opportunity for all, ii) it
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would be controlled at the local level to reflect the heterogeneity of the population, and
iii) it would strive to develop students with self-reliance and a sense of responsibility
(McGinn et al., 1980).
In order to initiate educational innovation in the freed Korean society, the military
government established two committees: the Korean Committee on Education (KCE) in
September, 1945 and the National Committee on Educational Planning (NCEP) in
November of the same year. These committees were composed mainly of Korean
educators and educational professionals: the US military camp recognized that it knew
very little about Korean education.

The NCEP designed three important education

policies that became the basis for the education system in modem Korea: i) setting a
national education goal such as Hongik Ingan (devotion to the welfare of the human
being), ii) introducing six-year compulsory education, and iii) establishing the 6-3-3-4
school ladder system (Presidential Commission for Education Reform, 1997).
4.2.3.2 The Second Phase: the Period of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960)
The USMG transferred the authority for education to the Korean government
when the first Republic of Korea was established in 1948. The three years of USMG was
fraught with political instability and economic difficulties. Furthermore, the Korean War
between the South and the North that broke out in 1950 made all situations terribly
worse, and conditions for education were no exception. Nevertheless, this period is
credited for establishing the foundation of the education system which remains to the
present. Under the First Republic led by Syngman Rhee, the father of modern Korea,
many educational measures were planned and implemented. Critical among them were as
follows.
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The first education law was enacted in 1949, one year after the inception of the
Republic. This enactment called for a 6-year free compulsory education program,
discussed first under the USMG by many Korean education experts, to be implemented.
The introduction of compulsory education reflected the ever increasing demands for the
education of the general public which could not be met during the previous regime. A 5year plan for the completion of compulsory education at the primary level was created in
1954 and was implemented from 1954 to 1959. The plan universalized primary
education, with an enrollment rate of 96.64% in 1959 (Presidential Commission for
Education Reform, 1997).
Local educational autonomy was institutionalized in 1952, a first in the history of
education in Korea. The law created the provincial and the local boards of education, and
the local school districts. The provincial boards were composed of representatives from
counties and controlled secondary education matters. The local boards represented the
various wards and townships and controlled primary schools. This system of autonomy in
education survived until the military regime suspended it in 1961.
During the Korean War, although the destruction was enormous in terms of
school buildings and teachers, education reform continued. For example, the education
law was amended to implement educational decentralization in 1951. The wartime
tertiary education program - War Time Union Colleges - was introduced to sustain
higher academic education. Therefore, despite the unprecedented hardship confronted
during the war, the level of enrollment in primary education was maintained with the
financial assistance of international organizations such as the UN and USAID (McGinn et
al., 1980).
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4.2.3.3 The Third Phase: the Period of Chung Hee Park (1961-1979)
The 1960s were a period of a rapid economic development in Korea. President
Park Chung Hee, who took power through a military coup in 1960, announced the
priorities of national policy: the number one agenda item was economic development;
other major agenda items were national defense, national unity, and the development of
Korean culture. Every public policy was supposed to be closely linked to the economic
policy. This direction was translated into concrete policy in education. During this 18year period, education policy was characterized by the following major features:
strengthening the role of the central government, quantitative expansion of education, and
universalization of secondary education.
The central government actively began to involve itself in every aspect of policy.
The government designed a series of the Five Year Economic Development Plans, the
first of which covered the period 1962-1966. In conjunction with these economic plans,
five year educational reconstruction plans were also prepared.
While Korea achieved the universalization of primary education during the 1950s,
it strived to accomplish the universalization of secondary education by the end of the
1970s, achieving an enrollment rate of 95% for the junior high schools by 1980. This
expansion of the school enrollment rate was attributed to two education reforms. One was
the open-door policy for middle schools: the entrance exam to junior high school was
abolished in 1968. As a consequence, all elementary school graduates were expected to
enter middle school in their school districts without tests. The other reform was the high
school equalization policy of 1973 which terminated the high school entrance exam. This
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policy helped to increase high school enrollment from 28.1% in 1970 to 63.5% at the end
of the 1970s.
4.2.3.4 The Fourth Phase: the Post-Park Authoritarian Regime (1980-1992)
While quantitative expansion was the major focus of education policy through the
1970s, education in the 1980s showed a departure from the former stages in that it placed
some emphasis upon the quality of education. The government of General Chun Doo
Hwan, Park’s successor, initiated a radical and comprehensive education reform in 1980:
this was so called the 7.30 reform. This reform package contained a handful of
educational innovations as follows: i) the abolishment of the college entrance exam and
its replacement by the Scholastic Aptitude Test (the Korean SAT), ii) the expansion of
compulsory education to 9 years, iii) the introduction of graduation quotas at universities,
iv) the establishment of an education tax, v) the prohibition of private tutoring, vi) an
increase of the enrollment quotas at universities, and vii) the extension of education
college programs from 2 to 4 years.
Another distinctive feature of educational policy in the 1980s was that the
government undertook for the first time the long-term systematic planning of its
education policy. This was to be done by the presidential commission for education
reform. The first presidential commission was established in 1985 and lasted until 1987,
and a second one served from 1987 to 1989 (Ahn, 1999).
The mass political democracy movement was another feature of the 1980s which
had an effect on education. During the 1980s, the teachers’ movement captured the
public’s attention, particularly that of parents. This was triggered and encouraged by the
socio-political environment that culminated with the announcement on the 29th of June in
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1987, by the ruling party’s presidential candidate, of the Declaration of Democracy. This
will be discussed in a later section. A group of teachers established Jeon Kyo Hyup (the
Korean Teachers Association: KTA). They argued that education needed more autonomy,
and that teachers should participate in the process of decision making on important
education policies. Later, the KTA evolved into Jeonkyojo, the first teachers’ union in
Korea.
4.23.5 The Fifth Phase: Civilian Regime (1993-1997)
Since the beginning of the 1990s, as quantitative expansion approached its
ceiling, there was a growing consensus in Korean society that the education quality issue
should come to the fore.

Although Korea had, after decades of effort, achieved the

universalization of primary and secondary education, it was confronting challenges that
required a shift of the education paradigm and system innovation (Park, 2000).
First, even though Korean education showed remarkable performance as
evidenced by student scores in the international student achievement tests such as PISA
and TIMSS, the precollegiate level was still very deficient in nurturing self-assured and
creative students with self-motivated learning abilities. Second, the quality of higher
education was still far behind that of advanced countries despite the fact that it had
experienced a quantitative explosion during the previous decades, as could be seen in the
enrollment rate of 80% in 2000, one of the highest levels in the world. Third, there was a
serious systemic problem in Korean education. It had suffered from too many regulations
and was highly centralized. During its development, the central government, with heavy
regulations, took control of almost every aspect of education from elementary to tertiary
education. This center-oriented system seemed to work well in the beginning stages of
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education development. However, it became a major hurdle with respect to the qualitative
improvement of education.
It was out of a growing consensus on how to cope with the challenges described
above that the Presidential Commission on Education Reform (the PCER) was set up in
February, 1994. The PCER was asked to draft a comprehensive reform plan in response
to increasing demands for education innovation. It presented a series of the reform
proposals - the 5.31 Education Reform - in four separate reports between 1995 and 1997.
The vision of education reform was to establish a New Education System for “Edutopia”,
a utopia of education. Korea was to be “an Education Welfare State - a society of open
and lifelong education to allow each and every individual equal and easy access to
education at any time and place.” The major objectives of the reform were: i) to build an
open education system, ii) to revitalize elementary and secondary education, iii) to lead
higher education to full autonomy and diversification, and iv) to increase financial
support for education to 5% of GNP (PCER, 1997; Moon, 1998).

Table 4.7 Chronology of Major Korean Education Policies and Reforms
1946 establishment of the ministry of education, the first national curriculum reform
1949 promulgation of the education law
1952 establishment of free and compulsory elementary education
1964 discontinuation of the national qualifying examination for entrance and graduation
from colleges and universities
1968 i) promulgation of the Charter of National Education, ii) establishment of the
preliminary college entrance examinations administered by the MOE, to be taken prior to
the entrance exam administered by colleges, iii) abolition of middle school admission
exam
1973 i) reform of the high school admission system (“equalization of high schools”): all
students to take a state qualifying exam, and to be assigned by lottery to a regional high
school, ii) implementation of “the New Education System”, iii) elementary and secondary
curriculum reform
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1980 7.30 educational reform : i) abolition of individual college exams and its
replacement by National Uniform College Entrance Preexamination, ii) weight to be
given to high school academic records in college admission procedures, iii) establishment
of college gradation quotas, prohibition of private tutoring
1985 establishment of the Presidential Commission for Education Reform
1987 publication of Korean Education Reform: Toward the 21s’ Centuiy
1988 i) reorganization of the advisory council for education policy, ii) establishment of
the presidential commission on education as a permanent advisory body to the president,
iii) reform of college admission procedure (students to apply for college first, and take
the-entrance exam later), abolition of college graduation quotas
1994 establishment of the Presidential Commission for Education Reform
1995 release of the first proposal of the 5.31 education reform
Source: Adams and Gottlieb (1993), Ministry of Education (1998)

CHAPTER 5
CROSS-SECTIONAL COMPARISON OF
EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CHINA AND KOREA

This chapter begins by briefly presenting an overview of the theoretical
framework for comparing policy development and implementation processes across
countries. After that, it goes on to describe education governance reform in specific cases
- China and Korea - through the late part of the twentieth century. First, it examines the
motivating forces underlying this education reform from political, economic, socio¬
cultural, financial, and educational standpoints. This is followed by a description and
analysis of policy implementation including structural renovation and financial reform
during the period 1985-1995. Then it identifies the consequences of these reforms such as
the changing aspects of education finance - e.g., per student expenditures and revenues.
Finally,

it

compares

the

two

systems

and

discusses

their

commonalities

and

dissimilarities.

5.1 Policy Process and Reform Stage
This section reviews the policy process for a systemic comparison of educational
governance reform in China and Korea. This includes the concept of the policy process,
with various aspects or stages. It tries to identify how the three major stages of reform motive, action, and consequence - are related to or overlapped with the key phases of the
policy process. Then, the context in which the policy process takes place is followed.
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5.1.1 Three Major Stages in the Policy Process
The public policy process refers to “all mechanisms through which the decision
making and the implementation of public policy are made in our society.” The policy
process characterizes “how a political system goes about transforming public demand for
governmental action, arising from the socio-economic environment, into public policy”
(Miyakawa, 2000, p.2).
Scholars do not agree upon the nature of the policy making process. Instead, they
have different perspectives on how policy is made from formulation to termination, and
to complicate matters, every policy does not necessarily take the same path. Some of the
steps are often omitted when a final decision is suddenly made by a top manager. While
the process can theoretically be separated into logical stages, it is in practice very
complex and can not clearly be divided into separated stages (Ahn, 1984).
Table 5.1 Policy Process
Content by Stage
Authors
No. of Stages
Agenda setting, policy formation, decision
Adolino and Blake
5
making, policy implementation, policy evaluation
(2001)
Agenda setting (formulation), policy decision making,
Ahn (1984)
4
making, policy implementation, evaluation
Problem definition, policy agenda setting, policy
Anderson et al.
6
formulation, policy adoption, policy
(2000)
implementation, policy evaluation
Agenda setting, policy formulation, policy
Choi (2000)
4
implementation
Initiation, information, consideration, decision,
Jenkins (1978)
7
implementation, evaluation, termination
deciding to decide, deciding how to decide, Issue
Hogwood and
9
definition, forecasting, setting objectives and priorities,
Gunn (1984)
options analysis, policy implementation, evaluation,
policy maintenance, succession, termination

Table 5.1 demonstrates a variety of ways in which different scholars view the policy
process. Their theories have 4 to 9 stages, and there is considerable commonality.
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although different wording may be used. The stages and contents of the policy process
appear to depend on the econo-political system and stage of development of the society,
e.g., capitalist vs. socialist societies, and advanced vs. developing countries.
As can be seen in Table 5.1, however, three to five stages of policy making may
be considered common to all cases. They include agenda setting, policy formation,
decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation (Adolino & Blake, 2001;
Ahn, 1984; Choi, 2000).
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a systemic analysis and comparison of
three aspects of educational decentralization reform in China and Korea: motive, action,
and consequences. That is, i) what were the primary motivating forces?, ii) how was the
reform idea implemented?, iii) what were the major consequences?, and iv) what were
the similarities and differences between the two countries?
These three aspects of reform that have been selected for comparison are
important because they comprise the major phases of the public policy process in any
society as described earlier. It is possible to broadly parallel, if not tightly couple, these
three empirical aspects of reform with three theoretical stages of policy. To be more
specific, motive relates to or overlaps with problem identification and agenda setting,
action relates to or overlaps with policy

formulation and implementation,

and

consequence relates to or overlaps with evaluation. Table5.2 shows selected stages of the
policy process and associated comparison variables.
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Table 5.2. Selected Stages of Policy Process and Associated Comparison Variables

Major policy process

Major aspects of reform

Specific contents

problem identification/
agenda setting

motives

political, economic, social,
and administrative reasons

policy formulation/

actions
law,

enactment or revisions of

implementation
evaluation

enforcement, election.
consequences

efficiency, equity, adequacy

5.1,1.1 Problem Identification and Agenda Setting: Motives of Reform
The policy agenda refers to a set of problems that are recognized as needing to be
solved by the government. It has various forms depending on their contexts (Ahn, 1984);
it means system (public) agenda or government (official) agenda depending on who is the
subjective actor of the agenda: the general public or government.

It constitutes a new

agenda or an old agenda depending on whether it is repeated. Others classify these types
of policy agenda as problem definition agenda, proposal agenda, and negotiation agenda ,
or optional agenda and required agenda.
The policy agenda comes up, as a system agenda or a public agenda, with public
problems based upon socio-political, economic, and educational matters. Attention is
paid as to why some problems are successful in obtaining a government’s serious
attention while others do not. One of the most important factors in a problem getting
public policy agenda status is the political leadership, e.g., the president and legislature
(Anderson et al. 2000). It is seen in the cases of China and Korea.

79

Depending on the social environment, the policy agenda appears to become set in
various ways. Cobb and others (1976) identify the three different paths: outside initiation,
inside initiation, and mobilization.
In the outside initiation approach, a systematically organized interest group raises
social issues and attracts public interest and concerns through mass rallies and
advertisements. Based upon this public attention, they put pressure on the government to
place the issue on its formal policy agenda.
In contrast, inside initiation tries to capture government attention by collective
group activities; they do not use advertisement or mass demonstration to attract public
attention. Finally, in the mobilization approach, the government is actively involved in
moving an issue from the systemic agenda to the institutional agenda. In this approach,
the government fosters the establishment of non-government organizations (interest
groups) that are keenly concerned with particular policy problems. Agenda items are
presented by these interest groups and naturally take their place on the formal policy
agenda. By this approach, the government is likely to obtain the support of the public,
and avoid its criticism and opposition.
According to Cobb et al. (1976), these three models are related to the political
system of each society. The inside and outside initiation approaches are more commonly
found in democratized societies, while the mobilization approach is more often seen in
authoritarian regimes.
5.1.1.2 Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation: Actions
When a problem gets official agenda status, it needs to become formalized in
order to be developed into public policy. Policy formulation connotes “the development
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of a pertinent and acceptable proposed course of action for dealing with public problems”
(Anderson et al., 2000, p.15). It is one thing, policy adoption is another. That is, policy
formulation does not necessarily mean the adoption of laws or orders. Once, the policy is
adopted, implementation is supposed to follow.
Implementation refers to “the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually
incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders
or court decision” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983, p.20). In the U.S., the major actors for
policy formulation, adoption, and implementation are the president, the congress, and
administrative agencies.
The focus of policy implementation research has changed over time, showing a
generational cycle. The first generation of research was most concerned with whether the
results of a policy fulfill its stated goals. The second generation was interested in how
different individuals and institutes responded to the policy, and is most concerned about
conditions for the successful implementation of the policy across the board. Finally, the
third generation tries to draw lessons from the two former generations, by establishing
conditions for the achievement of the intended effects of the policy (McDonnell &
Elmore, 1987).
At one time, implementation was regarded as a less important step than policy
formation and design. However, since the mid 1970s, many studies demonstrated the
importance of implementation in policy, citing it as a crucial factor for the success of
policy. That is, however well designed a policy program is, it will be useless or even
counterproductive unless it is properly and fully implemented.
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McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identify four generic policy instruments for
implementation: mandates, inducements, capacity-building, and system-changing. In
addition, Adolino and Blake (2001) suggest four types of policy instrument: direct
government

instruments,

market

instruments,

voluntary

instruments,

and

mixed

instruments.
As mentioned earlier, this study uses three stages of education reform - motives,
action, and result - as a proxy for the commonly mentioned phases of the policy process
with which they overlap. The stage of action covers three phases of the policy process:
policy formulation, adoption and implementation. Based on these overlapping concepts, I
shall analyze the cases of China and Korea in terms of how the reform motive and ideas
were formulated or implemented. The examples explored include the introduction of nine
year compulsory education and the enactment of the related law in 1986 in China, and the
revival of local autonomy and enactment of local educational autonomy law in 1991 in
Korea.
5.1.1.3 Evaluation: Consequences/Results
The last stage of the policy process is evaluation. The results of the
implementation of the policy are evaluated by assessing how successful the policy has
been in achieving its intended goals. For effective evaluation, it is important to specify
what the original goals and objectives were, and to use some adequate evaluation
techniques. Without that, it is not possible to conduct a valid evaluation: the results of the
evaluation are likely to be biased or limited (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Hill & Hupe,

2000)
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Regarding the policy evaluation, Anderson et al. (2000) suggest two types: seatof-the -pants or political evaluation and systematic evaluation. Adolino and Blake (2001)
identify three arenas of evaluation: judicial, administrative, and political. Political
evaluation is not a desirable method because it is “impressionistic in nature. At best, such
judgments are based on fragmentary evidence and are often strongly ideological or
biased” (Anderson et al., 2000, p.17).

In contrast, both administrative and systematic

evaluations are conducted by the government or by a professional evaluation agency.
They try to obtain objective evidence in terms of statistics, for example, of the degree of
success. They are the preferred approaches.
This study uses systematic evaluation methods to assess the results of educational
governance reform. However, because of limited data accessibility, several major policies
that were implemented in the two countries, such as nine year compulsory education in
China and local education autonomy in Korea, are evaluated using not only statistical
analysis, but also non-statistical inference.
5.1.2 Policy Making Context
As described in the previous section, policy ideas have contextual sensitivity.
Similar programs will appear different in terms of agenda setting, policy formulation, and
implementation, depending upon their county-specific environments. For example,
education reform ideas from industrialized nations, e.g., OECD member countries, may
not be duplicated in less developed countries, e.g., China, Korea, and the East Asian
countries. Therefore, to take this into account, policy making should be country-specific.
For example, the political system theory emphasizes the relationship between input,
throughput (conversion) and output, which are strongly influenced by environmental
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factors. Most important are the socio-cultural, econo-political and the institutional
environments in different countries (Easton, 1964; Adolino & Blake, 2001). Examples of
each are described below.
5.1.2.1. Socio-cultural Variables
Education reform can be influenced by at least two important cultural factors. One
is the attitude of the public toward the existing educational system. Public dissatisfaction
with current educational services and demands for quality education lead to education
innovation

movements.

In

many

cases,

this

is

independent

of the

country’s

developmental stage. The other factor is a shift of the ideological values that education is
to pursue. For many nations, at some point in time, a dominating concern becomes, “Who
is education for?” In other words, equality of opportunity in education can become the
most predominant issue in a society. However, this ideology does not last forever; rather
it soon yields to the next wave of values such as excellence, efficiency and marketoriented value. Such shifts in value orientation have forced educational leaders to initiate
education reform policies (Cuban, 1990). This occurred in China and Korea: each
restructured its educational governance system for this reason.
5.1.2.2 Econo-political Variables
The need for the development of a national economy in the competitive global
market inevitably requires labor forces to be better equipped with knowledge and skills.
In particular, education is required to be more responsive to the demands of the everchanging industrial and information society. For example, business leaders tend to blame
education when the economy declines. This is the so-called “scapegoat theory” that calls
for educational innovation as a panacea for many or all of the existing problems. An
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examination of the global trend in education reform reveals that it is based upon the
perceived need to establish a human infrastructure for economic development in the age
of information and high technology. Korea and China are just such cases. Investigating
the political system can reveal how the education policy making process is affected by
political actors such as interest groups, legislators, and partisan leaders. The influence
that interest groups can have depends on the degree of democratic development. For
example, under an authoritative regime, interest groups’ impact may be small when
compared with the impact that they can have in a democratic society.
5.1.2.3 Institutional Variables
One of the common policy issues in the international comparison of public policy
in education is, “Who controls education?” Different countries have developed dissimilar
systems of educational governance, with different policy making processes in dissimilar
contexts. For example, European countries such as France and the Scandinavian countries
use a centralized decision-making process, unlike other countries in the European
regions. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon nations such as America, England and Canada have
highly decentralized policy making traditions (Castles, 1993).

5.2 Motivating forces
5.2.1 China
As in many other countries, education reform in China since the 1980s was led by
a variety of idiosyncratic forces including econo-political, socio-cultural, educational, and
financial variables.
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5.2.1.1 Econo-political Sources of Reform
When they launched a broad reform in the mid 1970s, Chinese leaders led by
Deng Xiaoping declared a set of paramount principles for national development,
particularly for the recovery of the glory of China. These cardinal principles were the
three orientations: modernization, the world, and the future, and the four modernizations:
industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. These strategic
principles for national development focused on economic advancement.
To realize national modernization, the Chinese government adopted two key
strategic policies: the open door policy and the market-driven economic policy (Hawkins,
2001). China initiated education reform as part of this broad economic reform, with the
strong belief that education plays a key role in economic development by providing an
infrastructure of human resources, i.e., a well-trained workforce.
The market economy had a critical impact on Chinese education reform (Wang,
2003). The market function working in the field of education resulted in increased
productivity and efficiency in education. This was the economic foundation for education
reform. The economic reform movement changed and broadened the mode of education
from the traditional to a modem one. Consequently, the education policy stressed
reformation of the existing education system by the introduction of market-driven
programs; e.g., school choice and privatization.
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Chinese education policies fluctuated
each time there was a change in political leadership. It is often said that Chinese public
policy changed because each political leader had a different perception of “the national
development”: they pursued different ideological directions (Tsang, 2000).
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The two major ideological streams of the policy in modem China were the radical
led by Mao Zedong, and the moderate led by Deng Xiaoping. The two factions had
different primary goals for national construction. The radicals stressed ideological
devotion to communism and human liberation. The moderates valued the material and
moral improvement of people’s lives. The former paid much more attention to the
continuous class struggle and revolution to change the social relations of production,
while the latter pursued the practical and tangible improvement of the standards of living
of the general public.
5.2.1.2 Socio-cultural Sources of Reform
Two social and cultural elements also provided impetus for educational reform.
One was the public attitude toward the Cultural Revolution (CR), which lasted from 1966
to 1976. In general, the CR was judged by the Chinese people to be a nightmare, having
brought devastation, deprivation, and destructive turmoil. This severe perception helped
to build a broad consensus on national construction and triggered a social innovation
movement in China.
What confronted the new generation of decision-makers was a harsh
reality: very poor living conditions, deeply confused ideology, a national
economy which was on the brink of collapse, and a closed society which had lost
its confidence in constructive criticism. These problems were recognized as a
serious impediment to social and economic development, and thus invited broad¬
ranging reforms. [Lewin & Hui, 1989, p. 7]

The other was the cultural and historical factor, engraved in minds of the general
public in China that had traditionally led education reform. The Chinese people were
proud of their historical heritage, being the nation of great philosopher Confucius and a
country of “the four great inventions” in the history of the world: printing, magnetic
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compass, gunpowder, and paper. This national confidence that they can do anything and
realize a great nation in the near future led the national reform policy in the late 1970s
(Guo and Cummings, 2005).
5.2.1.3 Educational Sources of Reform
The

conventional

belief that education is

a primary mover of national

development had a strong influence on the launch of both the educational and economic
reforms. From the outset of economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese leaders
recognized the importance of skilled workers and the serious shortage of human
resources for economic development in China as well. This was evidenced by Deng’s
remark:
....the economy of our country may approach the level of the developed countries
at its 100th anniversary. One of the reasons we say so is that we possess the power
to develop education well, to increase the scientific and technological level and to
train hundreds of millions of all kinds of qualified manpower at all levels in the
time before the 2040s. Our country, its power and the potential of economic
development depend increasingly on the quality of labor and on the quantity and
quality of the intellectuals. [ Deng Xiaoping, 1985, cited in Lewin et ah, 1994, p.
17]

His remark caused Chinese leaders to pay close attention to education, and to
believe that without education innovation, no economic and national development could
be achieved. They recognized that the education system at the time of reform would not
able to meet the increasing demands of society, in particular with respect to the four
modernizations (Hawkins, 2001).
There were four problems that the Chinese government sought to correct by
education reform in 1985 (CPC Central Committee 1985, Wan Li 1985, Lewin et ah,
1994). First of all, elementary education was problematic because of its low quality; this
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was having a negative effect on all subsequent levels of schooling. Secondly, vocational
and technical education had failed to provide a properly trained workforce; there was a
mismatch between the job requirements of the labor market and the levels and kinds of
skill of graduates. Thirdly, the entire education system was not working as a social
institution that leads societal changes, nor was it responding to the various needs
stemming from the social, economic, scientific and technological, and cultural changes
that were occurring. Fourthly, the educational governance system was being operated so
rigidly by the highly centralized authority that it suffocated the eagerness of local
governments to develop their own educational programs and systems for their people. It
“deprived them of their vitality and initiative in serving the need of socialist
construction” (Lewin et al., 1994, p. 19).
The major goal of the 1985 education reform was to strengthen primary
education. This was to be accomplished by the expansion of compulsory education, and
by governance renovation and financial reform. In addition, reform of vocational and
technical education was stressed. It was clearly announced in the CCP Decision on
Education Reform in 1985 which said:
Through the reform, we mean to usher in a new education situation in
which elementary education will be substantially strengthened, vocational and
technical education will be greatly expanded, colleges and universities will be
able to exploit their potential and exercise their initiative to the full, outside
school and after school education as well as regular school education will develop
simultaneously, and education of all kinds and at all level will actively address the
multiple needs of economic and social development. [CPC, 1985]

5.2.1.4 Financial Sources of Reform
Although the several motivating forces for reform in China have been described
above, it is important to understand that the most imperative issue in education reform

was school finance, not only its adequacy, but also its efficiency. Many countries in both
developed and developing stages pursue school reform in the name of improving
educational achievement, enhancing the involvement of stakeholders, or facilitating
power redistribution. However, China initiated a radical transformation of its governance
structure, from a highly centralized system to a decentralized one, for a different reason.
The main purpose of this reform was to cope with ever increasing financial demands,
primarily the result of its population expansion and the introduction of nine-year
compulsory education. When China popularized basic education in the mid 1980s, the per
capita income was $300; by comparison with other countries, this was regarded as
inadequate to implement that policy. An adequate financial basis was recognized to be
imperative for the effective implementation of the reform policy (Tsang, 1996).

5.2.2 Korea
Paralleling the discussion of China in section 5.2.1, this section examines the
same three dimensions of educational governance reform in Korea: motivating forces,
decentralization in action, and the consequences of reform.
The driving forces underlying the decentralization movement in Korea are very
complex in terms of their scope and density. While the financial problem was a strong
reason for governance restructuring in China, political democratization had been a
paramount agenda item for the Korean government since the mid 1980s. The major
motivations that drove the education decentralization reform between 1985 and 1995 in
the Republic of Korea are described in this section.
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5.2.2.1 Socio-political Motivation for Reform
As Huntington argues, one of the most impressive global features in developing
countries such as those in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in the late
twentieth century was the global democratic revolution. More than 30 countries changed
their political systems from authoritarian to democratic between 1974 and 1990
(Huntington, 1991), and Korea was one of them. This revolution had a deep impact on
the centralized system that was firmly rooted in Korea’s socio-political background.
Boyer and Ahn (1991) present the main reasons for Korea’s solid and complete
centralization.
First, South Korea is an inheritor of the Confucian tradition of a centerdown authority structure. Second, the legacies of centralization of the Yi dynasty
(1392-1910) and Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) are still alive, and third, South
Korea, similar to other developing countries, chose to follow the neoclassic topdown growth model of monolithic industrialization. Fourth, South Korea’s
perception of North Korea as a continuing threat to its security provides a
rationale for central control of all public affairs. Fifth, South Korea experienced a
succession of military regimes from 1961 to 1987. [Boyer and Ahn, 1991, cited in
Lee 1995, p. 23]
Korea had been under authoritarian regimes for thirty years, from 1961 to 1991.
During this period, decentralization was suspended despite the fact that the Constitution
in 1948 clearly promulgated a national system of local autonomy. Furthermore, President
Park’s so called Yushin Constitution” in 1972 prescribed that the local assembly would
not be constituted until national unification was achieved. The fall of the Park regime in
1979 gave new hope to the Korean people; there was an outpouring of demand for
democracy and for the revitalization of the local autonomy system.

2 President Park Chung Hee revised the national constitution in 1972 to include many
undemocratic provisions such as the elimination of the presidential term and adoption of
the indirect election of president.
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During the political chaos - the so called Seoul Spring - followed by the
assassination of President Park in 1979, General Chun Doo Whan captured power and
became the next president. Not unexpectedly, the situation became even worse. Many
political dissidents and student activists raised questions about the legitimacy and
political authority of Chun’s government, and they argued consistently that the existing
constitution should be revised to establish a democratic political system in particular, and
a democratic society as a whole. This socio-political confrontation between the
government and the anti-government groups culminated in April, 1980 when President
Chun declared that his government would keep the existing constitutional system. This
presidential announcement triggered a massive demonstration against the government.
Hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens joined this movement, demanding the
resignation of the president and arguing for regime change. This incident was quite
different from any that had occurred before; the general citizenry rarely joined in
demonstrations against the government, even though they shared the sentiments of the
activists, because they believed that this type of demonstration was the province of
student activists and politicians only (Seth, 2002).
This unprecedented situation brought about a historical turning point in Korean
society. The presidential candidate of the ruling party, Rho Tae Woo, issued a political
reform package that was called “The 6.29 Declaration.” This reform proposal included
eight socio-political reform agendas, and chief among them was the revival of the local
autonomy system. This political momentum stimulated wide-ranging discussions of
educational decentralization reform in Korea.
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5.2.2.2 Legal Motivation for Reform
When the national assembly tried to draft a national constitution in 1948, one of
the important issues was the local autonomy to be granted for administration and
education. This had been a key topic of political conversation between 1945 and 1948
under the US military regime. The American authority had sought to implant the US
educational governance system into Korea, and this was incorporated into the first
constitution without serious objection. Ever since then, Korea has had a legal basis for
systems of local autonomy.
The National Constitution stipulated local autonomy in its Chapter 8:
i) the local self-governing authority shall manage local-based
administrative affairs and national duties delegated from the central government
under the jurisdiction of related laws. The provincial authority shall enact various
ordinances for local autonomy within the laws (article 96). li) the organization
and operation of local self-governing authorities shall be based on laws, and a
local assembly is established in each jurisdiction, iii) laws shall be enacted for the
organization, power, and election of local board members (article 97). The
constitutional article on education says that laws shall be enacted to guarantee
educational autonomy, professionalism, and political neutrality (article 31).

The Basic Education Law also prescribed that:

educational
autonomy and professionalism, ii) they shall initiate educational
policies which reflect well local-specific educational demands, iii)
school autonomy shall be respected, and parents, students, school
staff, and community leaders can participate in school operation
according to the related laws and ordinances (article 5). The Local
i) the central and local governments shall guarantee

Educational Autonomy Law reasserted the above; its main purpose was to
prescribe the organization and the function of local self-governed authorities over
education, science, technology, and physical education, and to make contributions
toward the educational development of each province (article 1).

These three documents together - the Constitution, the Basic Education Law, and
the Local Educational Autonomy Law - served as the driving engine to achieve
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educational decentralization between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.
5.2.2.3 Administrative and Organizational Motivation for Reform
When the discussion of local educational autonomy was getting heated in the late
1980s, several problems with the existing system of administration and organization led
to the relocation of educational power. Despite the legal ground, the laws relating to local
autonomy didn’t come into full effect until 1991. This was because each law contained a
supplementary provision stating that for a while, the central government would carry out
the functions ultimately to be performed by the local assembly.
Originally, the regional boards in the metropolitan cities and in the provinces were
given the authority to handle all issues relating to general administration and education.
The executive officers for general administration were the mayors or governors
respectively, while those for education were the boards of education, which were to
delegate the authority for educational policy design and implementation to the
superintendent, a member of the board of education.
These functions, however, were not fully implemented. According to the Local
Autonomy Act, the functions of the local assemblies were to be exercised by the central
government until they were legally constituted; the Ministries of Home Affairs and
Education assumed the roles of the local assemblies and boards of education,
respectively.
Consequently, the members of the boards of education were appointed by the
minister of education following the recommendations of the mayor or governor of each
area. The superintendents were selected by the board of education and recommended to
the

central

government

for

appointment.
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Finally,

the

president

appointed

the

superintendents. Thus, local autonomy in education became superficial; this contributed
to renewed discussions of educational decentralization.
5.2.2.4 Financial Motivation for Reform
When it comes to the main purpose of governance reform, many developing
countries like China treated solving the financial problem as the main goal of the reform.
The financial centrality in Korea made some contributions to the discussion of
decentralization.
The financial imbalance between the central government and the provincial
governments was the core issue that had to be addressed. A method for increasing or
normalizing the local tax base, which was far smaller than the national tax base, was
needed. Although democratization, including decentralization, was an overarching idea
that had a strong influence on all sectors of society in 1989, the percentage of local taxes
was only 18.8% of the total tax revenue. When compared to the OECD countries such as
the United States (30.8%), Japan (25.9%), and Canada (43.3%), Korea’s tax base was
very centralized. This weakness in the degree of local financial independence in Korea
was one of the most important barriers to local autonomy (Park, 1992).
The financial dependence of local governments on the central government was
still the same in 1991. National taxes accounted for 81 percent of all taxes, and local
taxes 19 percent. By comparison, Japan’s national taxes were 63.4%, local taxes 36.6%;
and in the United States, 56.3% and 43.7%, respectively (Ito, 1992, p. 427).
The low tax base for local governments is closely related to Korea's basic policy
for development. The central government-driven development policies brought about
several socio-economic contradictions. Chief among them were serious economic

imbalances between regions, and large economic differences between urban and rural
sectors. For example, Seoul (the capital), and its neighboring Incheon and Gyeonggi
provinces were highly developed areas that accounted for 40% of Korea’s GNP, while
two-thirds of the country’s 260 local administrative units (cities, counties, and wards) had
been left behind in development, and could not even generate enough local tax revenue to
pay the salaries of their government officials.
In seeking a solution to this problem, local citizens argued that great investments
should be made for regional social and economic development. They believed that the
implementation of local autonomy would bring about locally balanced development, and
changes in Korea’s centralized public finance (Kojima, 1992).
There were at least three motives that led to financial decentralization in Korea
(Park,

1992; Lee, 2003). First, fiscal decentralization would make it possible to

implement the economic development projects more efficiently. If local governments,
rather than the central government, design these projects, local governments will have a
greater commitment to achieving efficiency and effectiveness in these public services.
Second, decentralization is an economically efficient way of delivering local services.
The uniform service provided by the central government may not meet specific local
demands because various localities have diverse needs for particular public services.
Third, decentralization enhances democracy through popular participation in the process
of local decision-making on important financial matters. Local residents would have an
increased voice as they determine the direction of local service delivery.
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5.3 Decentralization in Action
5.3.1 China
Educational decentralization reform in China took various forms. Most important
among them were the introduction of nine-year compulsory education, the structural
reform, and school finance reform.
5.3.1.1 Nine-year Compulsory Education
Education reform in China appeared to pursue both quantitative and qualitative
goals in the 1980s. The former is epitomized by the introduction of nine-year compulsory
education while the latter is reflected in the policy of vocationalization of schooling. The
latter diversifies the type of schooling in order to meet the needs of various customers
including government, enterprises, private business and individuals.
Government leaders in their educational planning were encouraged to take a long¬
term perspective, as the old Chinese saying: “It takes ten years to grow a tree, but it takes
one hundred years to rear a human being.” They believed that it was most imperative to
build an educational infrastructure for the future development of their nation. For
example, reducing illiteracy was a basic task for the Chinese government to undertake in
order to rehabilitate its old glory in the long-term perspective. The one feasible solution
to this problem was the expansion of compulsory education.
Compulsory education reform was an ambitious plan in terms of both scale and
scope. It provided hundreds of millions of children with the opportunity to attend schools,
and demanded that a huge amount of money be invested in education. In consideration of
their economic status, education professionals adopted an incremental approach and the
division of labor strategy between the central and local governments, and between the
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governmental and non- governmental sectors. The Compulsory Education Act, the first
education law in the modem history of China, provided a firm basis for the systematical
implementation of the reform.
The law required that (State Education Commission, 1986; Mulligan, 1991):
1.

Under the central government’s administration, nine-year compulsory education
should be carried out by local governments in accordance with local conditions.

2.

All children who reach the age of six, regardless of their sex, nationality, or race,
must receive compulsory education. In areas in which the conditions are below
the standard, the age can be extended to seven.

3.

Those parents and guardians who refuse to allow their children who have reached
the age of schooling to receive compulsory education will be criticized, and
necessary measures will be taken by the local government to order them to send
their children to school.

4.

The local governments are authorized to stop any work unit or individual person
from employing children and adolescents through criticism or punishment, such
as suspending a business license.

5.

Compulsory education is divided into two stages: elementary and junior high.
The universalization of elementary compulsory education is a condition for the
implementation of junior high compulsory education.

6.

The government encourages enterprise, institutions, and other social groups to
establish various kinds of schools in accordance with the compulsory education
law.
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7.

Compulsory education is tuition free. Students from poor families can receive
some financial aid from the states3.

8.

The State Council and the local governments at all levels should guarantee the
collection of the funds needed to implement compulsory education.
In order for the new law to be effectively implemented, the State Education

Commission took several concrete measures including financial measures, establishing
standards, and prohibiting child labor (Mullligan, 1991). The introduction of compulsory
education was expected to result in

increased enrollments in primary

schools,

consequently causing additional financial needs. To cope with these financial demands,
the State Council and the State Commission of Education initiated the so-called
additional 1 percent tax, imposed on any unit of work and business. This additional tax,
in addition to regular payments on product and business transactions, was supposed to go
the local governments.
Local governments responsible for providing the compulsory education service
needed standards and requirements for the effective implementation of the law. The
central government issued a regulation for this purpose in 1987: “The State Commission
of Education’s Idea on Making Standard Conditions for Running Compulsory Education,
and Steps, Targets, Plans, and Statistics in Implementing Compulsory Education”
(General Office of the State Commission of Education, 1987). The standard was linked to
the local conditions in terms of economic and societal circumstances. It provided two
basic principles. One was that the local government policy should meet the standard of a

Financial aid to students from poor families might be a political rhetoric because the
Chinese government couldn’t afford even compulsory education itself with GDP per
capita of $ 385 at that time (Tsang, 1996).
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higher level authority. The other was that each level of government should operate with a
division of labor. The township should implement compulsory education when its
condition can meet the standard required by the new law. The county governments were
in charge of inspecting and guiding the implementation of compulsory education. The
provincial governments were responsible for managing a broad range of policies such as
planning, regulation, and school financing policies.
The Chinese government recognized that there were structural obstacles to the
implementation of compulsory education. Chief among them was the problem of child
labor and the dropout rate. In 1988, the State Commission of Education issued a
regulation prohibiting the use of child labor. This measure was needed because for
several decades many enterprises and private institutes had abusively hired young
children under the age of sixteen. The use of child labor was viewed as the main cause of
the dropout problem in elementary and secondary education. According to the
government statistics for 1979-1984, the dropout rates in elementary and lower secondary
schools in the whole county were 46 and 39 percent respectively (Bakken, 1988). The
regulation strongly warned employers not to use child labor.
Anyone who abusively hires and uses child labor will be ordered to return
the child and pay a fine from three thousand yuan to five thousand yuan for each
child hired. And in serious situations, authorities will take away the business
registration. Private enterprise and business people should sign a contract when
they hire people to avoid hiring child labor. Legal action will be taken against
those who violate the law and hire child labor that results in an accident.
[Mulligan, 1991, p.104]

5.3.1.2 Structural Reform
Structural changes that were realized during the education reform period in the
1980s can be divided into several categories. In addition to the expansion of compulsory
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education

explained

in

the

previous

section,

decentralization,

recentralization,

privatization, and vocationalization of schooling were also of momentous importance.
Implementation of decentralization in China was influenced by both the global
trend and Chinese-specific conditions. From the global perspective, many developing
countries were decentralizing responsibility for managing and financing primary and
secondary education. Three reasons for this worldwide trend were: i) dissatisfaction with
highly centralized systems of education was increasing, ii) education systems were
becoming larger and more complex, and iii) the financial capacity of the central
government to provide quality education was limited (Rondinelli, 1989).
In the 1970s, the Chinese society had witnessed a reform movement led by its
new leadership: Deng Xiaoping and his followers. The Chinese leaders saw the pitfalls
of the social system as a whole, particularly in the government system. They believed that
the system was dominated by a rigid bureaucracy, that management operated in a very
inefficient way, and that the decision-making structure was too highly centralized. In
addition, it suffered from a chronic shortage of resources for the implementation of policy
(Delany & Paine, 1991).
In general, new leadership tended to initiate changes to distinguish itself from the
previous regime, to legitimize its new authority and leadership. Under Deng Xiaoping
decentralization was initiated with a different rhetoric, albeit with the same instrument.
That is, “decentralization can serve purposes quite different from those stated, namely in
resolving

management

conflicts,

establishing

(Cummings & Riddell, 1994, p. 766).
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legitimacy,

and

asserting

control”

This movement had resulted in a change in the authority structure in the mid
1980s. Important among them were i) delegation of authority to the local level, ii)
delegation of administrative decision-making to experts, a departure from the partydominated structure, iii) stress on efficiency and accountability, and iv) emphasis on
market function in every social field (Wang, 2001).
The structural change in China’s education system was rooted in the Decision of
Education Reform by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1985. This resolution is
comprised of five sections: i) restructuring education to improve the quality of the nation
and produce as many skilled people as possible, ii) entrusting responsibility for
elementary education to local authorities, and instituting nine-year compulsory education,
iii) restructuring secondary education and vigorously promoting vocational and technical
education, iv) reforming the enrollment plan at the institutions of higher education, and
the system of job assignment on graduation, and extending their decision making power,
and v) strengthening leadership and mobilizing all positive factors to ensure successful
restructuring of education (CPC, 1985, p. 2).
The basic principle of power relocation in Chinese education was characterized
by the division of labor: central planning and local implementation. The authority and
responsibility for primary education belonged to local governments. That is.
Except for major policies and principles and general plans that are to be
determined by the central authorities, all other responsibilities and powers are to
be delegated to local authorities for drawing up and implementing specific
policies, rules and regulations, and plans as well as for guiding, administering and
monitoring the work for the schools. The authorities of the provinces, autonomous
regions and centrally administered municipalities will define the functions and
powers for administrative departments at all levels. [CPC, 1985, p. 236]
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In Deng’s new decentralization in 1985, power and responsibility devolved to
units at every level: provinces, municipal cities, county, township, and village
communities. The first aspect of Deng’s decentralization was that village governments
were accountable for primary education in terms of management and finance. They were
specifically responsible for raising funds for education. Township governments took
responsibility for providing junior secondary education, while county governments had
the obligation of handling senior secondary education. At each level an authority had
been created for financing the schools, and for the hiring and firing of teachers, with
some limited control of the curriculum. To complete the picture, higher education was
assigned to the provincial or the central government (Hawkins, 1996).
The second aspect of Deng’s decentralization was the restructuring of power in
schools. During the 1985 reform period, there was a change in principal assignment.
Before reform, school principals were appointed by the upper level authority. This
traditional practice was continued until it had evolved to a western type selection model
in which the schools were allowed to adopt an open application system. In this new
system, candidates applied and principals were selected by teachers and other educational
professionals (Wang, 2001).
Just what happened in school sites during education reform depended on the
political situation. When the schools were hyper-politicized, the school administrators
including principals were less powerful; instead party secretaries residing in the schools
became dominant. However, in the times when education was depoliticized, school
principals exercised major authority in school operations.
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The third aspect of Deng’s decentralization was departure from state party
intervention. Before reform in the 1980s, there was a dual system of school policy
decision-making; both principals and the party representatives of schools participated.
The party personnel had full authority over major decisions such as teacher staffing,
curriculum, textbooks, and school finance. The internal party apparatus at schools had the
final voice in deciding any administrative and social programs so that they would meet
the community’s ideological standards. This dual system came to an end when Premier
Zhao Ziyang pronounced at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 that there should be a true
separation of the state and Party authority in schools. Since then, party influence in
school administration declined considerably (Delany & Paine, 1991).
Policy often goes back and forth like a ping-pong ball. During the reform period,
China experienced two modes of policy oscillation, moderate and radical, and
decentralization and recentralization. The ambition of the Chinese government to initiate
nine-year compulsory education with limited economic capacity was accompanied by a
power shift to local units from the centrality. In fact, decentralization of authority and
responsibility was aimed largely at generating financial to support the new policy.
However, “for a variety of reasons, including issues of equity, the central
government in 1994 began a process of recentralization removing certain tax authority
from the local governments” (Hawkins, 2000). The most frequently cited reasons for this
recentralization in Chinese education involved psychological, practical, and political
points. First of all, decentralization had caused a sense of crisis among central
government officials. They feared losing control of education matters that had
traditionally belonged to the central government. Secondly, because this central policy
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gave local governments the authority to make major decisions independent of the central
authority, it created the problems of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. When local
governments insisted on having their own leeway for major projects that were sometimes
against the will of the upper level authority, there were no appropriate tools to control
them, thus despoiling the national policy. In addition, the local policy may not utilize the
economy of scale that improves efficiency. Finally, decentralization encouraged localism
and particularism.

The rearrangement of intergovernmental relations increased the

autonomy of local governments, and at the same time, it caused a lack of the national
unity in terms of the consistency and coherence of the central policy (Wang, 2001).
Consequently, the central government in 1994 withdrew the tax authority that had been
handed down to localities in 1985. Again, the central government imposed taxes and
levies to provide for education, including compulsory education (Hawkins, 2000).
As the market function was introduced to the socialist economic system, the
educational sector saw a range of changes. Critical among the structural changes were
privatization and school choice.
Traditionally, as in many other countries, Chinese education has evolved with a
dual tracked-school system: private and public or government schools. Before the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China, most private schools were founded and
run by preeminent educators who were influenced by western civilization, or by foreign
missionaries who entered China to teach new ideologies of development.
This education system led to social stratification. However, the new Communist
country founded in 1949 with an egalitarian and collectivist ideology was not very
tolerant of the existing system. Since then. Private schools began to disappear or were
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forced to merge with public schools, and did not reappear throughout the education
reform period in the 1980s when the market driven national innovation was undertaken.
The second phase of education reform began in 1993 with measures to revitalize
private schools and to allow school choice. Private education then appeared in two forms,
traditional private schools and semi-private schools; often called people-run schools
(min-ban school). The reintroduction of private schools meant the establishment of a
market environment in the education sector, thus weakening the monopoly of the public
education system and improving school quality through the resulting competition
between them.
With the reemergence of private schools, the ideology of the market economy
gave birth to a new policy that provided parents with an unprecedented opportunity to
choose schools that their children would attend. The emergence of school choice
appeared to be influenced by several socio-political and economic condition associated
with the changing Chinese society.
While the popularization of compulsory education was aimed at expanding the
opportunities of school aged children in a quantitative manner, the vocationalization of
education was intended to differentiate the school system to better meet the various needs
of the stakeholders including the government, private companies, parents, and students. It
was a trial of a qualitative change in the education system.
There has been some tension between universalization and vocalization. When
China initiated reform in 1985, two key problems facing secondary education were the
major impetuses for vocationalization in education. One was the serious shortage of the
middle level works and technicians that can support economic development. The
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economic reform, to increase productivity and efficiency, required workers equipped with
specific knowledge and skills. Thus the training and education system needed to be
changed by formally establishing a dual education system with a general regular track
and vocational and technical education tracks.
The other was the pressure for admission from applicants to universities and
colleges.

Only limited numbers (e.g., 4% of total graduates in 1980) of senior high

school graduates can progress to universities or colleges. To ameliorate this problem, it
was imperative for the Chinese government to restructure the secondary education system
into a dual track - general academic schools and technical-vocational schools (Lewin et
al., 1994).
As noted above, education policy changed with alteration of political leadership
and its perspective on the relationship between education and national development. The
vocational education policy has had a somewhat oscillating pattern throughout the
Chinese history. When the leadership valued ideological function in education, vocational
education diminished. When market-oriented groups came to power, it flourished.

5.3.1.3 Education Finance Reform
Several factors have led to the education finance reform in China. Most critical
among them was increasing financial needs as mentioned previously. Coupled with the
expansion of compulsory education, which needed a huge amount of additional funding,
the increase of population and the ideological position that education is closely linked to
economic growth also led to financial reform.
Education finance reform was implemented as part of general financial reform.
This means that educational policy was influenced by the general administration policy.
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This finance reform has gone through several stages since the 1980s. Until the late 1970s,
the financial system in China maintained its traditional center-oriented structure. Most tax
revenues were collected by local governments, and remitted to the central government.
The central funds then were reallocated to the local governments according to criteria
established by the central authority.
The 1980 reform changed the financial system from a centralized to a revenue¬
sharing system. More specifically, revenue was distributed in three ways: central revenue,
local revenue, and shared revenue. During the first stage of reform in 1980-1984, 80% of
the shared revenue went to the central government and only 20% to the local
governments. During this period, a uniform formula for allocation was applied, creating
an eagerness within local governments to generate financial resources. The new system
created considerable surpluses in wealthy regions and deficits in poor regions.
The second stage of fiscal reform came in 1985 when the Chinese government
recognized the problem of regional disparity caused by the revenue-sharing system. They
redesigned the fiscal system by introducing a different formula for each region,
depending on its socio-economic situation. The main purpose of this reform was to
narrow inequity among regions. The consequence was that the less developed regions
were allowed to hold relatively more of the funds they had raised, while the advanced
regions along the east coast such as Beijing and Shanghai were more tightly controlled by
the central government. This policy gave rise to unexpected problems. That is, “a high
share of remittance dampened the enthusiasm of the local governments to expand their
tax bases” (Ma & Norregaard, 1998, p.3).
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The third stage of reform in 1988 was intended to rekindle the local governments’
zeal for gamering resources. The State council introduced a new system with six types of
revenue sharing between the central and the local governments. It increased the revenue
of the major provinces such as Beijing and Shanghai. However, this system also was not
free from shortcomings. It encouraged local governments to conceal their fiscal capacity
in order to escape remittance to the central government. They did this by shifting
budgetary funds to extra budgetary funds4. This resulted in a sharp decline of the
budgetary revenue to GDP from 28% in 1979 to 13% in 1993 and the central
government’s share from 51% to 28% in the same period.
In short, the financial decentralization reform in the 1980s caused three critical
problems. It increased the central government’s deficit, it widened regional inequity, and
it weakened the central government’s capacity for microeconomic management.
In search of a solution to these problems, the Chinese government initiated a tax
assignment reform in 1993. It was designed to increase the percentage of the budgetary
funds to the GDP, and to expand the revenue share of the central government. The major
contents of the reform were a redefinition of revenue sources for the central and local
governments, and this change was followed by a reassignment of national taxes and local
taxes. The national tax bases were expanded. In addition, a new organization, the
National Tax Service (NTS), was established to collect revenue for the central
government.

4 The two major sources of educational finance included budgetary funds mainly from the
central government, and extra-budgetary funds from non government sectors such as
social contribution, school-generated income, school fees, and surcharges and levies by
local governments.
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In order to mitigate the local governments’ resistance to this fiscal reform, the
central government took a position of political compromise. For example, first, the
reform was supposed to be carried out gradually; second, local interests were to be
protected by keeping the local share more than it was in 1993; third, the increase in the
central revenue should be from the shared revenue.
This 1993 tax reform brought about a remarkable increase of the central
government’s share of the revenue, from 22% in 1993 to 56% in 1994. This implied that
the Chinese government had changed its policy direction, turning to recentralization of
financial governance after eight years of implementing decentralization.
In general, a government reform requires several reform instruments such as
mandate, inducement, capacity building, and system change. Although each instrument
might sometimes be used separately, these are generally utilized in a combined manner
(McDonell & Elmore, 1989). In the financial reform in China, the methods of mandate,
inducement, and system change seem to have been applied. China adopted the systemchange strategy in decentralization and diversification of educational finance in 1985. It
also took the mandate and inducement strategy that was seen in “the three-growth
principle” and in “the minimum average growth rate principle” in 1993.
The 1985 decentralization of education was done in response to financial issues
rather than to matters of education quality (Cheng, 1997). The traditional model of school
finance had been based on tong shou,

tong zhi (complete collection, complete

distribution) and chi daguo fan (eating from the one big pot). This means that providing
educational services, including school finance, was the responsibility of the central
government. This traditional mode was changed into feng zon chi fang (eating from
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separate pots). The authority and responsibility for'education were transferred from the
central to the locality since the reform in 1985, with the hope that it would be a more
effective way to collect funds for education.
The diversification strategy was another system-change strategy that altered the
resource generation mode from central government-only to a multi-channeling mode.
This diversified mode documented by the 1993 Reform Resolution of the CCP included
six types of funding methods. These are: i) urban and rural educational surcharges levied
by local governments, ii) contributions from industry and social organizations, iii)
donated funds from community organizations and individuals, iv) tuition fees from
students, v) income from school-run enterprises, and vi) funds from central authorities
(State Education Commission, 1994; Hawkins, 2000).
As mentioned above in the financial reform story of the 1980s, the system change
epitomized by the 2-Ds methods (Decentralization and Diversification) was not
successful, neither in terms of sufficiency nor of equality.

Therefore, a more

comprehensive reform package was released in 1993. The major reform document,
“Guidelines on Education Reform and Development,” included the three-growth strategy
as a mandate to the governments.
The first growth was that, while the main source of education funds should be
from the government, the education budget should increase every year at a higher rate
than that of the regular government revenue at each level of government. The second was
that the education expenditure per student should be increased year by year. The PPE (per
pupil expenditure) is a popular barometer of the quality of education and a standardized
index of the financial capacity for public education. The third was that the ratio of the
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total education expenditures to GNP should be increased annually, and it should rise to
4% of GNP by 2000 from 2.2% in 1993.
Another mandate strategy for the generation of educational resources was the socalled minimum average growth rate principle. It was contained in The Eighth Five-year
Plan (1991-1995) that “projected a minimum average of 15 % of government budgetary
allocations to education during the 5 years.” (Wang, 2001, p. 98)

5.3.2 Korea
Educational governance reform in Korea was characterized by its macro-systemic
reform and the restructuring of financial authority for providing pre-collegiate education.
Horizontal decentralization at the local level accompanied by a vertical one is described
below.
5.3.2.1 Two Perspectives on the Implementation of the Governance Reform
There are two major ways to implement governance reform. These were first
proposed by the National Education Policy Investigation of South Africa (NEPI, 1993).
One is a macro-systemic approach that emphasizes the relationship between the central
and local governments. It assumes that any change in education is supposed to be
affected by changes in intergovernmental structures. Governance reform, therefore,
begins with systemic changes in intergovernmental relations at four levels including
national, regional, local, and school (Wang, 2001).
The other is a micro-systemic approach that deals with the dynamics of school
site governance among the local actors such as parents, teachers, and community leaders.
This approach focuses on school management, which is the responsibility of parents.
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teachers, and students (Wang, 2001). The decentralization reform in Korea has evolved
from the macro-systemic approach in the beginning of 1990 to the micro-systemic
approach in the mid-1990s.
5.3.2.2. Macro-systemic Reform of Educational Governance in 1991
As described in the previous section, the local autonomy system introduced by the
implantation of the western ideal in 1948 had been put on hold for three decades by the
military regimes since 1961. In the late 1980s, the fall of the authoritarian government
gave Korea a momentum to revitalize the local autonomy system, one of the core agenda
items for democratization in the political arena. As seen in many other societies, reform
tends to be more easily initiated when the political situation is unstable (Hanson, 1997).
Korea was no exception.
The local educational autonomy movement was fostered by the political
environment in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s, the massive demonstration by political
dissidents and student activists for democracy in Korean society encouraged actors at
school sites to pursue democracy in education. The democratization campaign for
education had centered on the decentralization of power and authority from the central
government to localities, and to school sites. The education governance reform in Korea
since the so called “Seoul Spring” in 1980 focused on the intergovernmental system
innovation rather than on school governance reform, and the motivating force was
political rather than economic or financial.
The key actors for decentralization, political parties and various interest groups in
the society, have competed in revitalizing and designing the local education autonomy
systems. Chief among them were: i) political parties including the ruling party (DJP:
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Democratic Justice Party) and three opposition parties, ii) the Presidential Commission
for Education Reform (PCER), and iii) teacher groups such as the Korea Teachers Union
(KTU) and the Korea Federation of Teachers (KFT). They all shared the belief that the
existing system was so highly centralized that democratization in education could not be
achieved without innovation in the governance system.
The ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), had a sense of political
obligation because its presidential candidate, Rho Tae Woo, promised the revival of the
local autonomy system in 1987 when he proposed a political reform package, known as
“the 6.29 eight points proposal.”

Before the presidential campaign in 1987, the ruling

party took a first step toward keeping its political promise by revising the constitution
with the cooperation of the opposition parties. The existing constitution was based on the
former president Park’s 1972 Yushin Constitution that neglected local autonomy. Ever
since the Park’s constitution, the local autonomy system was not a concern of the central
government.
This was partly revised by Park’s successor, Chun Doo Whan, in 1980. The 1980
Constitution articulated in a supplementary provision (article 10) that the local assembly
would be established in a step by step manner according to the financial capacity of the
local governments, and the specific schedule is to be stipulated by the related law. After
that, however, no effort was made to create a specific schedule for instituting local
assemblies.

In October 1987, the Constitution was amended by eliminating a

supplementary article 10. With that, no reason remained for the government to postpone
the implementation of the local autonomy system.
With a victory in the presidential race in December, 1987, the ruling DJP moved
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farther to implementation local autonomy. The ideas of the DJP for local education
autonomy were reflected in amendments to the Education Law and to the Local
Autonomy Act in April, 1988. The major contents of the revised Education Law were:
(1) The board of education should be established at two levels, large and small
administrative units in accordance with the units of the local government. (2) All board
members should be selected by local assemblies. The term of office is 4 years. (3) The
superintendent should be selected by the board of education. The superintendent should
have more than 20 years experience in teaching, or educational administration as a
researcher and/or supervisor. The term of office is 4 years. (4) Local assemblies would
have the power to enact regulations. (5) The board of education or superintendent should
consult with the governors, mayors, or chiefs of the small unit (district, county, and city)
if they want to suggest regulations related to the residents’ financial burden or obligation
and affairs associated with local government [6 April 1988, No.4009; Lee, 1995],
However, this amended Education Law was not implemented because the political
situation had changed: The ruling DJP failed to obtain a majority of the seats in the
national assembly in the April election, 1988. The three major opposition parties were
able to get a dominating position over the ruling party in the assembly, and tried to design
a different system of local autonomy.
The opposition parties, without the cooperation of the ruling party, had passed a
revised Local Autonomy Law on March 9, 1989 that mandated that a local election be
held by the end of September of that year. On March 24 1989, however. President Rho
vetoed it. The political parties then began to negotiate with each other regarding the style
and content of local autonomy. They reached an agreement in December, 1989. Most
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importantly, this agreement stated that the election for the local assemblies and for the
local chief executives at both large units and small units would be held in 1990.
The agreement encountered a new political obstacle when the ruling party and
two other opposition parties formed one big political coalition, the Democratic Liberal
Party (DLP), in January, 1990, hence reversing the dominant position in the national
assembly. With the political confidence that came from having the majority of the seats,
the DLP tried to postpone the implementation of the heretofore agreed upon local
autonomy. The only opposition party, the Peace and Democratic Party (PDP) led by Kim
Dae Jung, who would later become President in 1997, objected vehemently. The ruling
DJP and the opposition PDP agreed in November, 1990 that the election for local
assemblies would be held by 1991, and for executives by 1995. Consequently, the revised
Local Autonomy Act that reflected this political compromise was passed by the national
assembly in December 1990 (Lee, 1995; Seth, 2002).
The Presidential Commission for Education Reform (PCER) also played a role in
designing the educational decentralization reform. The first PCER was created in 1985
and it released a reform package at the end of 1987, entitled “Korean Educational Reform
Toward the 21st Century.” That was when the political struggle between Chun’s
government and anti-government groups reached its peak.
Its principals recommendations were i) allow boards of education to be decision
making bodies, ii) reallocate functions between central and local governments, iii)
establish

a

reasonable

relationship

between

educational

administration

and

the

municipal/provincial governments, iv) establish school-centered management, v) institute
greater autonomy in the management of higher education, vi) establish a board of trustees
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for national universities, and vii) establish a regional university development committee
(PCER, 1987).
This reform proposal had some shortfalls in its content and feasibility. Because
the PCER was only an advisory commission, it lacked the power and authority for
decision making and implementation. In addition, it had proposed a broad reform
program rather than specific ideas for educational innovations that might be readily
enacted. Nevertheless, it had some influence on the reform of local educational autonomy
in the early 1990s (Lee, 1995).
The teachers’ groups were among the key actors during the educational
democracy movement of the 1980s. They played a crucial role in changing the existing
political system and educational structure. Teachers exercised their influence on pending
educational issues including decentralization through various teacher associations and
unions. Political parties recognized teachers’ influence because they constituted a large
fraction of the voters and their stances were critical to the success or failure of the
election campaigns. There were two major teachers’ groups with different characteristics
in their compositions and basic stance toward the direction of the government policy: the
Korean Federation of Educational Associations (KFEA) and the National Educator’s
Union (NEU). These two groups competed with each other in the development of local
educational autonomy in the late 1980s.
The KFEA, the largest teacher’s organization, was founded in 1948 and was the
only nationwide teachers’ group until a group of teachers established a rival organization
(NEU) in 1989. Its proposal focused on the reallocation of roles among central and local
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authorities. However, it did not pay much attention to school-level autonomy. Some of its
important proposals included (Lee, 1995):
The function of the Ministry of Education would be limited as to (1) the
nationwide policy making and planning, (2) support for regional balance, and (3)
support for city and provincial boards of education. As to the function of
metropolitan and provincial boards of education, it proposed (1) implementation
of a national policy, (2) short and long term educational planning for local
education, (3) the development of local curricula, and (4) guidance and support
for the county boards of education [p. 127].

While the KFTA was criticized as being a sub-organization of the government
for the purpose of controlling teachers, a group of teachers seeking policy change set up a
new teachers’ organization called Jeon Kyo Hyup (National Teacher Association) in
1987. It evolved into the National Teacher Union (NTU) in 1989, but its activities were
not legitimized until 1999 when teacher unions were legalized. The NTU was a core
force that drove education reform in the 1980s. It proposed a package of education
reforms including decentralization (Lee, 1995).
The central parts of their strategies for local educational autonomy were:
(1) delegate most of the power of the Ministry of Education to city and provincial
boards of education, (2) promote school level autonomy as well as the autonomy
of the large and small units, and (3) promote the independence of the boards of
education from the local governments [p. 112].

Unlike the KFTA, the NTU emphasized school level autonomy. Their proposals
for school-site autonomy were:
(1) each school should have a teachers association as a decision-making body; it
should consist of all school teachers. (2) this association should have the power to
approve the school budget, to review teacher personnel, student awards and
punishments; and to enact school regulations. (3) the selection of the principal
would be based on the teachers association’s recommendation [p. 112],
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Because political parties were by and large concerned with the design of the local
autonomy system focusing on the local elections and the division of electoral districts, the
matter of educational autonomy seemed set aside. Therefore, the Ministry of Education
drafted the Local Educational Autonomy Law (LEAL) in 1990. The major contents of the
LEAL were as follows (Chung et al., 1989; Lee, 1995)
(1) The board of education is established at only large units such as 6 metropolitan
and 9 provincial areas.
(2) The number of the board members will depend on the number of districts in each
metropolitan city and the number of district offices of education in each province.
(3) The role of the board of education will be to deliberate various educational affairs
to be submitted to the local assembly, including the budget bill, regulations, the
assessment of special levies, and commissions and fees regarding educational
matters.
(4) Superintendents will be selected by the board of education from board members
who have had more than 20 years of experience in education. The term of office
will be 4 years. A deputy superintendent will be appointed by the central
government upon the recommendation of the superintendent.
(5) There will be a local office of education, the small unit of educational
administration, in level of city (si), county (gun), and district (gu).
There was a controversy because the board of education was to be established
only at the metropolitan and provincial levels. The Ministry of Education (MOE)
provided three reasons for this (Lee, 1995):
First, educational autonomy at the small-unit level would require a large
amount of money for administrative expenses. Second, compulsory education
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(elementary and middle school) should not be influenced by regional financial
differences due to the implementation of local educational autonomy. Third,
small-unit educational autonomy would harmfully influence the existing publicschool-teachers-rotation system, [p. 141]

The MOE draft of the Local Education Autonomy Act was passed by the National
Assembly in March 1991. This marked a historical turning point in educational
decentralization. The political dynamics of educational decentralization are summarized
in the table below.
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Table 5.3 The Dynamics of Education Decentralization Reform in Korea
Major political events

Issues for educational decentralization

Democratic reform declaration by Rho
(1987.6.29)
Rho’s victory in presidential race
( 1987.12)
Ruling party (DJP) passed the Laws
(1988.4)
Ruling party fell into minority seats in
April election (1988.4): Yoso yadae

Among 8 item refonn proposals,
educational decentralization included
Ruling party began to revise related
laws
Education law revised

Opposition parties revised Local
Autonomy Law (1989.3.9)

Local election to be held by Sept. 1989

Rho’s Veto to the opposition parties’
Revised law (1989. 3.24)

the law was dead

Political compromise between DJP
and opposition parties (1989.12)

Local assembly election to be held in
1990 and for local chief executives at both
large units and small units

Formation of new ruling party by
Coalition of three parties (1990.1)

the ruling DLP to postpone local autonomy
the Ministry of Education drafted “Local
Educational Autonomy Law” (1990.3)

Opposition party (PPD) began political
Boycott for 4 months, and political
Compromise between DLP and PPD
(1990. 11)
Local Autonomy Act passed (1990.12)

Revised law not implemented

Election for local assemblies to be
held by 1991, for the executives by
1995

political parties less concerned with
education autonomy
Moe-drafted LEAL passed (1991.3)

Source: Lee (1995), Ministry of Education (2000)

5.3.2.3 Educational Finance Reform
To understand educational finance reform in Korea, one needs to look at the history of
fiscal policy in education. It showed some cyclic patterns, a policy pendulum of

121

governance styles from decentralization to centralization since the national independence
in 1945.
As mentioned in the previous section, unlike the case of China where a paramount
factor

leading

decentralization

was

the

financial

problem,

Korea’s

educational

decentralization was triggered by the political situation. Therefore, during the late 1980s
when the social discussion regarding decentralization had become heated, the issue of
fiscal decentralization was not on the core agenda. Nonetheless, as a secondary effect, the
general discussion of decentralization resulted in a power shift in fiscal authority in
Korea. This section examines two types of decentralization in education finance: the
vertical one between the central government and local authorities, and the horizontal one
between general administration and educational administration.
Unlike other countries, Korea has a unique tradition of a governance structure that
is multi-faceted: centralization and decentralization have coexisted. While the discussion
of decentralization sought to shift the central government’s authority to localities, there
was another debate over power relocation between general administration authority and
educational authority. It was emphasized that educational autonomy from a general
administration was as important as local autonomy from the central government, to
maintain educational professionalism and political neutrality. Many educational leaders
argued that educational autonomy will only be authentically realized when educational
governance is independent from local general administrations (Yoon, 1992).
Despite Korea’s traditional center-driven system, the relationship between the
central government and local governments changed over time. In particular, regarding
educational governance, it oscillated, demonstrating a kind of policy pendulum. Since
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national independence in 1945, educational administration was operated as part of the
general administration, a horizontal centralization of education in local governments.
This continued until 1952.
This conventional mode of governance changed in 1953 when local autonomy
was implemented for the very first time in the history of Korea; the function of
educational administration at the district and city levels was separated from that of
general administration. This illustrated a horizontal decentralization in the local level.
Each school district gained the authority to levy taxes and to create its own budget. This
authority was exercised by the local education office independent of the general
administrative authority. The board of education, as an executive body, therefore enjoyed
a higher level of local autonomy than that in the previous period.

However, this

horizontal autonomy in education was realized only at small local units of government
such as the district, the county or the small city. Education in metropolitan areas and at
the province level was still operated as part of the general administration, and horizontal
centralization was maintained. This system functioned until 1961 when local autonomy
was dissolved by the military regime. Since then, local autonomy experienced a dark age
until the collapse of authoritarian regime in the mid 1980s, ultimately to face another
turning point with its revival in 1991 (Song, 1996).
When the military government dismantled the local education autonomy system
in 1961, the educational leaders in Korea strongly objected. In response, the government
made a gesture toward reviving autonomy in local education by revising the Education
Law. It was, however, not meaningfully implemented because the formation of local
assemblies had been postponed indefinitely. Instead, the functions of the local assemblies
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and the boards of education were conducted until 1991 by the Ministry of Home Affairs
and the Ministry of Education, respectively. In particular, educational finance remained
centralized despite government rhetoric regarding the reinstatement of local autonomy.
With the revival of local autonomy in 1991, the nominal institution of local
autonomy seemed transformed into an authentic one. The local assemblies were formed,
and consequently, the authority for educational matters exercised by the central
government was delegated to the local governments. School finance followed the same
path.
To be more specific, the Ministry of Education decentralized its authority on
educational issues toward local governments. This included; i) creating ordinances
regarding local education, ii) allocating budgets, and iii) some other decision making
power. Until 1990, local education was heavily subsidized by the central government.
This subsidy was calculated on the basis of employee salaries, and operational costs.
After the financial decentralization in 1991, the central government provided a lump-sum
amount to the local authorities, giving them more leeway regarding their budgets (Yoon,
1992).
The Local Educational Autonomy Act (LEAA) reinstated local government
authority. The chairman of each board of education was to be selected from its members,
whereas previously the position was held by the governor or mayor - an additional
responsibility for each of them. The board members were selected by the local
assemblies,

rather

than

appointed

by

the

central

government.

However,

the

decentralization of educational finance was inadequate. The LEAA resulted in horizontal
centralization at the provincial and municipal levels as the budgetary authority for
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managing educational finance shifted downward just one step from the central
government to the local general administration (Choi, 1996).
5.4 Consequences of Decentralization
5.4.1 China
As described in the previous chapter, decentralization reform in China during the
1980s had centered on the three major innovations: the expansion of compulsory
education, structural renovation, and financial reform. Each measure had its own goals
that can be represented by several indicators.
The introduction of nine-year compulsory education plan was expected to
increase the efficiency of the educational system. This could be assessed by using the
proxies of enrollments, advancement, illiteracy rate, and educational conditions.

The

enrollment rate in primary school increased consistently since the inception of reform in
the 1980s.
Table 5.4 demonstrates the increasing enrolment rate from 93% in 1981 to 97.8%
in 1990. This official rate is based on school-aged children enrolled at the beginning of
the school year. It could have been overestimated because whether they actually attend
school is another matter.

Table 5.4 Net Enrollment Rate of Primary Schools, 1981-1990
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Year

Enrollment rate
93.0
93.2
94.0
95.3
95.9

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Source: Tsui Kai-yuen (1997), p. 110, modified
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Enrollment rate
96.4
97.1
97.2
97.4
97.8

The actual attendance rate turned out to be different from the net enrollment. For
example, while the net enrollment rate in 1987 was 97.1% on national average, the school
attendance rate average over 6 provinces was about 85%, far lower than the net
enrollment. However, it also increased consistently since the reform as shown in Table
5.5.
Table 5.5 Provincial School Attendance Rates for Children between 7 and 11, 1987 and
1992
Province

1987 sample survey

1992 sample survey

Neimenggu
Heilonjiang
Zhejiang
Shandong
Hubei
Guangdong

84.2
84.3 *
90.1
86.0
90.2
75.4

92.5
94.4
95.5
92.4
94.8
92.8

Source: Source: Tsui Kai-yuen (1997), p. 122, modified
Another result of the new policy was an increase in the advancement rate, the
percentage of students advancing to the next level of schooling.

Table 5.6 shows the

percentage of graduates entering higher level schools and the percentage of school-aged
children enrolled.

Since the education reform was launched in the mid-1980s, the

advancement ratio of primary school graduates entering junior high schools increased
from 68.4% in 1985 to 90.8% in 1995. The percentage of junior high graduates entering
senior high schools went up from 41.7 % to 48.4 % in the same period. The increase ratio
from the primary level is far higher than that from junior high school. It was consistent
with the policy goal that placed the major emphasis on improving primary rather than
secondary education.
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Table 5.6 Percentages of Graduates Entering Higher Level Schools and Percentages of
School-Aged Children Enrolled, 1985-1996

Year

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

% of primary school graduates
entering junior high schools

% of junior high graduates
enrollment rate
entering senior high schools (%)

68.4
69.5
69.1
70.4
71.5
74.6
75.7
79.7
81.8
86.6
90.8
92.6

41.7
40.6
39.1
38.0
38.3
40.6
42.6
43.4
44.1
46.4
48.4
48.8

96.0
96.4
97.2
97.2
97.4
97.8
97.8
97.2
97.7
98.4
98.5
98.8

Source: Lo (1999) p. 37, modified
One of the primary goals of the 1980s reform was to reduce the illiteracy rate, to
establish an infrastructure for human resource development. Since the 1980s, the
illiteracy rate among the population aged 15 and over has declined sharply, from 33.9%
in 1980 to 18.5% in 1995. There was a gender difference in illiteracy rate: male illiteracy
rate was consistently lower than that for females between 1980 and 2000. It can be
estimated from Table 5.7 that the compulsory education policy might have some positive
impacts on reducing the illiteracy rate.
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Table 5.7 Illiteracy Rate (%) by Gender in China, 1980 - 2000
Year

illiteracy rate among
population aged 15 and over
MF
M
F

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

33.9
27.5
22.1
18.5
15.0

21.4
16.6
13.0
10.1
7.7

illiteracy rate among
population aged 15-24
MF
M
F
9.6
6.6
4.8
3.2
2.0

47.3
39.9
31.9
27.3
22.6

4.1
3.0
2.5
1.4
0.7

15.6
10.5
7.2
5.2
3.4

Sources: Wang (2001), p. 170, UNESCO (1999), p 11-47
It is not clear how much impact the compulsory education policy had on the drop¬
out problem which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is associated with the use of
child labor. Table 5.8 demonstrates an increasing trend in the school attendance rate from
1983 to 1992. It can be associated with the government measure that prohibited the use of
school-aged child labor, a supplementary measure that had been taken to encourage the
effective implementation of compulsory education.
Table 5.8 School Attendance Rate, 1983-1992
Age cohort
total
1983
1987
1990
1992

7 to 11
city county

7 to 14
total city county

_
_
84.9
81.40
83.8
92.12 81.70 83.90
89.5
93.65 88.28 90.80
94.82 99.40 93.45 92.81

93.10
93.17
92.48
99.04

78.80
81.59
84.02
90.96

6 to 14
total city county
_

_

_

76.70 85.00 74.60
81.03 85.96 79.68
91.12 98.76 88.88

Source: Tsui, Kai-yuen (1997), p. 112
Table 5.9 summarizes the effect of education reform on educational conditions
between 1986 and 1992.

The physical conditions such as school building and teacher

quality were evidently improved. The percentage of primary and secondary schools
equipped with standard laboratories and equipment rose from 10% in 1986 to 20% in
1991. The enrollment of children aged 7-11 in primary school increased from 96.3% in
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1986 to 98% in 1992, and the percentage of counties achieving universal primary
education went up from 60% in 1986 to 70% in 1991.

Table 5.9 Changes of Educational Conditions Since Education Reform, 1986-1992
Index of conditions

1986

1992

% of primary school buildings in dilapidated condition
% of secondary school building in dilapidated condition
% of primary school teachers with at least 12years of education
% of lower-secondary school teachers with at least 14 years
of education
% of primary and secondary schools equipped with standard
laboratories and equipment
% of children aged 7-11 enrolled in primary school
% of counties achieving universal primary education
% of population illiterate
% of primary school graduates entering lower
secondary schools
% of lower-secondary school graduates entering
upper-secondary schools

7.5
7.3
62.8

1.9
2.1
82.7

27.1

55.6

10.0*
96.4
60.0
23 8***

20.0*
98.0
70.0**
15.9**

69.5

79.7

40.6

43.4

Figure
denotes 1988; “**” 1991, “***” 1982
Sources: Tsang (1996) p. 432

The structural reform was intended to decentralize power and responsibility for
education to local governments. The major goal of this decentralization was to enhance
the financial capacity of governments for educational policy, largely by shifting the
financial authority to local units. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of education finance
provided by the central and local governments from 1979 to 1997.
government's share of revenue has certainly fluctuated over time.
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The central

Figure 5.1. Fiscal Relationship between the Central and Local Governments in China
Source: Ma and Norregaard (1998) p.5, modified
The fiscal authority had been centralized until 1984. As a consequence of the
education reform that took place then, this trend took another path during the
decentralization reform period, 1985-1993. The local governments’ share of the revenue
increased, reversing the center-driven fiscal relationship. The fiscal status faced another
fluctuation when the Chinese government initiated a tax assignment reform in 1993,
taking

fiscal

power

and

responsibility

back

to

the

central

government.

This

recentralization resulted in a sharp increase of the central government’s share of revenues
from 22.0 % in 1993 to 56% in 1994, and therefore the local share decreased.
In fact, the major goal of the reform had been to solve the financial problems
(Cheng,

1997).

Gamering

sufficient financial resources

was imperative

for the

government to implement reform policies. Two key strategies had been adopted: the three
growth principle and the minimum average growth principle. Thus, the consequences of
decentralization reform can be evaluated by reviewing whether these basic principles of
financial policy were successful.
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The three growth principles were supposed to increase the annual per pupil
expenditure (PPE).
Table 5.10 shows the annual PPE at both the primary and secondary levels from 1981 to
1992. At the primary level, it increased from 53 yuan in 1981 to 139 yuan in 1992; at the
secondary level, it increased from 142 yuan in 1981 to 301 yuan in 1991. This
successfully met the first growth principle.
Table 5.10 PPE (Per Pupil Expenditure), 1981-1992 (Yuan)
Year

primary education

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

53
62
68
74
83
80
93
101
101
114
121
139

general secondary education
142
172
191
206
226
224
218
234
235
259
269
301

Sources: Tsang (1996) p. 432

The minimum average growth principle required that public expenditures be
allocated for education at the rate of 15% of the total government budget during the
Eighth 5-Year Plan (1991-1995). Table 5.11 shows how this principle was met since
1991.

It was satisfied only in 1994 and 1995 with 15.3% and 16% respectively.

Education expenditures as percentage of GNP were only initially on track to meet the
basic goal of 4% of GNP by 2000. It was only 2.5 % in 1995, far less than anticipated.
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Table 5.11 Public Expenditures on Education as Percentage of the GNP and of the
Total Government Budget
Year

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

education budget
as % of total government budget

education expenditures
as % of GNP
3.52
3.61
3.66
3.75
3.69
3.85
2.51
2.30
3.20
3.10
3.00
2.70
2.50
2.60
2.50

10.60
11.60
11.80
11.60
12.40
11.60
11.70
12.60
13.10
12.60
12.60
12.15
12.20
15.30
16.00

Sources: Wang (2001) p. 101, modified
One of the key strategies of the 1985 finance reform was diversification or multi¬
channeling of resource generation. The govemment-responsible-for-everything mode was
changed into a diversified one that included various non-government and private sectors:
enterprises, communities, school factories, students and parents, and so forth. Table 5.12
demonstrates that the central government’s share of funding sources decreased since the
1985 reform, from 76.52% in 1986 to 62.85% in 1991 to 53.63% in 1997. It implies that
fiscal decentralization has been working in the given period.
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Table 5.12 Diversification of Funding Sources for Education, 1986-1997
Sources

1986

1991

1997

Government budgets funds

76.52

62.85

53.63

Extra-budgetary funds
Levies and surcharges
Enterprise-run institutions
Institution-generated
resources
Social contributions
Tuition and fees
Others

23.48
4.94
5.20
4.16

37.15
0.27
5.83
5.09

46.37
10.58
4.72
3.91

4.59
3.06
1.53

8.59
4.42
2.95

6.74
12.88
7.54

Total

100

100

100

Source: Tsang (2000) p. 598, modified

Decentralization

was

not

without

cost.

The

restructuring

of power

and

responsibility resulted in a considerable financial disparity among regions. The specific
aspect of regional discrepancy can be reviewed by analyzing the per student expenditure,
the contribution of the non-govemment sector, and the ratio of students’ advancement in
different localities.
One aspect of this disparity is seen in Table 5.13 that tells the variance of the per
student expenditures and the per capita education expenditure at the county level in 1990.
The per student expenditure varies considerably among regions according to per capita
income level. For example, a county with 300 yuan per capita spends 85.15 yuan per year
per student for primary education, while a county with 800 yuan per capita spends 154.9
yuan per student, almost twice as much.

133

Table 5.13 Disparities Per Student Expenditures at County Level, 1990
per capita income of
county

per capita education
expenditures

Less than 300 yuan
300-400
yuan
400-600
yuan
600-800
yuan
more than 800 yuan
means of sample

29.03
30.21
30.80
38.93
55.67
34.48

per student budgetary
expenditures for primary
education
85.15
65.46
72.06
84.07
154.19
82.84

Sources: Tsang (1996), p. 435, modified
A second aspect of this discrepancy is illustrated in Table 5.14. Various regions
have different structures for resource generation.

For example, major regions were

garnering a considerable portion of their education funds from non-state sectors from
1981 to 1991: Beijing 55.59%, Hebei 78.07%, and Sandong 86.76%. Other regions such
as Guizou and Hainan were dependent largely on government budgets, with a small
portion of their funding sources coming from non-governmental, multiple channel
funding (MCF). MCF as % of the total budget in Guizhou and Hainan was 18.49% and
36.49%, respectively, in the same period.
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Table 5.14 Disparities among Regions in Multiple Channel (Non-Governmental) of
Funding, 1981-1991
Regions

Total

Beijing
Tianiin
Hebei
Sandong
Shanxi
Liaoning
Jinlin
Shanghai
Tibet
Hainan
Guizhou

24.57
18.87
39.76
55.00
26.53
39.80
24.43
39.35
2.20
6.09
16.77

State appropriation

10.91
6.99
8.72
7.28
8.42
17.90
8.03
18.95
2.00
3.87
13.67

Multiple Channel of
Funding (MCF)
13.66
11.88
31.04
47.72
18.11
21.90
16.40
20.40
0.20
2.22
3.10

MCF as % of
the total
55.59
62.96
78.07
86.76
68.26
55.03
67.13
51.84
9.09
36.45
18.49

***
m

!)
i

■/»
.1

i

)
i

Sources: Lo (1993), p. 22.17, modified
II
9
\

!

A third aspect of the disparity is identified in the ratio of advancement of students
by gender, school level, or region. The percentage of primary graduates entering junior
high is, in general, higher than that of junior high graduates entering to senior high. It is
worth paying attention to the disparity between rural and urban areas. Even though the
gap narrowed over time, it still remained considerable as shown in Table 5.15. The
advancement ratio from primary schools in 1990 in urban areas was 104.6 %5, whereas
that in rural areas was only 63.7%.

5 When primary school graduates go to work first and years later they enter the junior
high schools, the advancement ratio can be more than 100%.
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Table 5.15 Disparities in the Advancement Percentage by Year and Region, 1962-1990
Year
High

1962
1972
1982
1983
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Primary to Junior High (%)

Junior to High-Academic Senior

City

Town County

City

Town County

84.0
102.0
97.3
97.8
101.1
101.6
102.1
102.6
101.7
104.6

110.9
112.8
100.3
100.5
100.5
112.7
105.8
108.3
107.9
112.5

45.8
64.2
50.0
46.7
40.3
40.2
40.2
37.7
38.4
40.4

39.5
85.4
70.9
67.4
58.7
55.6
53.8
51.1
51.3
54.2

20.7
82.9
59.1
59.5
59.2
59.6
59.3
60.2
60.9
63.7

4.2
35.8
14.1
13.4
11.6
10.2
9.7
8.6
8.3
8.7

Sources: Hannum (1999), p. 205
To summarize, China’s educational governance reform was motivated by several
driving forces or needs, including economic, political, and educational needs. These
contextual conditions for reform had driven three major reform policies: the introduction
of nine-year compulsory education, structural reform, and financial reform. There were
both positive and negative consequences to this reform. The positive consequences were
the improvement of efficiency in the educational system (increased per pupil expenditure,
increased enrollment rate, and increased advancement ratio), and improvements to other
educational conditions such as educational facilities and equipment. The negative
consequence was the emergence of a disparity in educational conditions among regions,
particularly between rural and urban areas; the per pupil expenditure depended on the
economic conditions within each area. For example, the student advancement rate to the
next level of schooling was lower in less affluent regions. Differences could also be seen
in the non-governmental sources of funding for education.
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5.4.2 Korea

This section examines the results that the introduction of local educational
autonomy has yielded in Korea since the late 1980s. It focuses primarily on three reform
areas. The first is the aspect of the structural reform that was initiated by the macro
systemic innovation of the governance structure. The second is a political feature of the
reform that emerged from the local elections for the local assemblies and superintendents.
The third is the financial aspect of reform; the conditions of school finance before and
after governance reform are compared. Finally, in addition to its positive effects, it
reviews some side effects and limitations of this governance reform.

5.4.2.1. Structural Reform
The major results of the governance reform were as follows (Choi, 1996; Kim, 1992).
1) The basic system of governance in education changed from centralized to
decentralized. As a vertical decentralization, local educational autonomy brought about a
variety of shifts in power and authority from the central government to the local
governments. It was intended to provide momentum to localities to develop and
implement more creative and demand-sensitive educational programs that would meet
local needs.
2) The boards of education became decision making bodies. Before the reform,
they had functioned as executive offices for the management of educational matters in
each province. They exercised power through superintendents who held delegated
authority. After the reform, the boards deliberated and resolved important educational
matters by themselves and submitted them to the local assemblies. This meant that the
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boards

of education had changed their nature,

from

consultative

or executive

organizations to decision-making bodies.
3) Educational management gained a degree of independence from general
administration. Before the reform, the governor or mayor held a chair on the board of
education of each province/municipality, as an additional post. They, as heads of general
administration, could veto important education policies, for example, those that would
impose financial burdens on taxpayers. This dependency of education on general
administration changed in 1991 when each board could select its chair from among its
members,

and

had

the

power

to

resolve

major

provincial

education

matters

independently.
4) Popular participation in the decision making process was institutionalized.
After the revival of local educational autonomy, ordinary people including parents could
take part in the process of decision-making, i.e., the election of superintendents and
members of school boards. This had not been possible before the reform because the
central government not only set the major educational policies, but also appointed the
major actors; e.g., the superintendents.
5) The local governments had more financial power and responsibility than
before. Until 1990, local education was financed by grants from the central government,
and each grant was earmarked in terms of the usage and amount of money. The local
governments had little discretion. However, this changed in 1991: the central government
provided a lump-sum grant and permitted local governments to plan their own programs.
These structural reform aspects are summarized in Table 5.16.
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Table 5.16 Aspects of the Structural Reform in Education

Reform aspect

Before reform

i) Governance system
ii) The boards of education
iii) Horizontal relationship
among local governments
iv) Popular participation
v) Financial authority

centralized
executive office
dependence

decentralized
decision-making body
independence

less participatory
earmarked grant

participatory
lump-sum grant

After reform

Despite these positive effects of the structural reform, several problems emerged
(Choi, 1996; PCER 1997). First, the boards of education could exercise only limited
authority as decision making bodies. They deliberated and resolved education policy
issues, but the final decision was made by the local assemblies, although they usually
respected the decisions of the boards of education on education matters.
Second, the general public could not select their representatives directly. This
may viewed as a structural pitfall in this local educational autonomy. The members of the
boards of education were selected by the local assemblies, and the superintendents were
selected by the boards of education from among their members.
Third, the central government was still dominant in making the major
educational policies. It appointed a vice superintendent in each province, and exercised
power by the approval of “other” education matters. The central government emphasized
the importance of decentralization, but it tried to maintain authority in major areas such
as personnel administration, school finance, and even decision making. That made
decentralization mostly rhetorical, and in fact a technical recentralization (Kim, 1998).
Perhaps this was reasonable because, at least initially, the local governments lacked the
management skills to handle the decentralized education.
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5.4.2.2. Political Democracy and Popular Representation
Educational decentralization in Korea showed, by and large, political features
rather than financial or administrative aspects as seen in other developing countries. The
main characteristics of the results of decentralization since the mid-1980s are reviewed
from this perspective (Lee, 1995; Seth, 2002).
First, the revival of local autonomy in 1991 of was paramount importance by
itself because it meant a revitalization of grass-roots democracy. It was achieved in 1987
by a political event called the 6.29 declaration, and was a turning point in the history of
governance reform in Korea since the 1950s. The 30-year suspension of local autonomy
by the military regimes came to an end with the growth of democracy in the society.
Second, that revitalization of local autonomy proceeded in a democratic manner
was an important product of the reform. Unlike the authoritarian government where
crucial policy issues were decided by the president in a top-down manner, many people e.g., members of political parties, interest groups, and teachers associations - took part in
designing their local autonomy and in planning their course of action.
Third, the establishment of a system for the general public to participate in the
decision making process was an important aspect of decentralization. When the
opposition parties defeated the ruling party in the national assembly election in 1989,
they designed their own scheme of local autonomy, and negotiated it with the ruling
party. The passage of a law in 1990 with the full agreement of the political parties led to a
new wave of governance reform in Korea. Ever since then, the ordinary people, now
enfranchised citizens, could participate in election of their representatives, e.g.,
governors, mayors, and members of their local assemblies.
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The decentralization policy reached home in the local elections. In 1991, after 30
years of authoritarian governance since the military coup in 1961, three rounds of local
elections took place. The first election was in March of that year; members of the local
assemblies at the small unit level (si, gun, and ku) were elected. The voter turnout was
not as high as expected. Only 55% of the total electorate voted, and many electoral
districts found no competition among candidates; 443 out of a total of 3,562 districts had
single candidates. A plurality of the candidates, 45.2%, was from the ruling party, 12.6%
from the opposition parties, and 39.3% were independent.
The second election was held in June of that year to elect the members of the
provincial assembly in each area. The voter turnout showed little change from the March
election; 58% of qualified voters participated in electing their local representatives. The
ruling party won a landslide victory.
The third election was held in August; it was not a public one, instead, the
members of the boards of education were elected indirectly. The local/district assemblies
selected candidates for the boards of education, and recommended them to the
provincial/municipal assemblies. The intention was that the school board members would
be elected by these upper-level assemblies. The majority of the candidates elected were
retired educators (51.8%), followed by professors (10.6%), doctors and pharmacists
(4.9%), and others (25.7%).
For all three of these elections, the general public showed a lack of interest. As
identified by Bedeski (1994), the low voter turnout for local autonomy reflected the
distrust that the people had toward national politics, and it also was affected by the strict
regulations regarding the period of the election campaign: e.g., only two weeks for
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elections campaign were given to candidates.

In addition, the citizenry lacked

information about what local autonomy really meant, and why it was important for them.
This disinterest in, and complaints by, the citizenry about the new system were
clear to see in the results of a survey done in 1992, just one year after local autonomy was
reintroduced (Lee, 1995). When asked about what changes had occurred since the
adoption of local autonomy, the majority of respondents (69%) answered that they found
little or no changes. Some (18%) perceived the new system as just being a waste of
money. Only 2.7% responded that they were satisfied with local autonomy. The voters
tended to think that the members of assemblies were pursuing their individual interests
first, above the public interest, and that assembly members lacked the knowledge and
skill needed to deal with important local issues.
In addition, the initial stage of local educational autonomy failed to stimulate
people’s concern and interest because the existing system had been deficient in providing
citizens with adequate opportunities to participate in decision-making on important local
policies. In contrast, the general administration had allowed people to do so.
Various conflicts among the key local actors led to inefficiency in local
educational autonomy in the early stages. There were conflicts between the local
assemblies and the boards of education, and between the superintendents and the boards
of education. The indirect election system for members of the education boards was
considered to be a pitfall of local educational autonomy because it played as a hurdle in
incorporating local needs into education policy (Choi, 1996; Lee, 1995).
5.4.2.3 Governance Reform and Financial Decentralization
The changes in educational finance caused by the introduction of local autonomy
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can be examined from two perspectives: vertical decentralization, mainly represented by
grants from the central government for local education, and horizontal decentralization,
represented by the transfer of funds from the general local administration.
5.4.2.4 Vertical Decentralization
In general, financial decentralization is measured as the ratio of expenditures or
revenues of local governments to the government’s total expenditures or revenues (World
Bank, 2004; Lee, 2003). Financial decentralization in Korea increased considerably after
the revival of local autonomy in 1991. From the expenditure perspective, Table 5.17
shows that the percentage of expenditures by local governments increased relative to that
by the central government. The local governments’ share in 1986, when talk about local
autonomy had just begun, was 29.9%, but it increased to 39.9% in 1991 at the time of
local autonomy’s revival. This situation remained essentially the same through the mid1990s.
Table 5.17 Shares of Central and Local Government Expenditure (%)

Central government
Local government

1981

1986

1991

1996

76.8
23.2

70.1
29.9

60.1
39.9

61.1
38.9

Source: Lee (2003), National Statistics Office (2001), Ministry of Home Affairs and
Administration (1982-1997)
From the revenue perspective, the same pattern is found in Table 5.18. The local
governments received 23.3% of the total national revenues in 1986, five years before
local autonomy was reintroduced. This local share of revenues jumped up to 35.1% in
1991, indicating that local autonomy had a considerable impact on shifting financial
power and management from the central to the local governments.
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Table 5.18 Shares of Central and Local Government Revenue (%)
1996
1991
1986
1981
Central government
Local government

82.4
17.6

76.7
23.3

64.4
35.7

64.8
35.2

Source: Lee (2003), National Statistics Office (2001), Ministry of Home Affairs and
Administration (1982-1997)

This pattern is also identified in the central and local government share of tax
revenue. Table 5.19 shows that the local tax revenues among total nationwide tax
revenues occupied around 11.7% in 1986, and this almost doubled to 20.9% in 1991. It
remained the same in 1991, 21.1%. On the whole, the share of local finance in the total
governmental expenditures and revenues increased after 1991. However, the pace of the
increase changed from the mid 1990s: the local governments’ share declined little by
little. Two reasons for this are offered. One is that the magnitude of national finance
outpaced the increased local government finance (Lim, 2003). The other is that the
central government was attempting to withdraw the decentralized authority from the
localities, to recentralize educational finance as illustrated in the case of China in the
early 1990s (Kim, 2000).

Table 5.19 Shares of Central and Local Tax Revenue (%)

Central government
Local government

1981

1986

1991

1996

88.8
11.2

88.3
11.7

79.1
20.9

78.9
21.1

Source: Lee (2003), Ministry of Home Affairs and Administration (1982-2001)
Financial decentralization in education showed a similar pattern, but its specific
aspects were quite different, both in terms of the pace and the scope of decentralization.
As seen in Table 5.20, the centralized system of school finance kept its traditional mode
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until the inception of local autonomy: the central government maintained 75.6% of the
fiscal share at its peak in 1990. The reintroduction of local educational autonomy
drastically changed these shares after that. The local governments were responsible for
providing 24.4% of total expenditures for local education in 1990, but this share
increased sharply to 39.2% in 1991, reaching 40.6% in 1995. This was mainly because,
with the revival of local educational autonomy, the central government changed its way
of granting education funds to the local governments from the earmarked to the lump¬
sum subsidy, hence providing local governments with more leeway.
Table 5.20 Fiscal Imbalances in Education between Central and Local Government (%)
Year

Central government

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

73.7
74.9
75.8
76.6
72.8
75.6
60.8
62.9
58.1
59.0
59.4

Local governments
26.3
25.1
24.2
23.4
27.2
24.4
39.2
37.1
41.9
41.0
40.6

Source: Ministry of Education, 1986 -1996. The national grants for local education were
distributed on the basis of the population to each province/municipality by law since
1991. Because both the actual plan and implementation were in the hands of local
governments, these grants are counted as local governments’ budgets.
Several other considerations led to this result. As can be seen in Table 5.21,
education’s share of the total government budget had steadily increased since the 1960s
in the hope that education would be a primary mover for national development. The
education budget occupied 14.9% of the government budget in 1964, but it increased to
22.8% in 1995. The major portion of this education budget was subsidized to local
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governments by law as unblocked lump-sum grants. This enhanced local autonomy in
school finance.
Table 5.21 Total Government Budget vs. Education Budget by Year (in thousand won)
Government Budget (A)

Year
1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

Education Budget (B)

69,481,150
94,652,348
446,273,301
1,586,931,050
5,804,061,441
12,532,361,835
22,689,432,968
54,845,022,310

10,367,630
15,331,155
78,478,212
227,925,711
1,099,159,170
2,492,308,215
5,062,431,258
12,495,810,267

B/A *100 (%)
14.9
16.2
17.6
14.4
18.9
19.9
22.3
22.8

Source: Ministry of Education (1999) Education Statistical Yearbook, p.873
S.4.2.5 Horizontal Decentralization
As in the power balance of school finance between the central and the local
governments, the relationship between the general administrative authority and the
education authority in each province was important in deciding the degree of financial
autonomy for local education. The Local Finance Law authorized the local governments
to receive some revenues to finance education, chief among which were the tobacco tax
revenues that would be transferred to the local education authorities. Table 5.22
demonstrates the transfer of the tobacco tax revenues of each local government for public
education since 1989 when it was created. Seoul metropolitan city, for example,
transferred 110,117 million won in 1989 for public education, and it transferred more
than twice as much, 237,043 million won in 1995.
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Table 5.22 Transfer of Tobacco Tax from the Local Governments (million won)
years

Seoul

Busan

Daegu

Incheon

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
199-5

110,117
121,075
124,525
122,228
130,714
247,615
237,043

38,580
40,925
42,680
43,800
44,550
42,548
86,982

20,190
24,742
26,871
26,925
28,030
51,051
49,674

14,800
18,628
21,268
24,861
23,968
44,562
42,863

Gwangju

Daejeon

8,870
8,854
12,163
11,817
11,800
22,635
20,288

9,428
10,786
11,416
12,240
13,306
14,264
25,290

Source: Song (1999), p.67
Another important financial resource for education to be received from the local
governments was the teacher salaries in public middle schools. Two major metropolitan
cities were obliged to transfer money for middle school teacher salaries to the education
authority in the area: 100% in Seoul and 50% in Busan. As seen in Table 5.23, the two
cities paid 82,830 million, and 16,239 million won in 1989, respectively, and they
increased their payment up to 220,500 million won in Seoul and 41,600 million won in
Busan in 1995.
Table 5.23 Transfer for Teachers’ Salary from the Two Metropolitan Cities (million won)
Years

Seoul

Busan

1989
1990
1991
1993
1994
1995

82,380
99,150
119,652
138,107
148,144
220,500

16,239
21,624
24,012
26,698
40,384
41,600

Source: Ministry of Education, 1990- 1996
Table 5.24 shows the total education budgets and transferred funds from the local
government each year, and the ratio of the transfer to total education budgets by year.
The share of the transferred money increased temporarily around 1990, but went into a
path of decline afterwards. The scale of the transfer reached its peak in 1990 at 5.47%,
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and turned downward to 4.15% in 1993. This curve had turned upward again to 5.65% in
1995.

This implies that the local governments did not fulfill their obligation for

education in the middle years.
Table 5.24 Transfer from Local Government by Years (million won)
years

education budgets (A)

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

6,313,075
7,798,446
9,416,919
10,765,082
12,213,944
14,046,808

transfer from local gov’t (B)
345,083
404176
428,623
447,038
640,951
786,402

B/A*100 (%)
5.47
5.18
4.55
4.15
5.25
5.60

Source: Ministry of Education, 1991-1999
The amount of the transfer from the local governments for public education
varied depending upon the economic conditions of each locality. As shown in Table 5.25,
different provinces transferred various levels of financial resources for education after the
revival of local autonomy in 1991. Altogether, a difference between the metropolitan and
the provincial areas appeared in terms of the magnitude and stability of the transfer. For
example, the Seoul and Busan metropolitan cities were stable in their commitment to
education.
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Table 5.25 Transfer from Local Governments by Region (hundred thousand won)
Regions

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Seoul
Busan
Daegu
Incheon
Gwangjoo
Daejeon
Gyunggi
Gangwon
Chungbook
Chungnam
Jeonbook
Jennam
Gyungbook
Gyungnam
Jejoo

7,817
1,008
941
4,100
9
283
7,264
965
544
380
380
398
933
961
261
26,244

8,317
1,570
1,045
7,900
340
3,710
16,930
937
81
347
321
389
1,220
597
1,635

10,720
1,175
2,250
4,600
550
1,550
16,684
5,166
2,115
3,158
1633
3,271
5,677
781
2,877
62,207

10,669
2,079
6,210
2,620
150
35
8,746
5,240
2,123
2,714
739
2,858
3,210
2400
3,131

10,748
2,791
5,308
25
1,882
10
3,713
3,906
1,181
2,706
2986
2,463
2,409
1,090
3,429

52,954

44,776

Total

45,339

Source: Ministry of Education, 1994-1998

5.4.2.6 International Comparison
Regarding the degree of financial decentralization in Korea, there are two
perspectives. One is a general viewpoint that Korea has had a centralized system for a
very long time, with a degree of decentralization that is low when compared with other
countries. However, according to a study shown in Table 5.26, Korea's financial
decentralization was higher in expenditures than the average for OECD countries (Lee &
Hyun, 2006). Lee and Hyun’s study maintains that decentralization is not always a best
choice; rather it needs to seek an optimal fiscal decentralization in consideration of the
country-specific conditions. In addition, the fiscal independence of the local governments
in Korea is relatively high, mainly because of the transfer system of finance. Thus, their
study concludes that it is wise to use the finance transfer system to leverage
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decentralization, without emphasizing self-resource mobilization in each region (Lee &
Hyun, 2006).
Table 5.26 International Comparison of the Financial Decentralization in the 1990s (%)
Countries

Revenue

Expenditure

Sweden
Japan
Denmark
Finland
Austria
Norway
Australia
Iceland
Korea, Rep.
Spain
Czech Republic
France
Poland
Turkey
Luxembourg

39.6
36.3
32.4
29.8
29.1
25.6
22.4
20.8
20.7
20.7
20.6
18.4
13.9
12.9
8.3

58.1
—

66.3
40.8
48.2
55.3
64.2
27.1
42.5
53.4
30.7
31.4
42.8
—

29.6

Source: Lee and Hyun (2006), p. 108-110
Another indicator that Korea has a normal level of local finance when compared
with the major advanced countries is suggested in Table 5.27. While the ratio of local to
total finance in Korea was 42.2% in 1987, it was 61.5% and 28.0, respectively, in Japan
and the U.K. With a ratio of 15.4%, France appears to be a much more centralized
country than Korea.
Table 5.27 International Comparison of Korean Local Finances in 1987 (%)
Local finance/total finance
Local fmance/GDP
Total fmance/GDP

Korea

Japan

U.K

42.2
8.6
20.4

61.5
18.1
29.5

28.0
13.6
48.4

Source: Ito (1992), p. 417
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France
15.4
7.4
48.3

5.4.2.7. Limitation on Decentralization in Korea
While local autonomy was historically significant in that it was a revival of
grass-roots democracy, it faced, after five years of implementation, several obstacles.
First, local autonomy was a foreign concept to the Korean people. Because the
centralized system of society had predominated for such a long time, it was hard for them
to accept the new system. Second, because it was suspended for 30 years after a short
experience, local governments and citizens needed time to accumulate the knowledge and
skills needed to operate under local autonomy. Third, there was a continuous debate as to
whether decentralization would be the best choice for this small country. Korea had
accomplished remarkable economic growth without decentralization. Lastly and most
importantly, the general public distrusted local autonomy. They saw in local politics the
same power struggles that they saw in the national politics, where individual and selfish
interests were pursued over the public interest (Boyer & Ahn, 1991).
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CHAPTER 6

MAJOR FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter compares and contrasts the educational governance reforms in China
and Korea between 1985 and 1995, and draws some lessons for policy making. The first
section presents the major findings of comparison of three aspects of their reform,
motives, actions, and consequences. It identifies the convergent and divergent aspects of
these reforms in the two countries. The second section outlines the environmental
conditions and the technical strategies for successful decentralization.

6.1 Major Findings Compared and Contrasted
The assumption underlying this study is that decentralization theoretically has
clear benefits. However, many empirical studies show little consistent evidence for this.
This is because both the consequences of decentralization policies and their evaluation by
stakeholders are likely to depend upon socio-economic and political conditions. This
study attempts to uncover knowledge and information about decentralization by a cross¬
national comparison. The comparison is carried out using the framework discussed in
Chapter 3, focusing on the general characteristics of decentralization, and the motivation,
actuation, and results of the governance reforms enacted in China and Korea.

6.1.1 General Characteristics of Decentralization in China and Korea
An initial comparison of the general characteristics of decentralization in terms of
types, country family, political system, and temporal oscillation reveal various features of
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country-specific policy.
6.1.1.1 Types of Decentralization
Two types of decentralization are seen depending on whether the aspect of power
relocation is horizontal (functional) or vertical (territorial). Horizontal or functional
decentralization means that the power shifts from a single authority to two or more other
units of governance that operate in parallel. Vertical or territorial decentralization refers
to the redistribution of authority and responsibility to a lower level of organization within
a system such as a state, province, region, municipality, district, or school site (Bray
2003; Rondinelli 1981).
The two cases of Korea and China show the complexities of the power structure.
China had a basic governance system that could be rearranged vertically from the central
government to localities, as is seen in almost all countries. In addition, China developed a
somewhat unique system of governance. The education functions were horizontally
divided and managed by two or more ministries in the central government (Cheng 1997).
Korea’s decentralization was essentially the same as China’s. The only difference
was that the horizontal decentralization occurred at the local level, rather than at the
central level as in China. It was a vertically driven decentralization; the central authority
shifted power and authority over education to local governments as part of the
revitalization of local autonomy in 1991. The new system allowed the local educational
authorities to establish local boards of education that were empowered as the decision
making bodies, and it facilitated the transfer of educational funds from local general
administrations to educational authorities.
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6.1.1.2 Country-Family, Political Systems, and Educational Governance Structure
As seen in Chapter 2, Castle’s analysis describes four families of nations
categorized by the aspect and degree of decentralization. The degree of centralization
decreased in the four families in the following order: Scandinavian, Latin, German and
Anglo-American.
The educational governance system appeared to depend on the political system. In
general, a country with a federal system operates a decentralized system: examples are
the United States, Canada, and Germany which all have highly decentralized structures.
In contrast, countries with unitary systems tend to have relatively center-oriented
educational systems. Korea had a unitary system and kept a highly centralized system
that was deeply rooted in its cultural and historical heritage. China also had a unitary
system, and so was regarded as having a centralized education system. Both initiated
radical decentralizations in the 1980s.
In

addition,

geographically

large countries in

general have decentralized

educational systems; examples are India, Canada, and the United States. Relatively small
nations tend to operate centralized systems, although exceptions are seen, e.g., Malta and
Brunei. China, however, was an exception to this generalization. Despite its large
geographic scale, China ran a centralized educational system. Korea, a small country with
a centralized system, fitted this generalization.
6.1.1.3 Temporal Oscillation of Educational Decentralization
Many empirical studies identify oscillations in educational policy. In particular,
the United States shows clear, ping-pong-like, centralization and decentralization policy
swings; this was analyzed in Chapter 2. Korea introduced local autonomy in 1953 during
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wartime despite its long standing centralized system. It continued for nine years until
1961 when it was abruptly ended by the military regime. Since then Korea sustained a
strong centrally controlled governance system that helped it to achieve its remarkable
national development. This rigid system of governance was broken in the late 1980s
when the 30-year-long authoritarian government was cast aside by the democracy
movement, which revitalized local autonomy in 1991. Thus, Korea can also be seen to
have experienced policy oscillations throughout its modem history.
Cyclic patterns can also be found in China’s educational governance structures.
According to Hawkins (2000), the Chinese education system, a highly centralized
structure throughout its history, experienced radical change in the mid-1980s. When the
Chinese political leaders proclaimed the importance of economic reform and an opendoor policy for national development, education was regarded as a key sector that needed
to be renovated. Education leaders in China initiated educational decentralization in
1985. The power and responsibility for providing primary education were transferred
from the central and provincial governments to regional and local governments. This
decentralization, however, saw another change toward recentralization in 1993 when the
central government took some of the authority to tax back from the local governments in
the name of protection of equality among regions. This was China’s history of policy
oscillation.
6.1.2 Motivating Forces:

What were the primary motives for the decentralization
movement in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995?
The educational governance reforms in China and Korea initiated since the mid
1980s were similar, as were the econo-political environments in the two countries.
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Nonetheless, differences could be seen in their political systems and their economic
conditions, such as their major objectives and their stage of economic development.
6.1.2.1 The Convergent Aspects of the Motivation for Reform
Decentralization proceeded in China and Korea as part of a global mega-trend
involving globalization, neo-liberalism, and a shift of the societal paradigm. For example,
agricultural society evolved into an industrial society, and then to an information society.
Following these changes, the governance system in society changed from decentralized to
centralized, and back again to decentralized. This mega-trend pushed many countries all
over the world, including China and Korea, toward decentralization.
To be more specific, both countries undertook their decentralization reform drives
in the similar environmental context: an econo-political system in transition and an
emergence of new leadership. China has conducted a comprehensive and radical reform
of its educational governance system continuously since the launch of the Deng Xiaoping
government in 1975. The two major motivating forces of the reform were as follows.
The first was the change in the political and economic systems. China initiated a
set of radical reforms to break through its economic impasse. These included an open
door policy and the introduction of a market-driven economy. These government actions
created historical momentum for national development. The open door policy ended the
period of the closed and hostile policy toward to western society that this big communist
country had long maintained, along with its ally, the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the
political leaders fostered the market economy as a key strategy for realizing their cardinal
principles for national development: modernization, globalization, and the future. The
introduction of the market economy played a galvanizing role for power rearrangement -
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decentralization - between the central and local governments. This then became a core
agenda item for many aspects of change.
The second was the change in political leadership. One of the characteristics of
modem Chinese politics is policy oscillation, a direct result of the struggle between
moderates and radicals in communist ideology. The radicals, followers of Mao Zedong,
were stuck to the ideology of revamping social relations through endless class struggle
and human liberation. In contrast, the moderates represented by Deng Xiaoping since the
early 1970s, pursued pragmatic programs that emphasized the importance of productivity
and efficiency to enhance the standard of living of the people. They were tolerant of the
western ideology of a market economy. As any new government tends to do, this newly
launched regime tried to differentiate itself from the former one. It did so by adopting a
massive reform, which included decentralization.
Korea evolved very similarly. First, there was the historic turning point in its
political system in the 1980s, the transition from the authoritarian military regime to a
semi-democratic government. This would be part of the global trend toward democracy
and was largely the result of the massive civil movement, as examined by Huntington.
The authoritarian government, launched first by the military coup in the early 1960s,
dominated Korean society for about 30 years. With the help of Korea’s rapid economic
development, once called “the Han River miracle”, civil society matured. Society began
to recognize that it was time for Korea to pay more attention to democracy; it demanded
political reform from its government. This caused a serious socio-political conflict
between the government and the dissident groups which included students, teachers, and
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politicians. This confrontation culminated in June, 1987 when the government yielded to
the people’s power by releasing “The 6.29 Declaration.”
Second, the power transition saw the emergence of a new leadership based on
political legitimacy in that the president was elected by the direct vote of the people. The
new leadership, although it was a pseudo-democratic leadership,6 provided momentum
for change in the nature of the political system. That is, Rho’s government took a series
of political measures that differentiated from the former government; chief among them
was deportation of his predecessor, Chun Doo Hwan. This advanced democracy for
politics in particular and for society as a whole. The emergence of the new leadership
facilitated a series of national discussions on decentralization.
6.1.2.2 Divergent Aspects of the Reform Motivation
Coupled with these similarities were clear differences between the two countries.
The major goal of the reform and the condition of the national economy were not the
same in China and Korea. First, China, as analyzed in the previous chapter, sought to
solve its financial problem in education: it was their key issue. China’s leaders saw that
educational development would be essential for the modernization of their country, and
in particular that the introduction of nine-year compulsory education would be of
foremost importance to enhance the level of national literacy. This expanded compulsory
education was, however, too ambitious for their national economy to handle. The GNP at
the time was just $300 per capita. The government then devised a new policy instrument,
decentralization

and

diversification,

to

shift

the

financial

burden

to

localities.

6 The new leadership bom in the midst of the massive democratic movement in 1987 was
not an authentically democratic one. Rather it was a pseudo democratic leadership
because most of the power elite in the ruling party and government were officials of the
former military dictatorship.
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Decentralization transferred power and accountability for providing public education to a
variety of stakeholders including the local governments at various levels. This
diversification strategy sought multiple sources of educational finance. Decentralization
to solve financial problems is often found in Latin American countries including Mexico,
Argentina, and Chile.
In contrast, the major reason for decentralization in Korea was the establishment
of democracy in the society; the fiscal power shift was simply a part of the program.
Since the foundation of modem Korea in 1948, the center-driven system dominated all of
society; it was viewed as a more efficient route toward national development than a
decentralized system. It worked during the age of national development from the 1960s to
1980s, leading to miracle-like economic advancement.

However, this economic

advancement had been achieved at a cost: the democratic development of society had
been stifled. As the national economy became strong, the civil society developed and
began to keep close watch on governmental policies. It demanded decentralization as a
course of democracy that was expected to check the uncontrollable military regime. With
The 6.29 Declaration, a symbol of the triumph of the democracy movement in 1987,
these civil demands became reform proposals, and afforded political activists and the
government the leverage to revitalize local autonomy. The cases of Spain and Colombia
provide other good examples of decentralization as a solution of political issues.
These

differences

in

reform

motives,

based

on

the

expected

goals

of

decentralization in the China and Korea, partly reflected the dissimilarity in the level of
national economic development, which in turn had an impact on the success of each
reform. China, one of the lowest GDP-per-capita countries in the world at the time of the
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reform, targeted the financial issue, while Korea at a middle level of economic
advancement,

focused

on

political

issues.

Each

used

the

same

instrument,

decentralization, to solve its country-specific problem.
In addition, several indirect motives in each country played an important role in
the initiation of reform. The Chinese reform was encouraged by cultural factors. When
China was in despair after 10 years of Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the
national pride of the people (China is the home country of Confucius) provided an
impetus for launching a massive reform, which included decentralization. This was
further supported by the general belief that education would be a key factor for the
recovery of China’s old glory.
Korea’s decentralization was secondarily motivated by legal demands to realize
local autonomy, as stipulated in the Constitution, the Local Autonomy Law, and the
Local Educational Autonomy Law since the inception of modem Korea in 1948.
Managerial efficiency also necessitated power relocation to ameliorate the side-effects of
the center-driven administrative system, such as inefficient bureaucracy. In particular, the
fiscal imbalance between the central and local governments triggered the discussion of
both horizontal and vertical decentralization in the

1980s.

The above-described

motivations for decentralization in China and Korea are summarized in Table 6.2.1.
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Table 6.1 Motivating Forces of Reform in China and Korea
Items
China
Korea
Econo-political
System and Leadership change
System and Leadership
motivation
change
- From national isolation
to open door policy, and
- From authoritarian to (semi)
from the planned communist to
democratic government
a socialist market economy
- From Mao Zedong(radical)
to Deng Xiaoping (moderate)

- From Chun Doo Whan to
Rho Tae Woo

Socio-cultural &
legal motivation

Socio - cultural heritage
- negative public attitude
toward the Cultural Revolution
- national confidence based
on pride as home
country of Confucius

Legal foundation for reform
- Constitution
- Local Autonomy Law
- Local Education Autonomy
Law

Educational and
administrative
motivation

Role of education for reform
- Leaders’ recognition of
importance of education as
a primary mover of
national development
-four major education
problems identified in the 1985
resolution

Inefficiency of central control
- superficial local autonomy
- the central government
control of all major issues

Financial motivation

Paramount reason for reform
- decentralization as a solution
of financial issues
- increasing population, and
introduction of nine-year
compulsory education

Improving fiscal imbalance
-financial dependence of
local government on the
central government
- three motives of fiscal
decentralization

*

6.1.3 Decentralization in Action:
How were the reform ideas and motives actuated
in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995?
How the reforms were actuated in China and Korea can be analyzed by
considering the following three aspects of reform: overarching actions, structural reform,
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and fiscal reform. These are summarized in the Tables 6.1.3.1, 6.1.3.2., and 6.1.3.3,
respectively.
6.1.3.1 Overarching Actions
For

China,

there

were

two

momentous

events

that

stirred

educational

decentralization from 1985 to 1995. One was the central government’s resolution in
1985: “Decision of the CPC Central Committee for Reform of China’s Educational
Structure.” The other was “Programs for China’s Education Reform and Development”
issued by the State Council of Education in 1993, which was released as way of updating
the process and contents of the 1985 reform.
For Korea, several events triggered the decentralization reform action, chief
among them were a set of reform proposals: the one for political reform, “The 6.29
Declaration,” and the other by the presidential commission for reform, “Education
Reform toward the 21st Century”. Each called for educational decentralization reform
outlining its broad direction and providing specific reform programs. In particular, The
6.29 Declaration provided momentum for the revitalization of local autonomy.
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Table 6.2 Overarching Actions for Decentralization in China and Korea.
Items
China
Korea
Overarching Actions
- Resolutions and Proposals
by the central authority
(party, education ministry,
presidential commission for
reform, political leaders)

1. “Decision of the CPC
Central Committee for
Reform of China’s
Educational Structure”
(May 27, 1985)
- entrust responsibility for
elementary education to
local authority
- institute nine- year
compulsory education

1. “The 6.29 Declaration for
Political Democracy
Reform (June 29, 1987)”
- realization of local
autonomy and education
decentralization
- constitutional revision for
presidential election by
direct vote and six other
proposals

2. “Programs for China’s
Education Reform and
Development” (State
Education Commission,
March 1993)

2. “Educational Reform
toward 21st Century”
(Presidential Commission
for Education Reform,
December, 1992)

6.1.3.2 Structural Reform
China instituted at least three major structural reforms in education. Firstly, it
enacted the nine-year compulsory education law that rearranged the power and
responsibility for providing education between the central and local governments. After
that, a set of supplementary measures such as education finance, a standard of obligation,
and prohibition of child labor followed. Secondly, the system of school site governance
also was restructured; this included the introduction of the open application system for
principal selection, and the separation of the party and the school in administration.
Thirdly, the central government withdrew its previously delegated authority to tax from
the localities in 1993. This was done in the name of the protection of equity, eight years
after the implementation of decentralization in 1985.
Korea’s decentralization movement, launched by the 6.29 Declaration, brought
about a series of specific actions for implementation. First of all, the basic structure of
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local autonomy was mapped out by political negotiation among various parties. Second,
the Local Autonomy Act that outlined the general principles of decentralization was
enacted. It, in particular, described educational autonomy. However, this enactment could
not take effect because of the political situation. Thirdly, the Ministry of Education
drafted a new law, the Local Educational Autonomy Law, which was passed by the
National Assembly in 1991. Fourthly, the elections for local leaders - local assembly
members, superintendents, governors and mayors - were held in 1991 and 1995.
Table 6.3 Educational Structural Reform in Action in China
China
1. Enactment of law and
Structural Reform
supplementary measures
- “Nine-year Compulsory
Education Law (1986)”
- financial measures,
standards of obligation,
prohibition of child labor
2. Three major reforms by
Deng Xiaoping
- division of labor, school
site reform (separation of
party and school)
3. Recentralization etc.
- withdraw tax authority
- privatization
- vocationalization
Strategies for Reform

1 .Incremental approach
2. Asymmetric approach
3. Policy synchronization
4. Active role of the
central government

and Korea
Korea
1. Enactment of laws
- Education Law
- Local Autonomy Law
- Local Education
Autonomy Law
2. Political negotiation
- major contents of the law
- activities of key actors

3. Local Elections
- local assemblies
- local government heads
: mayors, superintendents,
Governors
1.Incremental approach
2. Asymmentric approach
3. Policy synchronization
4. Active role of the central
government

6.1.3.3 Financial Reform
As an essential element for the effective implementation of reform, China
undertook four stages of financial reform beginning in the early 1980s. The basic
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principles of this reform were diversification of financial sources and decentralization of
fiscal power. This was supplemented by three growth principles: 1) the growth rate of the
education budget should be higher that that of the total government budgets, 2) the per
student expenditure should increase yearly, and 3) the education budget as a percentage
of GNP would increase from 2.2% in 1993 to 4% by 2000.
Korea undertook a reform initiative that represented both vertical and horizontal
decentralization in educational finance, while fiscal power relocation oscillated between
centralization and decentralization. The vertical decentralization changed the way the
financial resources were distributed from the central to the local authorities. It went from
an earmarked subsidy to a lump-sum grant. The horizontal decentralization facilitated the
transfer of funds from local governments to educational administration. These actions
enhanced the responsibilities of local authorities for education by establishing a standard
of transfer.
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Table 6.4 Educational Finance Reform in Action in China and Korea
China
Korea
Finance Reform
1. Four stages of fiscal
1. Oscillating stages of
reform
fiscal
reform in education
2. Basic principles for fiscal - decentralization and
reform
recentralization
- decentralization and
diversification
2. Selected types of power
- six channels of funding for
redistribution
education
- vertical decentralization
- horizontal decentralization
3. major strategies
- three growth policy
- two - leg policy

3. major strategies
- from the earmarked to
the lump - sum grants
- transfer for education
from local government

6.I.3.4. Summary: Convergent and Divergent Aspects
As examined above, both cases of decentralization in action reveal isomorphic
and idiosyncratic aspects. The similarities include: i) the central authority drove the
education reform in a top-down manner, ii) the major concerns were the structural and
financial aspect of reform, and iii) the strategies employed for effective reform
implementation were incremental, asymmetric, synchronic, and center-driven.
Along with the isomorphic aspects of these decentralizations, dissimilarities are
also seen. Although the central authorities were heavily involved in the process of power
transfer in both countries, the background and types of involvement were different. China
took a top-down approach. The central leadership, Deng Xiaoping and his followers,
designed the programs of power relocation and issued center-driven resolutions, orders,
and laws for implementation. These were triggered to revitalize the glory of China
through modernization.
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Korea’s story was more complex. Decentralization was realized as part of the pro¬
democracy movement after the collapse of an authoritarian regime. Although the central
authorities, including the ruling party, the presidential commission for reform, and the
ministry of education, took major actions for implementation, they were actually passive
actions taken in response to the people’s demands for democracy. It would be safe to say
that Korea’s decentralization was based on the bottom-up approach, while China’s was
top-down.
6.1.4 Consequences of Reform:
What were the major results of decentralization in
China and Korea between 1985 and 1995?
As seen in the previous sections, the background for and the major goals of the
decentralization policies were different in China and Korea. Thus, the consequences of
the reforms have been evaluated by different criteria. The results of the reforms are
summarized below in Tables 6.1.4.1. and 6.1.4.2., which focus on administrative
structure and finance.
6.1.4.1 Results of the Structural Reform
For China, the structural reform had centered on securing adequate financial
resources for providing pre-collegiate education. Fiscal responsibility was transferred to
lower levels of government. To be more specific, the authority and responsibility for
elementary, junior secondary, and senior secondary education were delegated from
township,

county,

and province to village,

township,

and county

governments,

respectively. The reform resulted in the enhancement of the efficiency of the educational
system as can be seen in Table 6.1.4.1. The system efficiency is represented by the
enrollment ratio of school age children, the advancement ratio to upper level schools, the
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school attendance ratio, the literacy rate, and the teacher quality in terms of the average
number of years of schooling. However, these accomplishments were accompanied by
some side-effects that included regional disparity in per pupil expenditures, advancement
rate, and financial resources from the diversified sources.
For Korea, the structural rearrangement was different. It focused on the
accomplishment of democracy in the governance structure and administration. Its
achievement included procedural, structural, and electoral reforms. First of all, the
revitalization of grass-roots democracy was the most important outcome of the reform7.
This was evidenced, in the early stage of the reform process, by many stakeholders, who
participated in discussions of how the decentralization policy would be designed and
implemented. Secondly, the function and role of the board of education was changed
from advisory and executive committee to a decision-making body, and horizontal
decentralization between local government and educational administration was also
emphasized. Thirdly, the framework of local autonomy was solidified by three rounds of
local elections for local leaders such as governors, mayors, local assembly members, and
superintendents.

7

While revitalization of local autonomy
is viewed an important outcome of
decentralization reform in the Korean context, it could be interpreted as a cause of
decentralization because the central authority initiated power relocation based on
people’s demand, rather than on decision of its own to restoring local autonomy.
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Table 6.5 Consequences of Educational Structural Reform in China and Korea
Reform areas/Results
China
Korea
1. The administrative system
1. Revitalization of grassStructural Reform
of power and responsibility
roots democracy
for education changed
- process democracy
- popular participation
- primary education: village
- lower secondary: township
- three rounds of local
- upper secondary: county
elections
.

2. Efficiency of the
education system enhanced
- Enrollment rate
- Advancement rate
- Attendance rate
- Illiteracy rate
- Teacher quality
3. Limit of reform
- disparity per PPE at the
county level
- disparity of diversified
funding among regions
- disparity of advancement
rate among region

2. Basic governance system
changed
- the role of the board of
education changed
- popular participation
- horizontal decentralization
- rhetorical decentralization /
technical recentralization
3. Limit of reform
- disinterest and complaints
of citizenry
- conflicts among actors

6.1.4.2 Results of Financial Reform
From the perspective of educational finance reform, China achieved remarkable
success with its new policy instrument, diversification. The share of non-government
budgets (extra-budgetary funds) in the total education budget increased from 23.48% in
1986 to 37.15 % in 1993. Their total education budget also increased. Significantly, the
indicators of financial adequacy (per pupil expenditures, the size of the education budget
as a percentage of the total government budget and GNP, and educational facilities and
equipment) all improved.
Korea altered the authority for educational spending from the central to the local
governments. The new method, the lump sum approach, resulted in a higher level of local
autonomy in school finance than the old method, the earmarking approach. The reform
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enhanced vertical decentralization by increasing the percentage of the local education
budget in the total budget, and this went in company the improved horizontal
decentralization because the local governments were obliged to increase the amount of
transfer fund for teacher salaries and school operations.
Table 6.6

Consequences of Educational Finance Reform
China
1. Fiscal source of education
Financial reform
decentralized and diversified
- government source:
government appropriation,
education tax, special
education funds, and
student loans
- non government sources:
tuition and fees, donations,
school factory, study-work
programs, private company,
NGO etc.
*23.8% (’86) -» 37.2%(’91)
2. Increased adequacy of
educational finance
- Per pupil expenditure
- Education expenditure as %
of GNP
- As % of total government
budget
- Diversification of funding
source
3. enhancement of the
physical condition of
schools
- % of pre-collegiate school
building in dilapidated
condition

6.1.4.3 Summary: Convergent and Divergent Aspects
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in China and Korea
Korea
1. Vertical decentralization
increased
- share of expenditures
between central and local
government
- share of revenues between
the central and local
government
- share of education budgets
between central and local
government
- education budget as % of
total budget and GNP
2. Horizontal decentralization
increased
- transfer from local
government (tobacco tax)
- transfer from local
government (teacher salary)
- transfer from local
government (total)
- transfer from local
government (region)
3. International comparison
- international comparison
of financial decent
- international comparison
of local finance

Decentralization in both countries turned out to work. China showed a remarkable
increase in the efficiency of its educational system as measured by various indexes such
as enrollment ratio, illiteracy rate, and per pupil expenditures. Korea also accomplished
considerable enhancement of local autonomy in educational administration and finance.
These were evidenced by the enactment of the Local Educational Autonomy Law,
vertical and horizontal power shifts, and three rounds of local elections for local
education leaders.

However, the focus was different. While China placed the policy

priority on education finance reform, Korea stressed the importance of democracy in its
administration and management of education.
Despite these achievements, there were some limitations to the decentralization
policy. In both countries, the central government did not give up its lingering desire for a
centralized system. For example, the Korean Ministry of Education still exercised a
strong influence on major policy agenda items such as personnel administration. The
Chinese central government decided to take the taxing authority delegated in 1985 back
from local governments in 1993. Both cases can be called “rhetorical decentralization and
technical recentralization’’

6.2 Lessons Learned and Policy Implications
The cross-national analysis of the decentralization reforms in China and Korea
and the broader global experience discussed in the previous chapters provide several
lessons and policy implications for reform. This section outlines the environmental
conditions and technical strategies for effective decentralization. This knowledge and
information can be applied to new cases in various settings.
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6.2.1 Environmental Conditions that Affect Decentralization
Decentralization is often regarded as a crucial means, rather than an end in itself,
of achieving policy values such as efficiency, productivity, and equity. However,
decentralization does not automatically achieve these values; the prevailing conditions
need to be considered for decentralization to succeed. Some of these conditions are socio¬
political, financial or economic, and managerial. Cultural variables are also important.
6.2,1,1 Socio-Political Conditions
Many empirical studies have identified two social and political elements that are
crucial for effective reform: consciousness of crisis in society and political leaders with
positive attitudes. First, in the initial stage, most reforms suffer from a lack of a broad
consensus for reform because of the systemic resistance of individuals and groups who
fear the loss of vested interests. However, when society is at economic and political risk,
it easily reaches a broad consensus for reform, thus overcoming such obstacles (Corrale,
1999; Hanson, 1998; Kemmerer, 1994; Prowda, 1993; Rondinelli, 1981; Weiler, 1987;
Winkler, 1989).
chaos

after

the

Spain’s experience in 1978 is just such a case; when society was in
death

of General

Franco;

the

government

initiated

a

radical

decentralization to avoid national disorder. Colombia followed the same track when it
faced societal confusion in 1991.
Second, for a reform to have a safe and sound implementation, it is critical to
have the support of political leaders at the different levels of government. When the
national leaders are positive about transferring power and authority to lower levels of
government, the chances for success increase. It is the same when they accept and
encourage the involvement of local stakeholders in the decision-making process. By the
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same token, if the local elite are accepting of responsibility handed down from the upperlevel authorities, the smooth implementation of decentralization at the regional level is
facilitated (Corrale, 1999; Hanson, 1998).
When Deng Xiaoping became president of China in 1976, Chinese society was
really in confusion, as observed by Lewin and Hui (1989): “What confronted the new
generation of decision-makers was a harsh reality: very poor living conditions, deeply
confused ideology, a national economy which was on the brink of collapse, and a closed
society which had lost its confidence in constructive criticism.” (p.7)
Deng’s reform, initiated in the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong, was
launched in the midst of social disorder. Deng and his followers demonstrated a firm
stance toward education reform as evidenced by the remarks of higher government
officers.8
For Korea, the political confusion caused by the public demonstrations for
democracy in the early 1980s provided an impetus for reform. Chief among these outcries
were “Seoul’s Spring” in 1980 followed by the death of Park Chung Hee, and the 6.10
national demonstrations for democracy in 1987 that concluded in The 6.29 Declaration.
This transitional situation gave rise to serious social confusion and disorder, and
galvanized the necessity for reform in all sectors of society including education. Political

s The State Education Commissioner, Li Tieying, emphasized at the world public
education conference in March, 1990 that “first priority must be given to education in the
overall development of the nation...China’s education must adhere to the reform and
open policy, and be geared to China’s modernization, to the world, and to the future.”
A local leader, the deputy-governor of Guangdong province, also maintained the
importance of education in national development by saying “Education should contribute
to our overtaking Asian’s Four Little Dragons”
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leaders demonstrated firm attitudes toward reform. For example, the ruling party felt a
responsibility to honor The 6.29 Declaration, its promise for decentralization reform, The
opposition party was also steady in their will to revitalize local autonomy, and its leader,
Kim Dae Joong, even went on a hunger strike when the government in 1990 displayed a
reserved attitude toward reform.
6.2.1.2 Economic and Financial Conditions
For decentralization to be effectively implemented, some assert that a minimum
level of economic development is needed. Most policy programs are inevitably related to
financial matters; only a few limited programs that can be initiated without financial
support. The financial factors affecting effective decentralization include an increased
investment in public service. Therefore, financial power relocation is a core subject in the
discourse of education decentralization. Two aspects of the financing need to be taken
into account. One is the transfer of expenditure distribution and allocation, and the other
is that of the self-revenue generation. In particular, the shift of taxing authority for
revenue generation is viewed as a key component for meeting various local financial
demands. Empirical studies show that central governments have a tendency to hold on to
their taxing authority, even when decentralization is comprehensive (Fiske, 1996;
Hanson, 1998; Prowda, 1993, Rondinelli, 1981; Winkler, 1989).
There is an alternative policy approach to the center-driven governance system:
privatization of education (Cummings and Riddell, 1994; James, 1987; Riddell, 1997).
James (1987) described two paths to privatization. One is based on “excess demand” that
is mostly found in the secondary private schools in developing countries. When a
government does not have the financial capacity to satisfy an increasing demand for
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public education, it may choose to transfer the power and authority for education to lower
levels of government or to individual institutions
The other is based on “differentiated demand” that is dominant at all levels of
private schools from primary to tertiary in industrialized countries, which is independent
of the financial capacity of the central government. “It is common in this category for an
important religious or cultural group to deliver a separate education system from
preschool through to tertiary level.”(p.757) James identified at least eight OECD
countries (the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Greece, Spain, Denmark, and
New Zealand) in the differentiated demand category.

Decentralization in many

developing countries, including many in Africa, has been the result of excess demand,
and it has enhanced educational opportunities for the general public. However, this is
accompanied by a wider gap between rich and poor regions in quality of education.
When China initiated its reform in 1985, its economic and financial capacity for
implementing national innovation was regarded as far below the normal standard (Tsang,
1996). Nine-year compulsory education, therefore, was typical excess-driven demand
decentralization. Korea had a sound national economic status in comparison with China
when its reform started in the late 1980s. Since the major goal of Korea’s decentralization
reform in the transitional period was the realization of democracy, the power shift policy
was not based on excess-driven demand or differentiated-driven demand; rather it might
be said to be a politically-driven demand reform.

6.2.1.3 Administrative and Managerial Conditions

175

Decentralization requires an appropriate arrangement of administrative functions
among the different levels of government. A clear legal infrastructure of law, regulation,
and directives should define the role and function of each agency. A well written
management manual with well defined procedures makes it easier for local employees to
implement a reform program. The probability of success may depend on the technical
capacity of both the central government and the local governments to manage the
decentralization (Berman et al., 2002; Hanson, 1998; Litvac et ah, 1998).
The importance of building administrati ve capacity is well evidenced in the cases
of China, Cambodia, and Indonesia. In particular, China implemented support programs
in the areas of personnel training, improving data collection and utilization skills, and
providing consultation in decision-making. This effort substantially facilitated the
introduction of their compulsory education policy (King and Guerra, 2005).
In addition, the development of a new flexible system of administration may
make it easier to change the previously arranged functions at each level of authority into
the new environment. Regarding the regional organization for decentralization, empirical
case studies showed several types (Hanson, 1995): the establishment of new regions as
seen in Venezuela (1969); merger or combination with the existing system as seen in
Spain (1978); and the utilization of the existing system as seen Argentine (1991) and
Colombia (1993). Korea also utilized its existing system.
6.2.1.4 Psychological and Cultural Conditions
The result of reform is likely to be influenced by psychological and behavioral
factors, and by the organizational culture. Positive attitudes and behaviors by officials in
the central government play an important role in the process of decentralization. Some
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appropriate

instruments

for

overcoming

resistance

and

getting

cooperation

for

decentralization need to be developed. It is important to build trust and respect between
the central government and the local authorities, and between citizens and governments.
In local provinces, the leadership needs to recognize the importance of exchanges of both
personnel and information between the central government and the local governments.
Furthermore, it is crucial that an effective incentive system that encourages the
performance of decentralization be established both in the central ministry and in the
local provinces (Hanson, 1998; Rondinelli, 1981).
When the Chinese government decided to withdraw taxing authority from the
provinces in their 1993 reform, they feared at least two things. One was the loss of central
control over the localities in the name of decentralization, and the other was the
emergence of sectionalism or localism that might seriously hurt China’s national identity
and threaten its stability.
The organizational culture makes a difference depending on whether it prefers
the top-down or bottom-up approach. In bottom-up decentralization, it is assumed that the
society has a cultural basis for local autonomy. However, top-down is a bit different in
that the centrally initiated decentralization does not always guarantee the cultural
infrastructure for effective restructuring of power among the different levels of
government. In some cases, the local governments do not want the transfer of power; this
was seen in Mexico. In an environment where the localities prefer centrally designed
plans and implementation, decentralization cannot be successfully realized (Kemmerer
1994). Korea experienced this in the early stages of its reform, as seen in the results of
the local elections in 1991; the citizenry, who were well accustomed to the culture of
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center-driven policy, simply lacked interest (Kemmerer, 1994; Rondinelli,1981; Winkler,
1989).
6.2.2 Technical Strategies for Effective Decentralization
A positive environment is a crucial condition for the success of a reform.
However, it does not automatically guarantee that the desired results will be achieved
without well designed strategies. Some technical strategies for effective decentralization
reform are presented in this section.
6.2.2.1 Consensus Building
It is often said that the success of a reform depends upon how much the
stakeholders share the vision of the programs to be adopted. In general, any reform is
accompanied by conflicts among various vested groups and individuals (Hanson 1998).
With respect to establishing a consensus on decentralization, Hanson suggests the
following eight strategies: (i) identify the stakeholders and their interests, (ii) build their
legitimate interests into the model, (iii) organize public discussion, (iv) clarify the
purpose of the decentralization, (v) respect the role of the various actors, (vi) provide
adequate training, (vii) analyze the obstacles to decentralization, and (viii) develop a
monitoring system.
There have been many cases in Latin America, in Colombia, Mexico, and
Chile, for example that illustrate the importance of consensus building. These cases are
considered partial failures, mainly because they did not pay much attention to the
importance of consensus building. On the other hand, Spain and New Zealand recognized
the importance of soliciting support by encouraging national debate and discussion
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regarding decentralization. The success that these two countries achieved is attributed to
their effective consensus-building programs (Fiske,1996; Hanson, 1998).
It is not clear whether China employed systemic consensus-building strategies as
seen in industrialized countries. Chinese leaders were likely to emphasize the inevitability
of reform on various occasions as seen in Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Inspection Tour in
1992”g and in other government officials’ remarks for the mobilization of reform (Lo,
1993; Sun, 1993). In the meantime, one of the key characteristics in Korea’s reform for
local educational autonomy was the participation of the stakeholders. During the reform
period in the 1980s, the teachers groups played very important roles in the process of
crafting the reform policy, and parents also joined in the discussion of decentralization
reform in the 1990s. In addition, the media campaign was an important instrument for
building consensus for the 1995 reform (Park, 2000).
6.2.2.2 The Incremental Approach
The approach to reform can be classified into two major categories according to its
speed and scope: incremental and all-encompassing. Both have pros and cons with
respect to the effectiveness of a reform. Many empirical cases show that the incremental
approach is more effective than the radical and all-encompassing one. To be more
specific, a radical reform brings about a so-called vision jump for the stakeholders. It is
often caused by the wide gap between the suggested vision of the reform and the status
quo, hence resulting in some frustration among individuals and organizations about what

9 “To reassert his economic agenda, in the spring of 1992, Deng made his famous
southern tour of China, visiting Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and spending the New
Years in Shanghai, in reality using his travels as a method of reasserting his economic
policy after his retirement from office. On this tour, Deng made various speeches and
generated large local support for his reformist platform.”(Lo, 1993, p. 22.4)
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to do. Therefore, reforms need to focus on a limited issue at the outset, and then gradually
expand their scope. It is important to show some tangible effects to stakeholders on a
short-term basis, particularly to those who are in doubt about the utility of the reform or
to those who actually oppose it (Hanson, 1998; Winkler, 1989).
For example, China planned to implement its nine-year compulsory education
plan in an incremental manner, rather than with an all-encompassing approach. China had
regions with different socio-economic conditions. The implementation schedule of
compulsory education was set in three categories according to the uneven regional
conditions (CCP 1985):

i) the developed regions (coastal areas) by 1990, ii) the semi-

developed regions by 1995, and iii) the underdeveloped regions (minority-inhabited
areas) by a regionally planned time. The expansion schedule for educational finance from
2% to 4% of GNP by 2000 took the same approach.
Korea also employed the incremental approach for the realization of local
autonomy. So that the new system would have a soft landing, it established local
assemblies first at the lowest levels (si, gun, gu), and later at the provincial and
metropolitan level. The local elections for the leaders of the si, gun, and gu were first held
in 1991. Then, after four years of “testing” the implementation of local autonomy, the
governors and mayors were elected in 1995.
6.2.2.3 The Asymmetric Approach
A country may consist of diverse provinces and regions with different financial
capacities, organizational culture, administrative structure, and political environment. The
pace and scope of decentralization should differ depending on these conditions: one size
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can’t fit all, and different things need to be treated differently. China and Korea both took
an asymmetric approach for their reforms in accordance with regional conditions.
Two approaches can be taken here for the asymmetric implementation of
decentralization. One is the capacity-based approach at the different levels of the same
governmental system. The central government would better decentralize power and
responsibility for providing education to a limited number of local governments that have
proven their capacities to implement decentralization (Hanson 1998). The other is the
outsourcing approach; this privatizes the provision of public education. The central or
provincial government shifts a public function such as education to the private sector, in
the hope that it can be more effectively implemented by the private institutions than by
the public sector (Hanson, 1998; Litvac et al., 1998).
6.2.2.4 The Synchronization Approach
In order for decentralization to be successfully implemented as intended, it should
function as a part of the greater governance and administration system, rather than trying
to go its own way. A decentralization policy has a complex architecture that is
intertwined with various functions of government such as the administrative, fiscal, and
political ones. For example, the transfer of fiscal authority means giving both the power
of resource generation and of expenditure allocation. In many cases, the central
government decentralizes the expenditure authority without providing appropriate
revenue sources; this was seen in Russia when it was the center of the former Soviet
Union. The simple shift of power without providing for capacity building may complicate
the decentralization efforts and lead to failure because of a lack of efficiency in resource
utilization and management. Furthermore, local policies should sometimes be closely
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linked to the national standard as is often demonstrated in the health policies of
developing countries such as the Philippines, Colombia, and Eastern European countries
(Corrale, 1999; Latvac et al., 1998).
When Chinese leaders set their cardinal principles for national development modernization, globalization, and the future - education became a key instrument for
their achievement. Consequently, educational reform went hand in hand with economic
policy. Decentralization of educational finance was implemented as part of the general
fiscal reform, thus enhancing the reform synergy. However, the shift of power on
expenditures was not accompanied by one on revenue generation.
In contrast, Korea’s local educational autonomy was by its nature not independent
of general administrative autonomy. This was due to the structural features of government
in Korea; there were two different entities of local government - general administration
and educational administration - at the provincial level. Therefore, local educational
autonomy proceeded hand in hand with general local autonomy. Fiscal reform followed
the same course.
6.2.2.5 Positive Involvement of the Central Government
When

it

comes

to

stating

the

key

factors

that

affect

the

success

of

decentralization, the role of the central government often comes to the fore. The functions
of this central unit in power relocation vary depending upon the environmental situation.
Important among them are the roles of planner, coordinator, facilitator, and supporter.
When the central government is positively involved in the whole process, the chances of
success increase. Basically, its positive role derives from changes in attitude and behavior
by the officials of the central ministry (Hanson, 1998; Tatto, 1999; Winkler, 1989).
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However, the central government should be aware of a potentially serious sideeffect when it undertakes an active role in decentralization. Countries with a tradition of
centralization are not familiar with self-governance, with the election of representatives,
and with the appropriate way to exercise their right to make their ideas known. For
example, despite decentralization to the commune council in the mid-1980s, China was
criticized as lacking popular representation. The central government in Cambodia still
appointed provincial majors and governors. Many Indonesian schools, although they have
their own school councils, rarely meet to discuss important school policies and programs
(World Bank, 2004). Korea experienced this also when the general public showed a lack
of interest in the local elections in 1991, partly because the central government had not
foreseen the need to provide technical assistance to increase the turnout rate.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I have conducted a set of longitudinal analyses and cross-sectional comparisons of
educational governance reform in China and Korea between 1985 and 1995. What
fostered this study was the need to reconcile the theoretical benefits of decentralization
with the empirical evidence that often showed that the benefits were not being achieved.
Theoretically, the benefits of decentralization include the enhancement of democratic
participation, managerial efficiency, and the improvement of financial deficiencies.
Empirically, however, there is little consistent evidence for this. The consequences of
reform vary in accordance with country-specific conditions: they appear to turn out to be
successful, mixed, or failed.
This

study

has

sought

answers

to

several

questions

surrounding

the

decentralizations that occurred in China and Korea in the late twentieth century. The
questions were (1) What were the primary motivating forces behind the decentralization
movement? (2) How were the reform ideas implemented? and (3) What were the major
consequences of decentralization in each country with respect to the changes in the
educational governance structure, and the dynamics of control of the school finance
system between the central authorities and the localities?
The following sections present a summary of the comparison between China and
Korea, outline some policy implications focusing upon conditions and strategies of
successful decentralization, and suggest some recommendations for future research.

184

7.1 A Summary of the Major Findings
Below are major findings from the systemic comparison of education reform in
China and Korea.
First, regarding the primary motivating forces for governance reform in the two
nations, both had common econo-political, socio-cultural, financial, and administrative
conditions from the micro perspective, although they differ in their details. To be more
specific, the major similarities in the motivation for reform in the two countries were the
transition in the political system based on national crisis, and the emergence of new
political leadership. Differences included the key objective of reform and the national
economic condition; these are essential elements affecting decentralization reform. While
solving

an

educational

decentralization

in

1985,

finance
Korea

problem
stressed

was

China’s

principle

the

political

aspect

objective
of

of

educational

decentralization because it was developed as part of a political reform, one key aspect of
which was revitalizing the local autonomy.
Second, regarding how the reform ideas were actuated, both took the centerdriven approach. China’s central authority played a key role in mapping out the reform
plan. For example, when China launched its reform in 1985, the CPC (Communist Party
of China) issued a resolution entitled “Decision for Reform of China’s Educational
Structure” (May 25,

1985) which suggested implementing nine-year compulsory

education, and entrusting responsibility for elementary education to local authorities,
among other reform proposals. In the second phase of reform in 1993, the State
Education Commission of China issued “Programs for China’s Education Reform and
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Development (March, 1993) which extended educational reform by updating on-going
programs.
Korea also actuated reform ideas by central authority. The ruling party proposed a
comprehensive socio-political reform package in 1987 which was released in the form of
a presidential candidate’s pronouncement, “The 6.29 Declaration.” The Presidential
Commission for Education Reform issued a comprehensive reform proposal entitled
“Education Reform toward the 21st Century” in 1987, outlining a broad policy direction
and some specific reform programs including educational decentralization. Both
galvanized the discussion of governance renovation in education.
Each country enacted laws to facilitate its reform proposals. China drafted the
Compulsory Education Law in 1986, the first law regarding education since the inception
of modem China in 1949. It promulgated power and responsibility to different levels of
government for the provision of pre-collegiate education. Korea legislated several laws
for the implementation of decentralization, and the realization of local autonomy. Chief
among them were the Local Autonomy Law and the Local Educational Autonomy Law
(the Local Education Self-Govemance Law). It prescribed the reinstatement of local
assemblies, which had been dead for a long time, and reshaped the roles of the boards of
education from advisory committees to decision-making bodies.
Third,

regarding

the

major

consequences

of the

reform,

both countries

demonstrated considerable achievement in terms of the efficiency of the educational
system and the enhancement of political democracy in education. China showed some
intriguing results in its governance reform. With its structural reform, the Chinese
government transferred the authority and responsibility for pre-collegiate education from
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province, county, and township to county, township, and village, respectively. Fiscal
responsibility followed the same decentralization path. The consequences of these
measures turned out to be remarkable: enrollment ratio, illiteracy rate, per pupil
expenditure, and extra-budgetary fiscal resource all improved.
Korea achieved a variety of outcomes from its governance reform: procedural,
structural, and electoral. First, the most meaningful outcome was the revitalization of
grass-roots democracy itself in that decentralization encouraged the democratic process in
various aspects of educational administration. Second, the educational governance system
was revamped from a center-driven to locally-empowered structure. It covered both
vertical decentralization at the central level and horizontal decentralization at the local
level. Lastly, decentralization reform was solidified by three rounds of local elections for
local education leaders such as superintendents, governors, and mayors. In particular,
horizontal decentralization at the local levels led to an enhanced responsibility for local
governments; very importantly, it allowed them to generate additional financial resources
for education.
7.2 Policy Implications and Suggestions
This empirical case study of China and Korea yielded salient policy implications:
environmental

conditions

for

policy

makers,

and

implementation

strategies

for

educational administrators. It provided four aspects of environmental conditions that can
affect educational decentralization reform, which confirmed the admonition of Stephen
that “there is a lesson (and a warning) for policy makers: a common policy idea can be
interpreted and acted upon differently when it is transferred to a different setting.” Chief
among environmental variables suggested for particular considerations are socio-
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political,

econo-financial,

psychological

and

behavioral,

and

administrative

and

managerial.
Whether decentralization reform can be smoothly launched depends upon the
social and political conditions in a society. As Hanson noted, if society is having serious
difficulties and the people share a sense of crisis, the reform easily follows its own path
without resistance. Furthermore, any reform is decisively influenced by the attitude and
will of the political leaders toward the newly launched policies. The more positive the
leaders are toward the reform, the greater its chance of success.
The

financial capacities

of the

local

governments

are

important to the

implementation of fiscal decentralization, which requires a minimum level of fiscal and
economic

capability to

administer

the

reform.

As

seen

in most

cases,

fiscal

decentralization tended to focus on the power shift of the expenditure allocation, rather
than

of the

resource

generation.

Without

the

transfer of taxing

authority,

decentralization is only half done.
The attitude of Ministry of Education officials is crucial. When they are
preoccupied with

a

sense

of loss

of central

control

over

local

governments,

decentralization does not proceed easily. The organizational culture also affects the
feasibility of decentralization. When an organization is accustomed to a top-down
culture, the likelihood that decentralization will succeed decreases.
Without considering the management capacity of the local government, the
simple downloading of power is not enough for effective decentralization. When a local
government has well organized systems and infrastructure, the possibility of success in
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decentralization increases. Chief among the administrative and managerial properties of a
local government are clear legal systems and well written management manuals.
Coupled with the environmental conditions are technical strategies for the
effective actuation of decentralization. These include the consensus building approach,
the incremental approach, the asymmetric approach, the synchronization approach, and
the central involvement approach.
First, since reform is accompanied by conflicts among various vested groups and
individuals, reform success depends upon the degree of consensus among stakeholders
regarding the vision of the programs to be adopted and the policy changes to achieve the
vision. Hanson’s eight steps for consensus building presented in Chapter 6 provide salient
implications for policy makers.
Second, the incremental approach for reform is better than an all-at-once one. In
general, any radical reform causes a vision jump for the stakeholder in the short-term,
which results from the wide gap between the suggested vision of the reform and the
status quo. It brings about frustration among individuals. Therefore, the reform needs to
focus on a limited issue at its inception, and then to expand its scope incrementally.
Third, the economic, political, and other condition may be different in various regions.
The scope and pace of reform should differ depending on these. One size cannot fit all,
and different things need to be treated differently. Fourth, public policy has a complex
architecture, as does decentralization because it is intertwined with other governmental
functions. It is important that decentralization be implemented with other related
programs for forward-moving synergy. Fifth, the active role of the central government is
one of the most influential factors for increasing the chance of success. The central
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involvement needs to play the roles of planner, facilitator, coordinator, and supporter of
the reform. The central government’s role varies according to environmental conditions.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research
This study examined the dynamics of decentralization reform in China and Korea
from the macro-perspective. It centered on the issues surrounding three aspects of reform:
the driving forces for reform, the ways in which reform is actuated, and the consequences
of reform. Mainly due to limited data accessibility, the analysis was conducted at the
macro level. Therefore, this study suggests several recommendations for further studies
as follows.
First, education policy is supposed to be authentically realized at the school site. It
would be crucial to examine whether any education reform program including
decentralization works at the front line, at the school level. I advocate studying
decentralization at the micro level from an international comparative perspective.
Second, when it comes to the key goal of educational policy, student achievement
comes to the fore. How decentralization contributes to the enhancement of student
accomplishment is not well known. This is partly because, as King and Guerra (2005)
have written, “educational development is rarely the rationale for decentralization, there
is no guarantee that the reform will, in fact, improve educational outcomes” (p.180). I
recommend studying the effects of redistributing the power structure between the central
government and localities on student outcomes.
Third, many studies on decentralization appear to focus on financial issues. In
particular, many studies on decentralization in China seem to assume that its fiscal aspect
is the only point of the power relationship between the central and local governments.
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Although financial matters are important in decentralization policy, there is more. I urge
researchers to study the impact of the extra-fiscal aspects of decentralization such as
personnel administration, information sharing, and reward systems.
Fourth, the central government got involved in decentralization in the name of the
protection of equity and technical efficiency, as clearly evidenced in the case of Mexico
in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the central efforts for decentralization were often regarded as a
buck-passing down to local government as seen in Argentina in 1975. A further study
needs to be conducted by the international comparative approach, focusing on the aspects
and effects of the central involvement in decentralization
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APPENDIX A

REFORM OF CHINA’S EDUCATIONAF STRUCTURE
DECISION OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MAY 1985
CONTENTS
I.

The fundamental aim of restructuring education is to improve the quality of the
nation and produce as many skilled people as possible.
II. Entrust Responsibility for Elementary Education to Local Authorities, and
Institute Nine-Year Compulsory Education
III. Restructure Secondary Education and Vigorously Promote Vocational and
Technical Education
IV. Reform Enrollment Planning of the Institutions of Higher Education and the
System of Job Assignment on Graduation and Extend Their Decision-Making
Power
V. Strengthen Leadership and Mobilize All Positive Factors to Ensure successful
Restructuring of Education.

I. The fundamental aim of restructuring education is to improve the quality of the nation
and produce as many skilled people as possible.
The decision made by the Twelfth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at
its Third Plenary Session on the reform of the economic structure has broadened
prospects for the vigorous development of China’s productive forces and of its socialist
material and spiritual civilization. A vital factor for the success of our cause lies in the
availability of skilled people, which requires the vigorous development of education as
economic growth allows.
Education must serve socialist construction, which in turn must rely on education.
Our massive socialist modernization programmed requires us not only to give full rein to
the skilled people now available and to further enhance their capabilities, but also to train,
on a large scale, people with new types of skills who are dedicated to the socialist cause
and to the nation’s economic and social progress into the 1990s and the early years of the
next century - a task which we cannot accomplish without greatly increasing the entire
Party’s awareness of the importance of education so as to gear it to the needs of
modernization, the world and the future. We need to train millions upon millions of
workers in industry, agriculture, commerce and other fields, who are well-educated,
technically skilled and professionally competent. We also need to train tens of millions of
factory directors, managers, engineers, agronomists, economic experts, accountants,
statisticians and other economic and technological personnel who are equipped with
modem knowledge of science technology and economic management and imbued with a
pioneering spirit. And we need to train tens of millions of educators, scientists, medical
workers, theoreticians, cultural workers, journalists, editors, publishers, workers
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theoreticians, cultural workers, journalists, editors, publishers, workers in the fields of
law, foreign affairs as well as Party and government workers who can keep abreast of
developments in modem science and cultural and the technological revolution. All these
people should be persons of moral integrity with lofty ideals, well education and
disciplined, have an ardent love for the socialist motherland and the socialist cause, and
work with dedication for the prosperity of the country and the people. They should
constantly pursue new knowledge and cultivate the scientific spirit of seeking truth from
facts, thinking independently and daring to make innovations. This presents a tremendous
and arduous task in the development of China’s education and the reform of the
educational structure.
Since the founding of New China, our education has taken a tortuous course in its
development. By taking over and transforming education has taken a tortuous course in
its development. By taking over and transforming education in the early days of
liberation and effecting educational reform through the re-arrangement of college and
university faculties, we succeeded in turning Old China’s semi-colonial, semi-feudal
education into a socialist one. In the past thirty years or more, thanks to the painstaking
efforts of countless educational workers, we have accomplished remarkable achievements
in education, registering an enormous progress unparalleled in Chinese history. The
overwhelming majority of educated workers and the backbone activists working in all
fields of endeavor today were trained after the founding of the People’s Republic.
However, for many years since the late 1950s, due to the Party’s failure to shift its focus
to economic development and the influence of the ‘Left’ theory that stressed ‘class
struggle as the key link,’ education was not given the prominence its deserves. Instead, it
was constantly disrupted by ‘Left’ political movement. The ‘left’ error reached its
culmination in the years of the ‘cultural revolution,’ when the need for knowledge was
negated and education abolished. As a consequence, our educational cause was seriously
damaged and large numbers of our educational workers were bitterly persecuted. The
educational of a whole generation of young people was disrupted, and the educational
gap between China and developed countries, which had been narrowing, widened again.
Following its Third Plenary Session, the Eleventh Party Central Committee
realigned the guiding principles and issued a series of new judgments and policy
decisions on education, thus enabling it to revive and develop vigorously. However,
erroneous ideas that belittle education, knowledge and skilled people have persisted, the
influence of‘Left’ ideas in education have yet to be eradicated, and a fundamental
change is require into order to gear education to the needs of socialist modernization. The
backwardness of our education and the defects in the educational structure have become
all the more obvious in face of current development resulting from our policy of opening
to the outside world, invigorating the domestic economy and carrying out a
comprehensive restructuring of the economy and in face of the new-rising technological
revolution worldwide. The major problems are as follows:
1. Government departments in charge of educational administration are exercising
too rigid control over the schools and, particularly, over the colleges and
universities, depriving them of their vitality. On the other hand, these departments
have failed to mange effectively matters that are well within their jurisdiction.
2. In matters of educational structure, our elementary education is inadequate, there
are not enough good-quality schools and there is a serious shortage of qualified

193

teachers and basic facilities. Besides vocational and technical education, which is
most urgently needed for economic development, has not expanded as expected,
while there is a lop-sided arrangement of various disciplines and levels of higher
education.
3. In matters of the guiding ideology, course content teaching methods, not enough
attention has been paid to helping students develop, from early childhood, the
ability to live and think independently and fostering students’ high resolve to
make the motherland prosperous and strong. Nor have enough efforts been made
to educate them in Marxism in a vivid and lively way. Many course textbooks are
outdated, teaching methods stereotyped and practice sessions ignored, and the
specialties now offered cover a very limited range of academic subjects. All this
indicates that education in our country is divorced, to varying degrees, from the
needs of economic and social growth and lags behind the scientific and cultural
development of the present-day world.
The Party Central Committee holds that in order to bring about a
fundamental change in the situation, it is necessary to start with a systematic
reform of the educational structure. In reforming the administration system,
while strengthening overall-control, we must take resolute steps to streamline
administration, devolve power on units at lower levels so as to extend the
schools’ decision-making power in the administration of school affairs. In
readjusting education structure, we should also reform the labor and personnel
system. Moreover, it is necessary to reform any guidelines, course content and
teaching methods that are at odds with socialist modernization. Through these
reforms we mean to usher in a new educational situation in which elementary
education will be substantially strengthened, vocational and technical education
will be greatly expanded, colleges and universities will be able to exploit their
potential and exercise their initiative to the full, outside-school and after-school
education as well as regular school education will develop simultaneously, and
education of all kinds and at all levels will actively address the multiple needs of
economic and social development.
Education cannot be promoted without increased funds. For the
foreseeable future, central and local government appropriations for educational
purposes will increase at a rate faster than the increase in the state’s regular
revenues, and the average expenditure on education per student will also increase
steadily. There are now some leading cadres at every level who would rather
spend money on unnecessary items and are not upset at prodigious wastes, but
who would not have the smallest sum of money allocated for the development of
education. This must change. However, we must be aware that the amount of
state investment in education is, after all, determined by the growth of the
national economy, and we can only gradually overcome the shortage of funds for
education and raise teachers’ relatively low salaries. Therefore, the problem now
is to make the most of our limited financial and material resources to strengthen
education so as to meet the pressing needs of socialist modernization. To this end,
it is necessary for us to carry out a series of reforms to mobilize effectively the
initiative of governments at all levels, of countless students, teacher and other
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employees and of people from all walks of life, so that all of them, united as one
and working with one mind, will help advance education year by offering
proposals and putting their potential to the best use. This goal cannot be attained
without strenuous efforts. All comrades of the Party and the people all over the
country should work hard to this end.
I.

Entrust Responsibility for Elementary Education to Local Authorities, and
Institute Nine-Year Compulsory Education

. The promotion of nine- year compulsory education and having local authorities take
charge of elementary education, which is to be administered by departments at
different levels, constitute a basic link in developing education and in reforming its
structure. Compulsory education is national education which all school-age children
and youths receive by law and which the state, community and families are required
to support. Being essential to production and to modem life, such education is a
hallmark of modem civilization.
China’s elementary education is still backward. This is in sharp conflict with the
people’s urgent demand for building a prosperous and powerful socialist country
which is highly democratic and civilized. Under no circumstances can we allow this
state of affairs to continue. At present, we consider it entirely necessary and feasible
to introduce nine-year compulsory education, place it at the top of our agenda as a
matter of vital importance for the improvement of the quality of the nation and for
the prosperity of the country, and call on the entire Party and people of all our
nationalities to go all out to put it into effect step by step. To this end, we must
formulate a law for compulsory education which, after being examined and approved
by the National People’ Congress, will be promulgated.
China being a vast country, with uneven economic and cultural
development, the requirements and contents of compulsory education should vary
from place to place. Theses places fall roughly into three categories:
The first category comprises cities and economically developed areas in
the coastal provinces and some parts of the interior, where one quarter of the
country’s population resides. Junior middle school education has become universal in
many of these areas, while the rest must step up their effort to make it universal by
1990 in accordance with the required quality and quantity.
The second category is composed of economically semi-developed
townships and villages, where about half of the country’s population resides. These
areas must, first of all, make primary school education universal and up to standard
and, at the same time, make preparations to complete the spreading of regular junior
middle school education or junior middle vocational and technical education around
1995.
The third category is made up of economically under-developed areas
where one quarter of the country’s population resides. These areas must, as economic
development permits, take a variety of measures to spread elementary education in
varying degrees. The state will do its best to assist these areas in educational
development.
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State assistance will be provided to areas inhabited by minority
nationalities to speed up the development of education there as well.
Local people’s congresses will draw up regulations concerning
compulsory education in light of local conditions and will make decisions on the
measures, methods and deadlines for the enforcement of the nine-year compulsory
education system.
While implementing the nine-year compulsory education system, we
should strive to develop pre-school education and special education for the blind, the
deaf and mute, the handicapped and retarded children.
Building a mighty contingent of qualified and dedicated teachers is a
fundamental guarantee for the success of compulsory education and for better
elementary education. To this end, it is necessary to take specific measures to raise
the social status and material benefits of the teachers of secondary and primary
schools and kindergartens and to encourage them to make education their lifelong
career. In the meantime, further training for existing teachers and assessments of their
performance should be conducted in earnest. Developing normal school education
and providing teacher training are measures of strategic significance for the
development of education. Teachers should be encouraged to teach themselves and
each other in the subjects they are teaching. Correspondence courses as well as radio
and television lessons should be arranged for them. Schools and colleges that provide
advanced studies for teachers should be well run, and all facilities now available
should be used for further training on a rotation basis. Furthermore, it is necessary to
encourage, select and organize a number of teachers and senior students from
universities and colleges, research workers form research workers from research
institutions as well as qualified cadres from Party organizations and government
departments to assist in further training of secondary and primary school teachers. In
short, the purpose is to ensure that in the next five years or so, the great majority of
teachers will be qualified for the jobs they hold. After that, only those who have
received the required schooling or obtained qualification certificates are allowed to
serve as teachers. Vigorous efforts should be made to step up and strengthen the
training of teachers for secondary and primary schools and kindergartens. Teachers’
schools and colleges must adhere to the principle of serving elementary and
secondary education, and all their graduates must be assigned to schools to take up
the job of teaching. A certain number of graduates from other colleges and
universities should also be sent to schools to be teachers. No government
departments or any other units shall be allowed to transfer qualified teachers from
secondary or primary schools to other jobs.
The power for the administration of elementary education belongs to local
authorities. Except for major policies and principles and general plans that are to be
determined by the central authorities, all other responsibilities and powers are to be
delegated to local authorities for drawing up and implementing specific policies,
rules and regulations, and plans as well as for guiding, administering and monitoring
the work of the schools. The authorities of the provinces, autonomous regions and
centrally administered municipalities will define the functions and powers for
administrative departments at the provincial, municipal (perfectural), country and
township levels. In addition to state appropriations, all local authorities are required
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to allocate a proper percentage of their reserve funds for educational purposes so as
to promote education in all places. Most of township revenues should be used for
education. The local authorities may levy an extra tax for education, which shall be
used for education. The local authorities may levy an extra tax for education, which
shall be used exclusively to improve teaching facilities for elementary education.
They should encourage state-owned enterprises, public organizations and individuals
to run schools and provide them with guidance. Also, they can encourage units,
collective undertakings and individuals to make financial donations to help develop
education, but of their own accord, not be exaction. In order to ease the schools’
- economic burdens, fees charged to schools by various quarters must be strictly
controlled.
V. Strengthen Leadership and Mobilize All Positive Factors to ensure successful
Restructuring of Education.
In the restructuring of education, it is essential to take into account the special
features of educational work and adhere to the principle of seeking truth from facts
and proceeding from realities. While fundamental principles should be the same
everywhere, concrete methods should be flexible and varied. In no case must we rush
reform into mass action and implement it by force. It should be carried out firmly and
cautiously, with the stress on experiment. All reform measures that have a bearing on
the general situation or cover extensive ranges should be approved by higher
authorities.
Throughout the educational restructuring, it is imperative to keep the
fundamental aim in mind, namely, to enhance the nation and produce as many skilled
people as possible. The fundamental criterion for appraising the performance of a
school is the quantity of people it has trained, not its economic gains. One would lose
one’s bearings in the reform unless one adheres to this criterion.
In order to strengthen Party and government leadership over education, the
State Commission of major principles and policies concerning education, make
overall arrangements for the development of educational undertakings, coordinate
educational reform. While administration is being streamlined and power being
devolved on subordinate units, legislation regarding education should be stepped up.
From now on, local authorities will have more power and bear greater responsibility
for the development of education. Party committees and governments a t all levels
should, in accordance with the policy decisions made by the Twelfth Central
Committee of the Party, give strategic priority to education and make its
development one of their chief tasks and an essential factor in their appraisal of their
subordinates’ performance. It should be pointed out, in particular, that after the
institution of the responsibility system for production in the rural areas, the Party’s
grass-roots organizations there should devote more attention to the cultural and
technical as well as ideological and political education of Party members and the
masses and to educational undertakings in their own villages or townships. The
Central Committee of the Party believes that under the new economic and
educational structures, local authorities will have greater opportunities to quicken the
development of education by making better uses of their economic and cultural
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resources. It should be acknowledged that economic and cultural development is
uneven not only between the various provinces, municipalities and autonomous
regions, but also within every province, city and country. It is, therefore, imperative
to encourage some areas to develop first and in the meantime encourage some areas
to develop first and in the meantime encourage the developed areas to help the less
developed ones to catch up with them.
In reform, it is necessary to allow more initiative to all quarters and, most
importantly, to teachers. In China, there are nearly 10 million teachers, the
overwhelming majority of whom live up to the high standards of their profession,
having been, over the years, unswerving in their faith in the Party, in their love for
the socialist motherland and in their devotion to the people’s educational cause,
despite hardships and political upheavals. In restructuring education, we must firmly
rely on the teachers, heed their opinions and let them play their role to the full. Major
reform measures concerning specific schools must be taken without prior discussion
by those schools’ teachers. With the growth of the national economy and the states’
financial resources, governments at all levels and the relevant departments should
make a point of solving several practical problems for teachers every year from now
on. We should foster and carry forward the fine tradition that all teachers are held in
high esteem, making teaching one of the most respected professions in the
community. At the same time, we should also encourage the initiative of ideological
and political workers, administrative and managerial personnel, service and other
personnel. They should be given appropriate material rewards and encouragement
according to their performance.
The system under which the principal or president assumes full
responsibility should be gradually applied. Where conditions permit, an
administrative committee or senate headed by the principal or president and
composed of a small number of prestigious people should be established to exercise
the power of review and supervision. The system of congresses of teachers and other
employees, with teachers as the core, should be established and strengthened in order
to ensure more democratic management and supervision. Party organizations in
schools should abandon the practice of monopolizing the management of everything
so as to concentrate on strengthening Party building and improving ideological and
political work. They should unite the teachers and students, strongly support the
principals or presidents in the execution of their functions and powers, guarantee and
supervise the implementation of the Party’s various principles and policies and the
fulfillment of the state’s educational plans. They should persist in educating the
teachers and students in Marxism, inspire them with the resolve to forge ahead
courageously and contribute to the prosperity of out motherland, and guarantee that
students develop morally, intellectually and physically, so as to help make the
schools truly sturdy bulwarks against the corrosive influence of capitalist and other
decadent ideas and firm bases for the building of a socialist civilization of a high
cultural level.
We should mobilize and urge the entire Party and people from all walks of
life throughout the country to support and get involved in the restructuring of
education and help develop our education. We should encourage all the democratic
parties, mass organization, public bodies, retired cadres and intellectuals, collective
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economic units and individuals to contribute actively and voluntarily to the
development of education in various ways in accordance with the principles and
policies laid down by the Party and government.
To benefit the restructuring of education, we should analyze our past and
present experience and, at the same time, draw on both the positive and negative
experience of other countries in their effort to develop education. In particular, the
new technological revolution, the new scientific and technological achievements, the
opening up of new areas in science and technology as well as the emergence of new
means of acquiring and transmitting information have exerted an enormous influence
- on education. The experience acquired by advanced countries in these fields merits
special attention. We should increase our exchange with foreign countries through all
possible channels and build our education on the basis of the achievements of
contemporary world civilization.
The present decision focuses on the question of restructuring school
education. Adult education, which involves cadres, workers and other employees,
and peasants, and radio and television education are essential components of China’s
education as a whole. The State Commission of Education should make a separate
decision on improving and strengthening the work in these fields.
As for education reform in the army, decisions will be made by the Central
Military Commission.
The Central Committee Party is convinced that reform of the educational
structure will succeed and that socialist education with Chinese characteristics will
flourish as never before, provided that Party committees and governments at all
levels exercise better leadership and adhere to sound policies and the entire Party
membership, people from all walks of life and from all our nationalities in the
country work together. This success will give a strong impetus to China’s socialist
modernization and help raise to a new high the cultural and scientific level of its
people and greatly broaden their mental horizon.
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APPENDIX B
EDUCATION REFORM TOWARD THE 21st CENTURY (KOREA)
INCREASING AUTONOMY OF EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION
The major thrust of innovative efforts in educational administration will be
directed toward decentralizing the centralized function and allowing local administrative
authorities to be self-reliant and flexible about issues which influence local education.
An urgent task is to provide the institutional base, which allows local administrative
authorities to realize true autonomy. Local autonomy suggests that the administrative
authority be restructured, that functions be reorganized between central and local
government and that staff be re-educated to serve the public professionally.
The principle of educational administration is that the creativity and self-reliance
of each school should be respected. Control and direction imposed from the top down
undermines the diversity and autonomy of the school. Educational administration is
given a mandate to affect a shift of concern from control and direction to support and
encouragement, which enlarge the span of discretion on the part of the school.
The importance of autonomy is greater in higher education for two reasons-by
virtue of the university’s being usually administered by professional experts of long
experience holding earned degrees of the highest order, and by virtue of the university’s
serving local needs. The services of universities for the regional community may be
heightened by the organization of a regional university consortium which facilitates the
sharing of resources and cooperation among member universities.

A. Board of Education As a Decision-making Body
1)

Rationale
The municipal or provincial board of education is currently an executive body;
whereas, the local district board of education which is not organized yet, should be the
decision-making body. The superintendent is the head of the executive body. Therefore,
the provincial board or education should not serve as a decision-making body, even
though its name denotes it. Rather, the provincial board should serve as a committee
which deliberates important issues but does not make decisions. The limit of the
superintendent’s responsibility is not clearly delineated, particularly in relation to the
local board of education.
As local autonomy is planned for implementation in the near future, the time is
ripe to make education administration independent of general administration. Its
independence will be ensured by endowing decision-making power on local boards of
education, so that educational issues are dealt with in a professional capacity free of
intervention from higher up. Independence, professionalism, and community initiative are
the principles which underpin educational administration. The importance of
professionalism suggests the necessity of having a democratic process of decision¬
making which brings together expertise and far-sighted vision of local professionals in
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managing the education system. Community initiative carries a mandate that the local
community participate in, and be responsible for, education in its area.
Educational autonomy brings forth important issues to be addressed. One is to
determine the level of administrative hierarchy which is given autonomy. The questions
read, ‘At which level, the province or local district, should autonomy be introduced? Or
‘Should autonomy be implemented at both levels?’ The number of civil servants who sit
on the board and the method of selecting them are other matters to be determined in the
context of the answer given to the first issue. Autonomy may require that the criteria for
the qualification be revised.

2) Strategies
a.

b.

c.

d.

The local board of education should change its role and status from an executive
body to a decision-making body. The role of the superintendent, as the head of
an executive body, should be articulated in relation to the decision-making body.
By creating the decision-making board of education at local levels, it is possible
to give a full degree of independence to education administration, independent of
municipal and provincial governments.
The decision-making type of board of education should be adopted at two levels,
large administrative districts (special and independent cities and provinces) and
small administrative local districts (city and country). The kinds and range of
decisions which can be legally made on these two levels should be clearly
spelled out in pertinent legal enactments. The board members should be divided
into ex-officio members (mayor, governor, and superintendent) and elected
members. At the special city or provincial levels, the number of board members
should range from 15 to 30. At the country level, it should range from 7 to 9,
depending on the size of the population. The adoption of a governing system at
the two levels is meant to be simultaneous with autonomy granted to general
administration.
The qualification requirements of board members should be articulated by law.
They should be appointed by the local assembly to serve a term of four years.
Their membership may be extended up to two terms. The board members are
not supposed to be affiliated with a political party.
The superintendent is elected by the board of education. The qualification
requirement of the superintendent should be upgraded by setting forth criteria
which consider teaching experience in particular should receiver greater
attention. The term of the superintendent is four years, subject to extension by
one term, as presently practiced.

B. Reallocation of Functions between Central and Local Governments.
1) Rationale
Control and direction are the hallmarks of educational administration. As these
denote, administrative authority is centralized, with the central government - the Ministry
of Education - snowed under by myriads of works, including not only policy formulation
and budgetary planning and allocation but personnel management and details that are not
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worth while to be considered. Responsible for an unmanageably wide range of works,
the central government ministry wields an unchallenged power up to now over local
governments. This creates a pyramidal type of power structure, and the same can be said
of the provincial government in relation to local district administrative units.
Inherent in the hierarchical structure of administration, local administrative units
are plagued by direction and orders imposed from the top down and are put into a straight
jacket, stripped of leeway for creative approach to administrative issues. With the
imminent implementation of local autonomy, it is inevitable to examine the
administrative functions and structure in terms if their relevancy to new needs and to
reorganize them across different levels of administration.
The functional and structural reorganization will necessitate changes in workload
and personal requirement. As new demands confront the educational system, needs and
problems should be identified. All of these should be brought into the picture in planning
for the reform of the administrative system.
2) Strategies
a. The Ministry of Education should limit its functions to the following :
(1) Planning, coordination, and major policy making,
(2) Formulation of criteria and the framework for works which need to be
standardized nationwide, e.g., educational goals, the procedure of developing
curriculum and textbooks, qualification requirement of teachers, standard
requirements of school facilities, etc.,
(3) Hosting and administration of educational events on the national scale and
establishment of government test, international events, etc., and
(4) Guidance and support for municipal and boards of education.
b. The municipal and provincial boards of education should expand their functions to:
(1) application of major policy measures into implementation strategy and regional
planning for education development,
(2) hosting and administration of educational events to take place at the provincial
level,
(3) liaison and coordination between the Ministry of Education and district
administrative units, and
(4) guiding and supporting the local district offices of education.
c. The local district office if education is responsible for other administrative work
than that performed by higher authorities. It consists chiefly of planning, guiding
and supporting primary and secondary schools in the district.
d. Through the reorganization of functions, the Ministry of education should examine
its structure in terms of its relevancy to the new emphasis on policy formulation and
planning. To strengthen its new roles, an Educational Policy Deliberation Council
should be created to strengthen the rational basis for the decision-making process.
Regarding important policy issues, the Council should be empowered to formulate
policy measures in cooperation with professionals and on the basis of research
finding. The Bureau of Educational Financing should be created to secure
necessary funding.
e. The structure of local boards of education and superintendent’s office should be
legally stipulated, lest their functions encroach on the autonomy of the local
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schools. Emphasis should be placed on their roles in the development of materials,
information services, occupational and career guidance, and guidance for teachers,
f. The size of the executive branch under the superintendent and its subordinate agency
should be readjusted so as to suit the size of population.
C. Relation between Educational Administration and the Municipal and Provincial
Government.
1) Rationale
The Education Law stipulates that the mayor or governor, who represents the
municipal or provincial Government, becomes an ex-officio member of, and the
chairman of the municipal or provincial board of education (Article 15.) Article 30
empowers him to veto approval on issues which impose excessive financial burdens on
people. Although this provision is intended to ensure on organic relationship between
educational and general administration under the present system, it may encroach
somewhat on the autonomy of the board of education, when it serves parliamentary
functions in its true sense. On the other hand, claim for the absolute independence of
educational administration from general administration may create an insurmountable
barrier between the two, excluding the possibility of cooperation. There is need to
establish an institutional mechanism ensuring fiscal responsibility and still effecting
cooperation and coordination. A cooperative relation is ensured when functional division
is legally provided to delineate the scope of responsibility.
2) Strategies
a. By having the superintendent and the governor or mayor as ex-officio members
of the board of education, it is possible to establish a cooperative relation between
the board of education and the municipal or provincial government. Repealing the
provision which appoints the mayor or the governor to be the chairman of the
board of education would make it possible to put the two entities on a part in
status. The chairman should be elected by vote among the board members.
b. The provincial board of education should be empowered to initiate the legislation
of provisions or acts related to education regarding the local district’s board of
education, while having the power to repeal the provision which empowers the
mayor or governor to veto it.
c. The local civil assembly should be empowered to elect the board of education
members and review special financial accounts of education legislates specific
policy measures and oversees personnel management. The functional division
should be stipulated by law. This will remove the possibility of feuds and effect
cooperation between the two entities, while enabling each to maintain autonomy
and independence from the others.
d. Steps should be taken to stabilize the financing of local education as the
prerequisite for regional planning for educational development and the
formulation and implementation of policy measures. This demands that the local
government be responsible for a greater share of the financial requirement. The
financial responsibility of the local government should be specified in law in
terms of proportion by component. The board of education is responsible for (1)
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the salary of secondary school teachers in its entirety (Seoul) and 50 percent of it
in other major cities, (2) the purchase of land for schools, and (3) the construction
of social education facilities, including public libraries, gymnasiums and youth
centers.
D. School-centered Management
1) Rationale
The present administrative system places primary and middle schools under the
supervision of the district office of education, high school under the supervision of the
provincial board of education, and colleges and universities under the Ministry of
Education. Orders and directives are the major medium of control by administrative
authorities. Since the issuance of orders is not bound by law, there is a strong tendency
among administrators to overuse them as a means for control and supervision, To make it
worse, they are blamed for touching on trifling matters which are the concern of the
school. Unnecessarily frequent reliance on orders undermines the autonomy of the
school. Putting an end to this is a must for heightening the professionalism of teachers
and administrators. The operation of the school should be dependent on the spontaneous
and creative participation of teachers.
The way in which the school is operated has a direct bearing on education.
From this viewpoint, the importance of autonomy and of democratic procedures is
highlighted at the school level, since they make indelible imprints on the minds of
students in the formative stage.

a.

b.
c.

d.

e.

(2) Strategies
The administrative authorities should reduce orders to the minimum while giving
the school principals full autonomy. The school is the place where most learning
actually takes place, and autonomy will motivate principals to be creative in
managing their schools. Autonomy will also contribute to flexibility in
organizing education programs in view of local needs.
Educational programs and the styles of administration should have the consensus
of teachers or faculty members.
Extra-curricular activities should be reorganized to improve the self governing
ability of students. These activities should be comprehensive enough to acquaint
students with the democratic process of decision-making, participation
awareness, and leadership skill.
To effect cooperation between school and the community, the dormant role of the
P.T.A. should be reactivated. In this connection, it is essential that the school
keep its door open to the local community so that their voices are heard in the
management of the school.
The lump-sum funding system, which presently applies to small schools having
less than 24 classes, should be extended to all schools. This will give each school
flexibility in school management, free it from frequent calls for reporting the
financial status, and relieve the pressure for meeting the deadline of the calendar
year.
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f.

As a means to break schools loose form the rigid control of the administrative
authorities, they should be encouraged to introduce the Management by
Objectives system for school management. This system not only enables schools
to assess their performance against goals, but inspires competitiveness among
schools, which leads to higher efficiency of school management.
g. School administrators should have ready access to training programs which
enhance their professional performance.
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